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Abstract 
In this thesis I develop a virtue-theoretic conception of critical thinking. I argue that many 
conceptions of critical thinking have conflated “critical thinking” with “good thinking”. In 
contrast to other intellectual pursuits, I identify critical thinking as its own activity which aims 
at the achievement and maintenance of intellectual autonomy. I identify the constitutive virtues 
of critical thinking as conscientiousness, self-awareness, and prudent wariness. I argue that 
virtues require internal success, and intellectual autonomy is the achievement of the external 
success of the critical thinking virtues. It is a mistake to consider other virtues or character 
traits involving moral or cooperative behaviour as constitutive of critical thinking, though 
these may be ancillary virtues and useful to foster alongside the virtues of critical thinking. 
The conception I offer in this thesis suggests a solution to concerns regarding transfer of 
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Introduction 
In chapter 1, I discuss several attempts to define critical thinking. Early skills-based 
conceptions of critical thinking have been criticised for not including dispositional 
components. Although dispositional components have since been added, these need to be 
coordinated with good aims—a critical thinker should be one who is disposed to act in a certain 
way. I provide an overview of Robert Ennis’ conceptions of critical thinking to show his 
responses to criticism of this kind over time. I identify two types of approaches towards 
defining critical thinking in the literature—approaches that build up the idea of the ideal 
critical thinker in terms of relevant skills and dispositions, and others that hold the ideal critical 
thinker as fundamental. I argue that the former of these approaches ultimately results in long 
lists of skills or dispositions that are incoherent. The latter approach is shared with virtue 
theory; I argue that the critical thinking literature can be enriched by bringing it into contact 
with virtue theory in general, and virtue epistemology in particular. 
 A recurring concern in the critical thinking literature is whether what is taught in a 
critical thinking class can transfer to other contexts. Some critical thinking theorists, though 
not explicitly encouraging the idea that instruction in critical thinking is a panacea to most 
intellectual woes, at least provide conceptions that allow others to draw this inference. This 
has led to the ‘critical thinking debate’, where critics of critical thinking have argued that these 
claims are overpromising at best and empty at worst. This debate began in the 1980s and has 
continued since. I present both sides and suggest that a virtue theoretic approach offers a 
promising way of resetting the discussion.  
In chapter 2, I provide an overview of virtue epistemology. I distinguish between 
virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, and show that Jason Baehr’s sub-category of weak 
autonomous virtue reliabilism provides the scope for using the concepts of virtue to investigate 
intellectual activity beyond the traditional concerns of epistemology. It is in this category that 
the main argument of this thesis is situated. I contrast two approaches to the definition of 
virtuous acts; those that require success and those that do not. I argue that a middle-ground is 
missed by both: if a virtue is a trait that we admire and that is worth having, then in possessing 
it we must succeed in expressing the virtue in a way that would be reliable under normal 
circumstances. This does not mean we have to achieve the end of the virtue in order to act 
virtuously or rightly, but that we must both intend to act and succeed in acting with a specific 
sort of excellence. This is a teleological conception of virtue, but one that does not tie virtuous 
action directly to an accomplishment of the telos of the virtue. I also address the situationist 
claim that virtues play less of a causal role than the environment in producing acts of 
intellectual goodness. I argue that these claims fail. They are largely based on poor 
interpretations of unreliable studies which, despite situationists’ claims otherwise, involve 
manipulations of non-epistemically-irrelevant variables. 
In chapter 3, I seek to discover the aim of critical thinking. The virtues of critical 
thinking are teleological, and in elaborating upon this claim I need to describe a plausible 
picture of the telos of these virtues. I compare critical thinking to other intellectual pursuits. I 
argue that the aims of critical thinking differ from those of scientific inquiry, as the scientist 
operates in an environment in which there is an intellectual division of labour that succeeds 
best when individual scientists pursue hypotheses in a somewhat uncritical manner. Similarly, 
a community of inquiry aims at reaching consensus, or a sociable reasoned judgement. These 
aims are at times opposed to critical thinking. Communities of inquiry do not thrive when 
every member of the community acts purely as a critical thinker. Communities of inquiry must 
provide a safe place for bad ideas to get a long run—if only for the sake of the community. I 
argue that, by contrast to communities of enquiry and scientific pursuit, critical thinking has 
the individualistic aim of achieving intellectual autonomy. Critical thinking aims at one being 
one’s own intellectual person. To be a successful critical thinker, I argue, is to form beliefs 
that are truly one’s own; it is to succeed in not being fooled either by others or by oneself.  
In chapter 4, I seek to find the virtues that are contributive to the aim of intellectual 
autonomy. I argue that one is intellectually autonomous insofar as one achieves the aims of 
three virtues: self-awareness, prudent wariness, and conscientiousness. I name these the 
critical thinking virtues. One is a critical thinker insofar as one has these virtues; possession 
of these virtues requires us to intend to act for the good of intellectual autonomy, and reliably 
act in a way that would achieve this good in ordinary circumstances. I describe virtues, such 
as open-mindedness, that supervene on the fundamental virtues of critical thinking, and other 
virtues that tend to be causally productive but non constitutive of intellectual autonomy. 
Honesty is an example of such a virtue. 
In chapter 5, I show the implications of conceiving critical thinking as a set of virtues 
that aim at intellectual autonomy. I argue that providing a telos for critical thinking virtues 
answers concerns about the incoherence of long, seemingly ad hoc lists of the skills and 
dispositions of critical thinking. Skills are a necessary component of critical thinking as these 
allow for the successful exemplification of the virtues of critical thinking. Thinking of critical 
thinking as a set of virtues accounts for two types of dispositions: those that motivate people 
to act irrespective of the good and those that involve acting towards a good. I show that this 
approach provides a rich framing of critical thinking classes—skills have a place, but they are 
being taught to achieve a particular goal. The skills associated with critical thinking provide 
many powers. Some of these are beneficial, such as an increased ability to write logical essays 
and make persuasive speeches; some are harmful, such as the increased ability to deceive 
others. These considerations lead to two trends in critical thinking conceptions which I argue 
are mistaken. It is wrong to define critical thinking in terms of its beneficial side-effects: 
critical thinking is neither argument analysis nor written composition; and it is conceptually 
wrong to add moralistic components to the conception of critical thinking to curtail the 
unwanted side-effects of having students misapply their skills. It is fine to practically focus on 
these side-effects in a critical thinking course. If a critical thinking course occurs at the 
beginning of an undergraduate degree, then it is sensible to show how the skills of critical 
thinking can also help in academic work; furthermore, a responsible teacher will encourage 
students use their critical powers for good. It does not follow that in teaching critical thinking 
we are teaching academic skills or moral virtue.  
Finally, in chapter 6, I return to the critical thinking debate and show that defining 
critical thinking as a set of virtues avoids common arguments against the transfer of critical 
thinking skills outside of the classroom. Virtues are stable character traits and the critical 
thinking virtues are not strongly tied to subject-specific knowledge; they aim at intellectual 
autonomy. Even though the challenge of maintaining intellectual autonomy varies greatly from 
context to context, the goal of maintaining intellectual autonomy always remains the same. 
This allows the skills of critical thinking to transfer to many contexts where the issue of 
intellectual autonomy is vital, but does not imply that possessing the skills of a critical thinker 
will automatically furnish one with an excellent legal mind or give one the facility to assess 
complex scientific argument.  
The aim of this thesis is to develop a conception of critical thinking that does not 
conflate it with good thinking. If critical thinking is defined as a set of skills and dispositions 
which produce good thinkers, then it meets resistance by those who argue that good thinking 
skills in one area differ too much from another to allow for transfer. Furthermore, attempts to 
define critical thinking in terms of the virtues have tended to include more virtues than are 
needed. These unnecessary additions tend to be virtues that encourage intellectually-moral 
behaviour. Furthermore, an undue focus on the moral leads to missing those virtues that 
encourage sceptical thought—with the worry that a focus on sceptical virtues may lead to 
‘egocentric’, or ethically-bad thinking. I offer a deflationary conception that identifies critical 
thinking as its own intellectual activity, with its own goal. A critical thinker is not one who 
can solve every problem in every field, or who has every intellectual or moral virtue, rather 
she is one who has the virtues required to think for herself. 
  
1. Attempts to define critical thinking 
In this section, I outline the early attempts to conceptualise critical thinking and distinguish 
between two methodological approaches: those that are act-based and those that are agent-
based. By identifying difficulties with act-based approaches I support the claim that the 
concept of critical thinking will benefit from the agent-based approach found in virtue 
epistemology. These difficulties in act-based approaches arise as they seek to build up a picture 
of the critical thinker by providing lists of requisite or ideal characteristics of behaviours. I 
show how these attempts vacillate between incompleteness and incoherence; that they cannot 
help either failing to list enough critical thinking characteristics or becoming confused—or 
even circular—if they add too many.  
1.1 Ennis’ ‘A Concept of Critical Thinking 
Robert H. Ennis’ 1962 A Concept of Critical Thinking marks the first attempt to systematically 
analyse what was, at the time, a relatively nascent term.1 Ennis notes that although ‘critical 
thinking’ had entered the educational lexicon, only its components had received analysis—
logic within logic textbooks, thinking from psychology and rationality from philosophy.2 
Ennis’ work is important, not only as it was the first of its kind, but also because it attracted a 
great deal of later criticism. Since 1962, Ennis has continued to revise and clarify his early 
position in response to this criticism and in the light of empirical evidence gathered from tests 
developed from this early conception.  
The early Ennis defines critical thinking as ‘the correct assessing of statements.’3 He 
notes that this definition originates from B. Othanel Smith, who, unlike Ennis, does not 
distinguish between incorrect and correct assessing of statements, but rather maintains that one 
1 Robert H Ennis, “A Concept of Critical Thinking,” Harvard Educational Review 32, no. 1 (1962): 
81–111. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 83. 
is ‘engaged in… critical thinking’ when one attempts to seek the meaning of a statement, and 
decide if it should be accepted.4 It is important to note that Ennis gives no argument for 
accepting this definition, but acknowledges this and asserts this is not his focus. Instead, he 
claims to be interested in outlining the aspects of critical thinking that may provide directions 
for education and further research.5  
Despite caveats as to the exploratory nature of the work, Ennis has been criticised for 
his lack of justification for the definition he advances and for focusing his conceptual analysis 
only on requisite skills.6 The lack of justification exposes Ennis to possibly unfavourable 
interpretations. John McPeck, for example, identifies an ambiguity in Ennis’ use of ‘correct’. 
It may be interpreted either as the right way of going about assessing statements or being right 
in one’s assessment. McPeck writes: 
It seems that by the word ‘correct’ Ennis must mean ‘being right’ in the sense of not being 
mistaken or of possessing the truth. That is, Ennis is advancing a formal or absolute notion of 
critical thinking that permits of neither degrees nor mistakes… Clearly, then, Ennis’s view of 
critical thinking is just wrong.7 
For McPeck, not allowing critical thinking to admit of degrees is a mistake, and the source of 
the definition, Smith, had it right by not embedding ‘correctness’ into his definition. McPeck 
seems to not actually believe that the ‘being right’ interpretation is the meaning Ennis 
intended, and grants him the benefit of the doubt (but not before a good deal of criticism for 
possibly holding this view).8 
4 B. Othanel Smith, ‘The Improvement of Critical Thinking,’ Progressive Education, 5 (1953), as cited 
in Ennis ‘A Concept of Critical Thinking.’, 83. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See John E McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); and 
Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education (New York: 
Routledge, 1988). 
7 McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education., 43. 
8 McPeck writes on page 43: ‘It seems that by the word ‘correct’ Ennis must mean ‘being right’ in the 
sense of not being mistaken or of possessing the truth.’ then disagrees with himself on page 45: ‘Let 
us assume… that Ennis means that one must be correct not in the sense of right, but rather in the sense 
that one goes through certain prescribed procedures in thinking.’ 
1.1.1 Ennis’ aspects and dimensions of critical thinking 
With correctness engrained in his conception, Ennis understands that there are many ways in 
which the assessment of statements can go wrong, and thus presents a list of twelve aspects as 
ways to avoid these ‘common pitfalls’.9 Ennis’ twelve aspects of critical thinking are:  
1. Grasping the meaning of a statement.  
2. Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.  
3. Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.  
4. Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.  
5. Judging whether a statement is specific enough.  
6. Judging whether a statement is actually the application of a certain principle.  
7. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable. 
8. Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.  
9. Judging whether the problem has been identified.  
10. Judging whether something is an assumption.  
11. Judging whether a definition is adequate.  
12. Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.10 
According to Ennis, these aspects are said to fit into one or all of three dimensions of critical 
thinking: the logical dimension (a dimension that involves understanding logical operators and 
basic terms within a field); the criterial dimension (knowledge of certain criteria involved in 
the application of one of the twelve aspects); and the pragmatic dimension (knowing whether 
a judgement is acceptable).11 Of these dimensions, the criterial dimension is perhaps the most 
unclear. Though it is largely left unexplained, Ennis provides examples of ‘criteria for judging 
statements’ throughout his explication of the aspects of critical thinking.12 For example, for 
the aspect Judging whether an observation statement is reliable to be satisfied, Ennis writes 
that the following criteria must be met: 
7.1   Observation statements tend to be more reliable if the observer: 
7.11 Was unemotional, alert, and disinterested. 
7.12 Was skilled at observing the sort of thing observed.  
7.13 Had sensory equipment that was in good condition. 
7.14 Has a reputation for veracity. 
7.15 Used precise techniques. 
9 Ennis, ‘A Concept of Critical Thinking.’, 83. 
10 Ibid., 84. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 85. 
7.16 Had no preconception about the way the observation would turn out.13 
It seems that satisfying the criterial dimension would require an agent to have satisfied similar 
sorts of criteria, though this is not explicitly stated. Nor is it stated whether the lists provided 
are absolute and exhaustive, whether these are criteria that need to be met, or whether they are 
simply rules of thumb.  
Ennis has also been criticised by Peter Rogers for conflating formal logic and the logic 
that inheres in each field of knowledge. Rogers claims that placing logical operators and 
knowledge of field-determinate terminologies together in one category wrongly ‘runs together 
form and content’.14 In fact, a good deal of future debate around the concept of critical thinking 
is concerned with whether, or to what extent, separate fields have separate logics. However 
these debates resolve themselves, a weakness in Ennis’ early conception is that it suggests 
simple logical skills are sufficient for solving complex problems because ‘knowing the 
meaning of basic terms in a field’ has been placed in the same category as understanding the 
difference between logical quantifiers.15 Rogers considers this placement ‘illicit… [f]or it 
implies that basic terms can be understood apart from study of their fields.’16 Besides the 
confusion created by placing these aspects under the same banner, by not making the 
distinction between rules which are consistent and applicable across all fields and rules that 
are unique to fields, Ennis has created conditions under which it is possible to lampoon critical 
thinking courses as naive attempts to improve proficiency in every field of knowledge.  
The critical thinking aspects advanced by the early Ennis are also seen by others to be 
problematic. First, they are problematic in themselves. Grasping the meaning of a statement 
is obviously necessary before one can think critically about it, but is this to say that 
comprehension is an instance of critical thinking? Second, the list is problematic in its 
13 Ibid., 90. 
14 Peter Rogers, “‘Discovery’, Learning, Critical Thinking, and the Nature of Knowledge,” British 
Journal of Educational Studies 38, no. 1 (1990): 3–14., 5. 
15 Ennis, ‘A Concept of Critical Thinking.’, 85. 
16 Rogers, ‘‘Discovery’, Learning, Critical Thinking, and the Nature of Knowledge.’, 6. 
methodology; Ennis’ specification of aspects of critical thinking represents, as Harvey Siegel 
observes, a ‘pure skills’ approach to critical thinking.17 This approach misses an important 
ingredient: a disposition to use these skills. The problem with a pure skills approach, according 
to Siegel, is that it would allow the success of an education in critical thinking to be measured 
by how well students can perform on the type of exams given in a critical thinking subject, 
and this neglects the importance of application outside the subject—the very point of a critical 
thinking class.18 
However, Siegel admits this criticism of Ennis may be unfair; it is obvious that skills 
require application, and Ennis is unlikely to have missed this point. Siegel reports that Ennis, 
in private correspondence, holds that his list of skills is the lists of skills involved in critical 
thinking, rather than what is necessary to be a critical thinker.19 Matthew Lipman later notes 
this distinction in extant attempts to define critical thinking. There are obvious connections 
between the critical thinker and critical thinking and Lipman states that ‘[t]he similarities may 
be so strong that we lose any sense we had of the thinker and the thinking being two separate 
things.’20 It is important, however, to resolve this ambiguity as although the thinker and the 
thinking may be similar, the conceptual approaches are importantly different depending on 
which is considered fundamental. In this thesis, I label these approaches as agent-based and 
act-based. Those, like Ennis, who conceive the critical thinker as derivative from critical 
thinking see their task as providing an analysis of the necessary components of critical 
thinking. In this act-based approach, defining critical thinking as a list of abilities would be 
appropriate. The list of abilities do not yet describe critical thinking but they are components 
of critical thinking that can be described independently of personal attributes, and from these 
17 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 6. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)., 
61. Lipman claims to have resolved the problems caused by this ambiguity by providing a conception 
of critical thinking that works for both the critical thinker and the thinking. 
the concept of a critical thinker is built up. In contrast, those who conceive critical thinking in 
terms of the critical thinker see their task as providing a description of a type of person. This 
approach is agent-based. In this section I explore the differences between these two 
methodologies.  
In 1987, conscious of the criticism of his definition as being too focussed on skills, 
Ennis revised his definition of critical thinking from ‘the correct assessment of statements’ to 
‘reasonable reflective thinking that is focussed on deciding what to believe or do’.21 It is from 
this definition that he characterises an ideal critical thinker. The characterisation is done by 
way of a list of abilities and dispositions the ideal critical thinker is expected to have. This list, 
shown in full in Appendix 1, later evolved into the ‘streamlined characterization’ provided 
below in Table 1: 
  
21 Robert H Ennis, ‘A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Abilitites and Dispositions,’ in Teaching 
Thinking Skills, ed. J Baron and R Sternberg (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1987), 9–26., 10. 
Table 1: Ennis’ 1991 ‘streamlined characterization’ of the ideal critical thinker22 
Working Definition: ‘Critical thinking’ means reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to 
believe or do. 
Given this definition, the ideal critical thinker can be roughly characterized by the following interdependent and 
somewhat-overlapping set of twelve dispositions and sixteen abilities. All twelve dispositions and the first twelve 
abilities are offered as constitutive of the ideal critical thinker. The last four abilities (here called ‘auxiliary abilities’) 
are helpful and generally needed by the ideal critical thinker. 
A. Dispositions of the ideal critical thinker: 
1. to be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise communicated 
2. to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question 
3. to take into account the total situation 
4. to seek and offer reasons 
5. to try to be well informed 
6. to look for alternatives 
7. to seek as much precision as the situation requires 
8. to try to be reflectively aware of one’s own basic beliefs 
9. to be open-minded and consider seriously other points of view than one’s own 
10. to withhold judgment when the evidence and reasons are insufficient 
11. to take a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so 
12. to use one’s critical thinking abilities 
 
B. Abilities of the ideal critical thinker: 
(The first five items involve clarification.) 
1. to identify the focus (the issue, question, or conclusion) 
2. to analyze arguments 
3. to ask and answer questions of clarification and/or challenge 
4. to define terms, judge definitions, and deal with equivocation 
5. to identify unstated assumptions 
(The next two involve the basis for the decision.) 
6. to judge the credibility of a source 
7. to observe, and judge observation reports 
(The next three involve inference.) 
8. to deduce, and judge deductions 
9. to induce, and judge inductions 
a) to generalisations 
b) to explanatory conclusions (including hypotheses) 
10. to make and judge value judgments 
(The next two are metacognitive abilities—involving supposition and integration.) 
11. to consider and reason from premises, reasons, assumptions, positions, and other propositions 
with which one disagrees or about which one is in doubt—without letting the disagreement or 
doubt interfere with one’s thinking (‘suppositional thinking’) 
12. to integrate the other abilities and dispositions in making and defending a decision 
(The next four are auxiliary critical thinking abilities—having them is not constitutive of being a critical 
thinker.) 
13. to proceed in an orderly manner appropriate to the situation, for example, 
a) to follow problem solving steps 
b) to monitor one’s own thinking 
c) to employ a reasonable critical thinking checklist 
14. to be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication of others 
15. to employ appropriate rhetorical strategies in discussion and presentation (orally and in writing) 
16. to employ and react to ‘fallacy’ labels in an appropriate manner 
  
22 Robert H Ennis, ‘Critical Thinking: A Streamlined Conception,’ Teaching Philosophy 14, no. 1 
(1991): 5–24., 8-9. 
1.1.2 Ennis’ dispositions 
Ennis attempts to move away from a ‘pure skills’ approach by adding critical thinking 
dispositions to his list of abilities. By describing critical thinking in terms of the type of 
motivations and abilities a critical thinker possesses, Ennis leaves gaps. I argue that these gaps 
are indicative of a danger with the act-based approach: those who take an act-based approach 
are faced with the complicated analytical task to provide a description of skills and dispositions 
that avoids inadequacy.  
Ennis’ auxiliary critical thinking abilities are interesting. He describes them as ‘not 
constitutive of being a critical thinker,’ but considering the contrapositive undermines this 
description: if someone does not monitor his own thinking, follow problem-solving steps or 
employ and react to ‘fallacy labels’ in an appropriate manner, it would be unfitting to call him 
an ideal critical thinker. According to Ennis, abilities 13, 15 and 16 involve ‘appropriate’ 
application, and this is also implicit in ability 14. Numbers 13(b) and 14, however, seem better 
placed in his list of dispositions. Ennis’ depiction of ideal critical thinkers fails to include the 
qualificatory ‘appropriate’ he found necessary to add to his auxiliary critical thinking abilities 
and this is puzzling. Why does reacting to fallacy labels require appropriateness conditions, 
when asking challenging questions does not? Fruitful dialogue can be easily derailed by an ill-
timed or pedantic challenging question just as easily as it can by an unfair challenge of fallacy. 
It is my contention that Ennis’ dispositions are deficient in that they do not all specify 
appropriateness conditions. Consider number 1, the disposition to be clear about the intended 
meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise communicated. Clarity is undoubtedly 
important—someone who is obscure in order to hide a deficiency in her arguments would not 
be an ideal critical thinker. Nor would one be an ideal critical thinker if, under pressure, one 
resorted to the use of jargon in order to keep others at a distance, making them fearful of 
appearing an amateur in an area of high technicality. Therefore, the disposition to be clear is 
rightfully found in those we call critical thinkers. However, this disposition should not be 
exercised at the cost of crudity. During a debate, one should not wish to be obscure for the 
sake of being obscure, but one may find it necessary to be subtle and complicated so as to not 
misrepresent the argument. In many cases, expounding a position in a clear manner would not 
do it justice, and in these cases, the ideal critical thinker may deem it necessary to be nuanced 
or find it is useful to say something that has a number of meanings. A critical thinker is not 
one who is always clear, but one who knows when it is appropriate to be clear and when it is 
appropriate to use language that is suggestive and rich, and possibly imprecise. 
Dispositions 2 and 3 can be treated together, since each reminds us that a critical 
thinker should not be disposed too much in one direction: if one is only disposed to focus on 
the question, one may miss fruitful paths of inquiry which may greater aid in illumination of 
a problem; if one is always disposed to take into account the whole situation, then one may 
fail to pay attention to specifics or applications when it is here that attention should be directed. 
Instead, dispositions 2 and 3 should be seen as opposing ends of a spectrum, and by placing 
them together Ennis seems to be gesturing towards this. At times a critical thinker must 
maintain focus on the conclusion or question, and at other times a critical thinker should take 
into account the total situation. Again we can see that an ideal critical thinker is not someone 
who is disposed to act in these ways, but one who is disposed to act in these ways when it is 
appropriate to do so. The fact that these activities are at points opposed is particularly 
problematic without added appropriateness-conditions. In cases in which a person were to 
maintain focus on the conclusion to the detriment of taking into account the entire situation, 
we would not be able to determine whether she was a critical thinker also without taking into 
consideration the context, and whether it is appropriate to do one and not the other.  
The disposition to be open-minded (number 9), also suffers from the lack of a 
qualificatory ‘when appropriate.’ If open-minded means being receptive to good reasons, what 
sort of receptivity is required? If open-mindedness means being willing to listen to, consider, 
investigate and eventually assess reasons that have the potential to be good reasons, then 
nobody has the energy or time to be fully open-minded. An ideal critical thinker, rather, knows 
when it is appropriate to follow up a line of reasoning. They are firm when appropriate and 
know when it is appropriate to consider an objection seriously. One who relentlessly considers 
objections, no matter how frivolous, is not an ideal critical thinker. Open-mindedness is 
certainly a good quality to display, but only when it is appropriate; there are many contexts 
where it presents an impediment to critical thinking. These will be discussed in chapter 3. 
Moreover, we can see that even the disposition to use one’s critical thinking abilities 
obviously requires warning that one should not always be disposed to do so. Those who teach 
critical thinking know all too well what it is like to have students misapply and over-apply 
their newly-fledged critical thinking abilities in situations that are inappropriate. An ideal 
critical thinker would know when it is right to passively accept information, when it is proper 
to accuse others of fallacy, and when it is best to ignore minor mistakes to get a better 
understanding of the whole.  
Ennis alters his list of dispositions again in 1996 (see Table 2 and Table 3) which show 
he is not satisfied with his 1991 list. Importantly, he modifies the disposition involving clarity 
to include the caveat to ‘seek as much precision as the situation requires’ (which can be 
interpreted as an addition of an appropriateness condition). The 1991 ability 13(b), to monitor 
one’s thinking, previously mentioned as more suitable in a list of dispositions, is added to them 
in 1996 in the form of the disposition to ‘[b]e reflectively aware of their own basic beliefs.’ 
Some dispositions listed in 1987 are rightly omitted (such as 4, the disposition to use and 
mention credible sources) and 1996’s disposition to be open-minded is split so as to claim that 
one should be open-minded both to alternatives and positions other than one’s own. These 
changes are better seen as Ennis wrestling with the inherent problem of dividing a 
characteristic into its attendant necessary traits rather than as indecision. The changes show he 
is concerned that he has not completely got things right.  
Table 2: Ennis’ critical thinking dispositions from 1987 to 1996 
1987 23 1991 24 1996 25 
1. Seek a clear statement of the thesis or question  1. To be clear about the intended meaning of what 
is said, written, or otherwise communicated 
1. Care that their beliefs be true, and that their decisions be justified; that is, care to ‘get 
it right’ to the extent possible, or at least care to do the best they can. This includes the 
interrelated dispositions to do the following: 
2. Seek reasons  
 
2. To determine and maintain focus on the 
conclusion or question 
A. Seek alternatives (hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources), and be 
open to them; 
3. Try to be well informed  
 
3. To take into account the total situation B. Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by 
the information that is available; 
4. Use and mention credible sources  4. To seek and offer reasons C. Be well-informed; and  
5. Take into account the total situation  5. To try to be well informed D. Seriously consider points of view other than their own. 
6. Try to remain relevant to the main point 6. To look for alternatives 2. Represent a position honestly and clearly (theirs as well as others’). This includes the 
dispositions to do the following: 
7. Keep in mind the original and/or basic concern  7. To seek as much precision as the situation 
requires 
A. Be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise 
communicated, seeking as much precision as the situation requires; 
8. Look for alternatives  8. To try to be reflectively aware of one’s own 
basic beliefs 
B. Determine, and maintain focus on, the conclusion or question; 
9. Be open-minded  9. To be open-minded and consider seriously other 
points of view than one’s own 
C. Seek and offer reasons; 
a) Consider seriously other points of view than one’s 
own (dialogical thinking)  
10. To withhold judgment when the evidence and 
reasons are insufficient 
D. Take into account the total situation; and 
b) Reason from premises with which one disagrees - 
without letting the disagreement interfere with one’s 
reasoning (suppositional thinking)  
11. To take a position (and change a position) when 
the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so 
 
E. Be reflectively aware of their own basic beliefs. 
 
c) Withhold judgement when the evidence and 
reasons are insufficient 
12. To use one’s critical thinking abilities 3. Care about the dignity and worth of every person. This includes the dispositions to: 
10. Take a position (and change a position) when the 
evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so  
 
A. Discover and listen to others' view and reasons; 
11. Seek as much precision as the subject permits  
 
B. Take into account others 'feelings and level of understanding, avoiding 
intimidating or confusing others with their critical thinking prowess; and 
12. Deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a complex 
whole 
 
C. Be concerned about others' welfare. 
13. Use one’s critical thinking abilities   
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and 
degree of sophistication of others 
  
23 Ennis, ‘A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Abilitites and Dispositions.’ 
24 Ennis, ‘Critical Thinking: A Streamlined Conception.’ 
25 Robert H Ennis, ‘Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability,’ Informal Logic 18, no. 1996 (1996): 165–182. 
Table 3: Tracking Ennis’ critical thinking dispositions from 1987 to 1996 
1996 
1. Care that their beliefs be true, and that 
their decisions be justified; that is, care to 
‘get it right’ to the extent possible, or at least 
care to do the best they can. This includes the 
interrelated dispositions to do the following:  
 2. Represent a position honestly and clearly 
(theirs as well as others’). This includes the 
dispositions to do the following: 
 3. Care about the dignity and worth of every 
person. This includes the dispositions to: 
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Despite some improvements over time, a major problem with Ennis’ attempt to 
characterise an ideal critical thinker in terms of dispositions and abilities remains: dividing 
attributes of an ideal critical thinker into lists of dispositions and lists of abilities means that 
these attributes must interact properly together and be coordinated with the right sense of 
success. It is easy to imagine situations in which the dispositions and abilities are misapplied, 
or applied by someone we would not consider an ideal critical thinker. For example, if the 
items on Ennis’ list are to be applied as rules, then those who rigorously apply Ennis’ rule of 
open-mindedness would be forced into the undesirable position of fully investigating the bona 
fides of an objection any time somebody approaches them. Taken as rules, Ennis’ dispositions 
are impossible to follow all at once—there are times where considering the views of others is 
less important than being clear and focussing on the question at hand. 
I defend a virtue epistemic approach to the conception of critical thinking. A virtue 
epistemic approach has two immediate benefits. First, the direction of analysis in virtue theory 
is clear: processes are derivative of agents, rather than vice versa. Second, virtue epistemology 
provides a teleological conception of critical thinking dispositions; identifying the aim of 
critical thinking allows us to both determine its constitutive features and describe how they 
interact with each other. If we conceive the ideal critical thinker as one who has certain 
intellectual virtues, such as open-mindedness, self-awareness, and prudent wariness, then 
problems concerning the appropriateness of blindly or foolishly following rules are properly 
identified and acknowledged. Ennis (and others who are inclined to provide act-based lists of 
these sorts) may believe that a teleological account of the attributes of a critical thinker may 
beg all the important questions and not be sufficiently analytic; that adding ‘when it is 
appropriate’ to a list of traits is unhelpful or possibly illicit. However, attempting to build the 
portrait of a critical thinker or the process of thinking critically with a non-teleological analysis 
of critical thinking dispositions is not going to work: the dispositions may clash or not 
coordinate properly; in some contexts they may function where in others they may not; and 
their application is often, if not always, dependent on a kind of golden mean—too much open-
mindedness, and concern for others’ welfare can be a bad thing.  
1.2 Passmore’s ‘critical spirit’ 
John Passmore, when defining what it means to be critical, avoids lists and concludes that we 
call someone critical if they have a critical spirit. Although Passmore does not specifically 
provide an analysis of critical thinking, a term he eschews, it is a valuable treatment of the 
character traits of those we call critical.26 His analysis, though not a response to Ennis, can be 
seen as a prescient concern for the direction in which Ennis and later theorists were headed.  
1.2.1 Teaching a student to be critical 
Passmore argues that teaching a student to be critical obviously ‘is not a matter of imparting 
facts,’ and it also is not something that can come from a process of drill, since ‘[a] person can 
be drilled into uttering stock criticisms.’27 For example, Passmore states that a person has not 
been taught to be critical if he has been drilled so that ‘whenever he hears a certain type of 
philosophical view put forward, [he states] “That’s nineteenth-century materialism,” or 
“That’s old-fashioned rationalism.”’28  
Passmore considers whether teaching a student to be critical involves the teaching of 
skills. He shows that it would be at least hypothetically possible for a student to learn all of 
the exercises in a critical thinking textbook but not to apply these associated skills in an 
external setting. Again, this student, according to Passmore, would not be critical. Instead, 
Passmore holds that 
‘Being critical’ is, indeed, more like the sort of thing we call a ‘character trait’ than it is like a 
skill. To call a person ‘critical’ is to characterize him, to describe his nature, in a sense in which 
to describe him, simply, as ‘capable of analysing certain kinds of fallacy’ is not to describe his 
26 Passmore, ‘On Teaching to Be Critical.’, 33. 
27 Ibid., 25. 
28 Ibid., 26. 
nature. It is a natural answer to the question ‘What kind of person is he?’ to reply ‘Very 
critical’, when it would not be a natural answer that the person in question is a skilful driver.29 
Again, we find an important difference here between critical thinking and being a critical 
thinker. Passmore demonstrates that although critical thinking is a necessary and regular 
activity of the critical thinker, the former it is not in itself sufficient for the latter. He continues 
to illuminate the distinction: critical thinking is capable of being misused, such as how the 
‘expert in the detection of fallacies can use his skill in order to conceal the fallacies in his own 
case, by drawing attention away from them.’ 30  According to Passmore, one can have 
sophisticated critical thinking skills without being in any way a critical thinker. In fact, as was 
mentioned before, Passmore worries that critical thinking ‘may suggest nothing more than the 
capacity to think up objections.’31 Passmore gives further insight as to why Ennis’ disposition 
to use one’s critical thinking abilities is problematic: being disposed to use one’s critical 
thinking abilities is not the best measure of whether one is critical, particularly if we take 
Passmore’s meaning—that one is disposed (and able) to think up objections. Clearly, what 
Ennis is reaching towards is that a person would not be much of a critical thinker if she were 
never tempted to use her abilities even if they were considerable. However, to thus insist that 
a critical thinker should exercise her critical thinking skills from time to time provides an 
incomplete picture—not incomplete in the sense that there are other dispositions that need to 
go alongside it, but incomplete in that it is missing an aim and, by being able to accommodate 
misuse, is lacking standards for proper use. In contrast, Passmore introduces the concept of 
the ‘critical spirit’—something which he says ‘cannot be misused’: 
No doubt those who possess [the critical spirit] may sometimes be led, as a result of their 
exercise of criticism, to abandon views, which are actually correct, as a just man can make a 
wrong decision, in virtue of being just, in a case where he would have made the right decision 
had he allowed partiality to sway him… But this is quite different from the case where a judge 
uses the sort of skill he has acquired as a judge in order to pervert the course of justice. The 
29 Ibid., 28. 
30 Ibid., 28. 
31 Ibid., 33. 
skills of a judge, or the skills of a critic, can be used or misused; justice or the critical spirit can 
be neither used nor misused. And this is because neither being just nor being critical is a skill.32 
There are multiple interpretations of ‘misuse’ that need to be drawn out. Consider three cases. 
First, the wit who cleverly employs ambiguous language in order to bring about a humorous 
result; second, the politician who cunningly uses ambiguous language to conceal a lie; third, 
the precocious critical thinking student, who is skilled in detecting arguments, but who 
exercises his skills at every possible turn, irritating interlocutors, and derailing valuable 
conversations in order to naggingly prove someone wrong. In each case, Ennis’ disposition to 
use one’s critical thinking abilities would be satisfied. He only avoids the implausible 
conclusion that every case could be called an instance of critical thinking because some 
contravene other critical thinking dispositions, such as to represent a position honestly; the wit 
would have been a critical thinker had he only used his skills to assess arguments instead of 
produce punch-lines; the politician would have been a critical thinker had he only used his 
skills to seek the truth; the precocious student would have been a critical thinker had he only 
chosen the right place and time to exercise his skills. 
We avoid this ‘had they only’ problem if we think of critical thinkers as certain types 
of people instead of people in possession of a set of dispositions that are capable of misuse. 
This is the value in Passmore’s conception of criticality as a character trait: being able to think 
up objections is only part of what it means to have the critical spirit. Our three cases may or 
may not be instances of Passmorean critical thinking; however, according to Passmore, none 
describe critical people, since none exemplify the critical spirit. The wit’s arena is critical 
thinking, but he is not the ideal critical thinker by Passmore’s judgement as he uses his logical 
skills to reach for a different goal. The politician survives on his use of critical thinking, but if 
he only uses her critical thinking skills to deceive, then, for Passmore, he is not the ideal critical 
thinker since he uses his skills to bring about a worthless end. The precocious student who 
overuses his critical thinking skills fails to be critical since he fails to control his abilities or 
32 Ibid., 28. 
judge which circumstances are appropriate or inappropriate for critical analysis. Passmore’s 
conception anticipates much of the critical thinking debate: by describing whether one is 
critical or not in terms of possessing a particular character trait, Passmore shows why attempts 
to engender it in students often fail.33 Skills lend themselves to teaching, but whether it is 
possible to change character through education has long been controversial. 
1.3 McPeck’s conception of critical thinking in Critical Thinking and 
Education 
John McPeck published his Critical Thinking and Education34 in 1981 and this became an 
influential criticism of not just Ennis, but of the entire critical thinking movement which had 
arisen in the years after Ennis’ initial work. McPeck’s work claims critical thinking is specific 
to subjects and that attempts to teach it as a standalone course are misguided. This book can 
be seen as the beginning of the ‘critical thinking debate;’ which pitches specifists, those (like 
McPeck) who hold that critical thinking cannot be taught outside a subject; against generalists, 
those, (like Ennis and Siegel) who hold that it can. McPeck builds a case against what he calls 
‘The Prevailing View of the Concept of Critical Thinking,’ and attacks conceptions by Ennis, 
Scriven, de Bono and others.35 It is unclear where McPeck would place Passmore. Passmore 
does agree that it is difficult to impart the critical spirit through teaching, since it is a character 
trait rather than a set of skills or habits; however, McPeck is not satisfied with this account: 
I do not think that John Passmore’s referring to this combination [of capacity and will] as a 
‘character trait’, is particularly helpful, since a character trait seems to consist in a more general 
disposition that applies across a wide variety of endeavours. In addition, a character trait 
connotes something more or less immutable in one’s personality that is largely affective in 
nature.36 
33 Ibid., 28. 
34 McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education. 
35 Ibid., 39. 
36 Ibid., 18. 
When we consider McPeck’s main thesis, that critical thinking cannot be taught in a standalone 
course and ‘[p]urporting to teach critical thinking… in isolation from specific fields or 
problem areas, is muddled nonsense,’ it becomes obvious why he disdains Passmore’s idea of 
an enduring trait that ‘applies across a wide variety of endeavours.’ The critical thinking debate 
will be examined later. As it is our current focus, we turn now to McPeck’s conception of 
critical thinking—and it is on this that his main thesis depends. 
1.3.1 McPeck’s Thinking is Always Thinking About X Argument (TIATAXA) 
McPeck begins his analysis of critical thinking by providing an analysis of thinking. He claims 
that  
… it is a matter of conceptual truth that thinking is always thinking about X, and that X can 
never be ‘everything in general’ but must always be something in particular. Thus the claim ‘I 
teach students to think’ is at worst false and at best misleading.37 
This argument is later referred to by many theorists, including John Andrews, who gives it a 
convenient acronym: the TIATAXA (Thinking Is Always Thinking About X Argument).38 After 
establishing the link between thinking and particular objects of thought, McPeck concludes 
that adding the adjective ‘critical’ simply describes the manner in which the thinking is 
performed. Thus,  
[t]he statement ‘I teach critical thinking’, simpliciter, is vacuous because there is no 
generalized skill properly called critical thinking.39 
For McPeck, this follows because ‘critical’ is an adjective like ‘creative’ and ‘precocious’; and 
it makes no sense to claim ‘I teach precocity’.40 
There are errors here that need to be brought out: ‘precocious’ does compare to 
‘critical’ in the sense that both are adjectives, but ‘critical thinking’ differs from ‘precocious 
37 Ibid., 4. 
38 JN Andrews, ‘General Thinking Skills: Are There Such Things?,’ Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 24, no. 1 (1990). 
39 McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education., 5. 
40 Ibid., 5. 
thinking’ in that the former has a history of use which makes the statement ‘I teach critical 
thinking’ meaningful. McPeck himself, three pages prior while lamenting the vagueness of the 
term critical thinking, noted that it has been used to describe a range of activities from ‘Latin 
to logic and clever puzzle games.’41 So if we allow the statement ‘I teach critical thinking’ to 
take on one of the meanings McPeck explicitly acknowledges, such as ‘I teach Latin’, then the 
statement makes perfect sense. (Whether teaching Latin is teaching critical thinking is beside 
the point.) A further concern is that in comparing his adjectives, McPeck does not state that ‘I 
teach precocious thinking’ makes no sense, but rather ‘I teach precocity’ makes no sense: 
removing ‘thinking’ renders the two statements awkward to compare. Finally, it makes no 
sense to teach either precocity or precocious thinking for special reasons to do with the very 
idea of precocity. Precocity is a capacity to pick something up with minimal instruction or to 
acquire skills much more easily, quickly and at a younger age than the average. Of course it 
cannot be taught. 
Perry Weddle observes that although thinking may always be about something, the 
conclusions McPeck draws from this do not necessarily apply to the composite term ‘critical 
thinking.’42 Weddle explains how to respond to a McPeckean challenge: 
So when to the remark, ‘I teach critical thinking,’ McPeck asks, ‘About what?’ one might well 
reply, ‘Not ‘about’ at all. Critical thinking is a subject; thinking isn’t. Critical thinking teaches 
such matters as the art of following and summarizing paths of reasoning, the art of arguing 
fairly and forcefully, and the art of not being swayed by sophistry. Its examples, from many 
fields are, of course, ‘about’; but its focus isn’t the subjects, it’s techniques for dealing with 
subjects in certain ways.’43 
Siegel, too, finds fault in McPeck’s TIATAXA, in that ‘it confuses thinking generally (i.e. as 
denoting a type of activity) with specific acts (i.e. tokens) or instances of thinking.’44 Although 
Weddle previously showed that the compound term need not take on that which is attributed 
to its parts, namely, thinking, Siegel’s response shows that although a single act of thinking is 
41 Ibid., 2. 
42 Perry Weddle, ‘McPeck’s Critical Thinking and Education,’ Informal Logic 6, no. 2 (1984): 23–25. 
43 Ibid., 24 (emphasis in original). 
44 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 19. 
inseparable from its subject, this is a token of thinking, and critical thinking describes a type. 
Whether providing students with instruction can increase the occurrence of this type of 
thinking is an empirical question to be considered later, but it is clearly not nonsense to have 
this instruction in mind when one states ‘I teach critical thinking.’ 
1.3.2 McPeck’s ‘reflective scepticism’ 
McPeck’s TIATAXA does not succeed; nonetheless, McPeck offers his own positive 
conception of critical thinking. He admits that it does make sense to speak of ‘critical thinking’ 
(though nonsense to speak the words ‘I teach critical thinking’). His line of reasoning for this: 
It has already been argued that thinking is always thinking about something-for example, some 
problem, activity or subject area. And only such things as problems, activities or subjects can 
be thought about critically. Critical thinking always manifests itself in connection with some 
identifiable activity or subject area and never in isolation. Consequently, just as there are 
innumerable activities and types of activity that can be thought about critically, so there are 
innumerable ways in which critical thinking can be manifested. Just as certain activities can be 
done well or poorly, so certain activities can be done critically or uncritically. There are many 
distinct types of behaviour that could count as ‘critical thinking behaviour’. In some instances, 
such behaviour might outwardly manifest itself in an act requiring physical strength, in others 
dexterity, perhaps most often in the assessment of statements of some kind.45 
It is important to note here the idea that manifestations of critical thinking vary with the 
activity, and the introduction of feats of strength as being possible instances of ‘critical 
thinking behaviour’ (as a contrast to Ennis’ ‘assessment of statements’). McPeck does hint 
that not every activity entails an attendant critical-thinking-manifestation ‘Given the large 
spectrum of activities that allow of critical thinking…’—though he is never clear what 
activities do not.46  
 An ‘innumerable amount of activities that allow for critical thinking’ leading to 
innumerable manifestations of critical thinking would make analysis of the concept difficult; 
there is, thankfully, a thread that ties these innumerable critical-thinking-manifestations 
together. According to McPeck, the innumerable critical-thinking-manifestations all appear to 
have the same element of scepticism, a ‘suspension of assent, towards a given statement, 
45 McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education., 5-6. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
established norm or mode of doing things.’47 The scepticism cannot be frivolous, McPeck 
maintains, but must be judicious—and that knowing into which of these categories the 
scepticism falls ‘must be determined by the norms and standards of the subject area in 
question.’48  
As he believes that all critical thinking instances have in common an element of 
scepticism, McPeck gives his definition of critical thinking as:  
[Critical thinking] is the appropriate use of reflective scepticism within the problem area under 
consideration. And knowing how and when to apply this reflective scepticism effectively 
requires, among other things, knowing something about the field in question.49  
McPeck embeds in his definition of critical thinking the qualification ‘appropriate,’ and 
explains that the determination of ‘appropriate’ is dependent upon the field in which the 
reflective scepticism occurs. By claiming that ‘the criteria for the judicious use of scepticism 
are supplied by the norms and standards of the field under consideration,’ it becomes clear that 
his definition is unhelpfully truistic: ‘the field under consideration provides the standards with 
which to question the field under consideration.’50 Siegel is quick to unearth its circularity: 
We would need to use critical thinking to determine whether any particular instance of 
reflective skepticism is or was in fact justified. Hence justified reflective skepticism assumes 
critical thinking; consequently it cannot in turn explicate or define critical thinking.51 
In an attempt to avoid inadequacy, McPeck has given a definition for critical thinking that is 
circular. McPeck’s approach is act-based, as can be seen below in his longer, formal outline 
of his conception of a critical thinker as: 
Let X stand for any problem or activity requiring some mental effort. 
Let E stand for the available evidence from the pertinent field of problem area. 
Let P stand for some proposition or action within X. 
47 Ibid., 6. 
48 Ibid., 7. 
49 Ibid., 7. 
50 Ibid., 7-8. 
51 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 23. 
Then we can say of a given student (S) that he is a critical thinker in area X if S has the 
disposition and skill to do X in such a way that E, or some subset of E, is suspended as being 
sufficient to establish the truth or viability of P.52 
Although McPeck’s formal outline appears to be stronger, closer inspection shows that it 
simply states that one is critical thinker if one has the skill and disposition to use critical 
thinking. As such, it inherits the flaws in his conception of ‘critical thinking’. Dropping the 
‘appropriate’ in his conception of ‘critical thinker’ solves the problem of circularity; however, 
doing so renders the definition inadequate, as the problems outlined in Ennis’ conception 
regarding dispositions absent of appropriateness conditions apply here as well. It appears as 
though McPeck and Ennis (and act-based approaches in general) are trapped in a dilemma: 
providing an adequate conception requires circularity, and avoiding circularity renders 
conceptions inadequate.  
1.4 Siegel’s ‘appropriately moved by reasons’ 
Although Harvey Siegel, in his 1988 Educating Reason does not agree with McPeck’s 
reflective scepticism, he does see value in McPeck’s formal definition of a critical thinker and 
paraphrases it as ‘the critical thinker has the disposition and skill to question the power of E 
to warrant P.’ He further clarifies this statement as meaning: ‘the critical thinker has the 
disposition and skill to query the extent to which E actually provides compelling reasons for 
P, or justifies P.’53 Siegel believes that it ‘under-values critical thinking to regard it simply as 
another… skill area’ and that it should be seen as a constellation of ‘dispositions, habits of 
mind, and character traits as well as skills.’54 He offers as his definition: 
A critical thinker… is one who is appropriately moved by reasons: she has a propensity or 
disposition to believe and act in accordance with reasons; and she has the ability properly to 
assess the force of reasons in the many contexts in which reasons play a role.55 
52 McPeck, Critical Thinking and Education., 9. 
53 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 23. 
54 Ibid., 8. 
55 Ibid., 23. 
Siegel identifies in both McPeck’s and his own conception ‘two central components:’ a 
‘reason assessment’ component, and a ‘critical attitude or critical spirit component.’56 The 
reason assessment component of a critical thinker requires that a critical thinker be capable of 
properly ‘assess[ing] reasons and their ability to warrant beliefs, claims and actions.’57 For 
Siegel, this means that the critical thinker understands and can use ‘principles governing the 
assessment of reasons.’58 By dividing these principles into those that are subject-specific and 
those that are subject-neutral, Siegel’s reasons assessment component makes explicit what 
Ennis’ conception did not: 
Subject-neutral principles include all those principles typically regarded as ‘logical,’ both 
informal and formal. So, for example, principles regarding proper inductive inference, 
avoiding fallacies, proper deductive inference—in fact, virtually all that is usually included in 
informal logic texts, and virtually all of Ennis’s list of proficiencies—count as subject-neutral 
logical principles. On the other hand, principles which apply only to specific subjects or areas 
of inquiry—e.g. principles governing the proper interpretation of bubble chamber photographs 
in particle physics, or those governing proper assessment of works of art, or novels, or 
historical documents, or the design of bathroom plumbing fixtures—are (as McPeck insists) 
though not general, nevertheless of central importance for critical thinking.59 
Siegel takes this opportunity to mention that there is ‘no a priori reason for regarding either 
of these types of principles as more basic (or irrelevant) to critical thinking than the other,’ so 
McPeck’s idea that subject-neutral principles are useless (or trivial) and that subject-specific 
principles are primary is ‘beside the point’—both are needed, and neither should be said to 
have importance over the other.60  
 For Siegel, the reason assessment component is necessary, but insufficient for critical 
thinking. For someone to be appropriately moved by reasons, the person must be disposed to 
act critically. Siegel, like Passmore, calls this the critical spirit or critical attitude component 
of a critical thinker. According to Siegel, 
One who has the critical attitude has a certain character as well as certain skills: a character 
which is inclined to seek, and to base judgement and action upon, reasons; which rejects 
56 Ibid., 23. 
57 Ibid., 34. 
58 Ibid., 34. 
59 Ibid., 34-35. 
60 Ibid. 
partiality and arbitrariness; which is committed to the objective evaluation of relevant 
evidence; and which values such aspects of critical thinking as intellectual honesty, justice to 
evidence, sympathetic and impartial considerations of interests, objectivity, and impartiality.61 
Siegel here insists that it is necessary be a particular type of person in order to be a critical 
thinker. Siegel differs from Passmore (for whom an account of ‘critical’ ends after an account 
of a ‘critical’ person) by describing the types of abilities that a critical person would be 
expected to have. However, we may read Siegel’s description as illustrative rather than 
analytic; it is secondary to character and includes skills that the critical thinker appreciates and 
applies. Siegel notes a difference between discussion of the critical thinking dispositions in 
terms of qualities of persons, and Ennis’ ‘micro-dispositions’ which Siegel states are focussed 
on bringing about analysis of statements.62   
Siegel’s analysis, though it begins by stating critical thinking is a mix of skills and 
dispositions, can now be seen as agent-based: critical thinking is derivative of the concept of 
the critical thinker. What is of great value in Siegel’s approach is that he is able to provide 
detail as to the processes of critical thinking, but always does so with a mind to its source in 
agents.  
1.5 The ‘Delphi’ report 
In 1990, a definition for critical thinking was generated by the American Psychological 
Association’s Delphi panel, under the leadership of Peter Facione. The panel consisted of 46 
experts in critical thinking, and sought, through use of the ‘Delphi Method’, to reach a 
consensus regarding the definition of critical thinking and its parts (see Appendix 2 for the 
consensus statement and Appendix 3 for the panel’s list of the ‘Affective Dispositions of 
Critical Thinking’).63 The panel separates critical thinking into skills and dispositions. The 
majority of experts agreed upon the following definition of the latter: 
61 Ibid., 39. 
62 Ibid., 8. 
63 The ‘Delphi method’ was invented in the 1950s by the RAND Corporation. It involves providing a 
panel with a series of questions, to which they respond with both their answers and their reasoning. 
Although the language here is metaphorical, one would find the panelists to be in general 
accord with the view that there is a critical spirit, a probing inquisitiveness, a keenness of mind, 
a zealous dedication to reason, and a hunger or eagerness for reliable information which good 
critical thinkers possess but weak critical thinkers do not seem to have. As water strengthens a 
thirsty plant, the affective dispositions are necessary for the CT skills identified to take root 
and to flourish in students. 
From the strengthening-water-is-to-thirsty-plant-as-critical-thinking-dispositions-are-to-
critical-thinking-skills analogy, it is clear that this is an act-based approach; that the water 
(dispositions) is strengthening suggests the plant (skills) is (are) already present. Interestingly, 
although this statement describes a type of person (and the type of person one would 
reasonably consider to have good qualities), the report states that ‘[t]he majority of experts 
(52%) forcefully reject the proposed normative use of “CT”’ and that only 17% of experts held 
that ‘critical thinking’ should be used in a normative sense.64 Facione reports that it was these 
17% of experts that believed one would not be a critical thinker if one used critical thinking 
abilities for immoral ends. In contrast, the majority of experts held that even if critical thinking 
is misused, it is still critical thinking and ‘[i]t is an inappropriate use of the term to deny that 
someone is engaged in CT on the grounds that one disapproves ethically of what the person is 
doing.’ The examples that are given of unethical critical thinking are similar to that of 
Passmore’s misuse of the critical spirit—attorneys who use their critical thinking skills to 
cunningly deceive a jury. 
What is clear from the Delphi report is that ‘normative’ is used only in its ethical 
sense: prospective critical thinkers fail to become so due to breaches of ethical norms. It is no 
surprise that this view is held by the minority. However, to conclude from this that critical 
thinking is not a normative term is to rely on a false understanding of ‘normative’. In fact, later 
conceptions of critical thinking, such as those given by Sharon Bailin and Harvey Siegel 
specifically emphasise the normative component: 
These answers and their reasoning are then anonymously returned to the members of the panel as 
feedback, and the process repeats itself until a consensus is found. 
64 Peter A Facione, “Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational 
Assessment and Instruction. Research Findings and Recommendations.,” ERIC Doc No: ED. 315 
423., 1990. 
Critical thinking is, first and foremost, a variety of good thinking. As such, any adequate 
account of it must explain the sense in which it is good. We begin by emphasizing this 
normative character of critical thinking. This emphasis distinguishes our conception, and 
philosophical conceptions more generally, from psychological conceptions, which are 
essentially descriptive—describing psychological processes, procedures, and/or skills thought 
to be central to critical thinking. 65 
Bailin and Siegel contrast what they call the philosophical approach with the psychological 
approach. According to a philosophical approach, ‘[t]o characterize thinking as “critical” is, 
accordingly, to judge that it meets relevant standards or criteria of acceptability, and is thus 
appropriately thought of as “good.”’66 In this approach, critical thinking is normative, but not 
necessarily ethically normative.  
Examples of ‘philosophical approaches’ to the conception of critical thinking include 
those offered by Siegel, who talks of the project of critical thinking as   
… upholding the importance of the fundamentally normative dimension of thinking, which is 
skilled exactly insofar as it is of a certain quality, that is, that satisfies relevant criteria to a 
certain degree.67 
Sharon Bailin et al. also capture the normative component of critical thinking: ‘… critical 
thinking is in some sense good thinking. It is the quality of the thinking, not the processes of 
thinking, which distinguishes critical from uncritical thinking.’68 More recently, Sharon Bailin 
and Mark Battersby describe the normative component of critical thinking in terms of its aims: 
‘whatever the particular role or intention [of critical thinking], because the ultimate 
epistemological goal is to reach a reasoned judgment, the normative structure of the practice 
necessitates inquiry.’ 69  
65 Sharon Bailin and Harvey Siegel, “Critical Thinking,” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Education, ed. Nigel Blake et al. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003)., 181. Bailin et al. 
explain in an earlier article how the psychological approach is problematic. See Sharon Bailin et al., 
“Common Misconceptions of Critical Thinking,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 31, no. 3 (May 
1999): 269–83. 
66 Bailin and Siegel, “Critical Thinking.”, 181. 
67 Harvey Siegel, “On Thinking Skills,” in Teaching Thinking Skills, ed. Christopher Winch, 2nd ed. 
(New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000), 51–84., 83. 
68 Sharon Bailin et al., “Conceptualizing Critical Thinking,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 31, no. 3 
(May 1999): 285–302., 288. 
69 Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby, “Fostering the Virtues of Inquiry,” Topoi, 2015, 3. 
1.6 Stagnation 
Attempts to define critical thinking, and, by extension, the ‘critical thinking debate’, have 
continued since McPeck’s original attack. Examples of an ongoing debate include an exchange 
between Stephen Johnson and Harvey Siegel in Teaching Thinking Skills, an edited volume in 
which Johnson, in response to curricular reforms in the United Kingdom placing a higher 
importance on learning skills, advances the McPeckean argument and Siegel responds. 
Johnson’s summary of his position is as follows: 
1. The appeal of thinking skills rests largely on the view that they are generally 
transferable. This view is mistaken.  
2. The myth of general transferability rests upon a number of fallacies and conceptual 
errors.  
3. The direct approach to teaching thinking can lead to knowledge playing a subsidiary 
role and even being seen as an impediment.  
4. ‘Mental processes’ are dubious entities and access to them is highly problematic. 
They support the myth of general transferability and encourage a checklist approach 
to thinking.  
5. Suggested examples of general thinking skills do not stand up to examination.  
6. Thinking skills present dangers: the disparagement of knowledge, the 
impersonalizing and neutralizing of thought, the neglect of truth, and the 
computerization of thought.70 
Johnson’s position contains the main worry of earlier specifists: that teaching for skills is not 
only useless, it is harmful in that it elevates skills over knowledge, and takes time away from 
more fruitful education. Siegel responds to Johnson as he did to McPeck, that although the 
ability to ‘identify unstated assumptions’ will depend on other things, such as knowledge 
within the area it is applied, it remains the same skill: ‘the execution of the skill [of identifying 
unstated assumptions] in chemistry, even if dependent on knowledge of chemistry, is not 
thereby a different skill from that of identifying unstated assumptions in aesthetics.’71 Siegel 
concludes by identifying the way in which the critical thinking debate is based upon a 
confusion: 
The key to avoiding [attacks like Johnson’s] is resolutely to refrain from thinking of skills, 
including thinking skills, in terms of mysterious processes or habitual and mindless routines, 
70 Stephen Johnson, “Teaching Thinking Skills,” in Teaching Thinking Skills, ed. Christopher Winch, 
2nd ed. (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000), 1–50., 2. 
71 Siegel, “On Thinking Skills.”, 74. 
and to insist on understanding skilled thinking in terms of quality: that is, as thinking that 
admits of positive normative evaluation in that it meets relevant criteria.72 
A more recent example of the critical thinking debate occurs between Tim Moore advancing 
a specifist argument and Martin Davies arguing against him. Moore argues: 
There would seem to be a danger in conceiving of critical thinking in the essentially positivist 
terms of [the generalist] approach; that is, by drawing on a number of general critical thinking 
heuristics, we can arrive at definitive and final judgements about the rightness and wrongness 
of propositions, about the correctness and incorrectness of solutions, and about the validity of 
lack thereof of ideas. … [T]his is a far too restrictive notion of critical thinking practices, one 
that has the potential to limit the possibility of dialogue and to close down the possibility of 
other types of knowledge and critique.73 
Davies responds in an article with the humorous tagline: Moore on the critical thinking debate, 
using syllogistic logic to both refute Moore’s arguments and press his point about the value of 
teaching the transferable, generalist skill of syllogistic logic.74 Briefly, Davies argues that the 
generalist and specifists divide presented by Moore accounts to a false dilemma, and that there 
is benefit in both approaches. 
A similar debate in the field of virtue ethics (and more recently, virtue epistemology) 
has been advanced by situationists, who argue that situational factors outside the control of an 
agent play a more causally-determinative role in behaviour than any enduring character traits. 
Character, they argue, does not transfer, or does not transfer as much as we think.75 In this 
thesis I show with reference to the situationist critique in virtue epistemology that the ongoing 
critical thinking debate is ameliorated by being clear about what can, and what cannot 
‘transfer’. Clearly, the ability to dissect and uncover a mistake in reasoning varies depending 
on one’s knowledge of a field. In this sense, knowledge could be seen as the more causally 
determinative factor in finding faults. However, virtues, such as open-mindedness, 
conscientiousness, and wariness are traits that if held in one arena, are likely held in another. 
72 Ibid., 82-83. 
73 Tim J Moore, “The Critical Thinking Debate: How General Are General Thinking Skills?,” Higher 
Education Research & Development 23, no. 1 (2004): 3–18., 16-17. 
74 W. Martin Davies, “An ‘infusion’ Approach to Critical Thinking: Moore on the Critical Thinking 
Debate,” Higher Education Research & Development 25, no. 2 (May 2006): 179–93. 
75 I address the situationist attack on virtues in section 2.5 
The success of a critical thinking act may be dependent on non-critical thinking elements, such 
as expertise in a field; but the success of a critical thinker is not determined by whether they 
are right, but on such things as whether or not they have been careful, or unbiased.  
1.7 Hope and virtue 
A virtue epistemic approach to critical thinking is timely. Emery Hyslop-Margison, for 
example, claims that critical thinking would benefit from considering the virtue epistemic 
literature. 76  Siegel, too, outlines the similarities between the critical thinking and virtue 
epistemology projects: 
The work of philosophers of education who focus on education’s epistemological dimensions, 
and of virtue theorists in epistemology, overlaps considerably. Among the former, theorists of 
critical thinking… emphasize the central educational task of the fostering of specific 
dispositions, habits of mind, and character traits in students, many of which correspond to the 
fostering of specific epistemic virtues. … [I urge] virtue epistemologists in particular, and 
epistemologists more generally, to [turn their attention to epistemological questions 
concerning education.] The philosophy of education can only benefit from such attention—as, 
I hope, will epistemology itself. 77 
More recently, Daniel Cohen has proposed the concept of virtue argumentation, whereby 
arguments are judged as good not simply in traditional terms, such as valid or invalid, but are 
good if they have ‘been conducted virtuously.’78 Cohen argues that argumentation may benefit 
in the same way that epistemology has from virtue theory:  
The overall orientation [of a virtue approach to argumentation] is agent-based: a good 
argument is one that has been conducted virtuously. But what exactly does that mean? It has 
to take all the roles that agents play in argumentation into account. As a result, it will be a 
broader perspective, capable of bringing disparate parts of the field into a larger whole and re-
shaping the disciplinary agenda. I believe this kind of re-orientation can help answer a cluster 
of outstanding questions for argumentation theorists: when, with whom, about what, and, above 
all, why should we argue. And, as a corollary but of no less importance, it can help us answer 
when, with whom, about what, and why we should not argue.79 
76 EJ Hyslop-Margison, “The Failure of Critical Thinking: Considering Virtue Epistemology as a 
Pedagogical Alternative,” 2009, 319–26. 
77Harvey Siegel, “Is ‘Education’ a Thick Epistemic Concept?,” Philosophical Papers 37, no. 3 
(2008): 455–69., 462-467. 
78 Daniel H Cohen, “Virtue Epistemology and Argumentation Theory,” OSSA Conference Archive, 
2007, 1–9., 1. 
79 Ibid., 1. 
Cohen also argues that just as ‘[c]ognitive virtues are aids on the way to cognitive 
achievements; critical virtues are aids on the way to achievements in argumentation.’80 An 
extended analysis of the conception of critical thinking and the critical thinking debate that 
makes use of virtue terminology is offered by Richard Paul, who provides a list of virtues 
which he considers to be necessary for ‘strong sense’ critical thinking, the type of critical 
thinking that is not simply an exercise of skills. Paul has a bleak outlook for any critical 
thinking project which does not teach his list of intellectual virtues: 
There is little to recommend schooling that does not foster what I call intellectual virtues. These 
virtues include intellectual empathy, intellectual perseverance, intellectual confidence in 
reason, and an intellectual sense of justice (fairmindedness). Without these characteristics, 
intellectual development is circumscribed and distorted, a caricature of what it could and 
should be.81 
More recently, there have been some attempts to conceive components of critical thinking in 
virtue epistemic terms: for example, Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby have argued that the 
critical thinking dispositions are better thought of as the virtues of inquiry.82 I compare my 
accounts with these in chapter 5. 
1.7.1 Benefits of a virtue epistemic approach to critical thinking 
An immediate advantage of a virtue theoretic approach to critical thinking is that it would 
make an act of critical thinking derivative of the critical thinker. Guy Axtell identifies that this 
reversal of analysis is a ‘defining methodological feature setting virtue epistemology off from 
its alternatives.’83 People are critical, thinking is not. This does not follow from a McPeckean 
complaint that thinking is always about something, but because criticality inheres in the agent 
rather than in instances of thought. To describe critical thinking is to describe the activity of 
80 Daniel H Cohen, “Keeping an Open Mind and Having a Sense of Proportion as Virtues in 
Argumentation” 1, no. 2 (2009): 49–64., 54. 
81 Richard Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship,” in Knowledge, Belief, and 
Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, ed. Guy Axtell (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)., 
163. 
82 Bailin and Battersby, “Fostering the Virtues of Inquiry.” 
83 Guy Axtell, “Introduction,” in Knowledge, Belief, and Character, ed. Guy Axtell, vol. 5 (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)., xiii. 
the critical person. Being proficient at the types of skills taught in informal logic courses, and 
having certain qualities, such as open-mindedness, are all things that we would expect of a 
critical thinker, but when we describe the critical thinker we require more than skills and 
dispositions—we need the skills and dispositions to coordinate with success of a kind that is 
characteristic of the critical thinker. 
 A further benefit of a virtue epistemic approach is that it would provide a clear 
distinction between skills and dispositions. In act-based approaches to critical thinking, the 
critical thinker is constructed from a list of requisite skills and abilities, but, as we saw in 
Ennis’s conception, the distinction between constituent parts is often unclear, as is how each 
part coordinates with others. Facione states that each skill can be seen to have its attendant 
dispositions.84 Bailin et al. and Robin Barrow decry the use of ‘skill talk’ altogether.85 It would 
be useful to have a clear distinction between these components, and also a clear account of the 
concept of a skill. Virtue theory provides this. According to Zagzebski,  
A virtue… can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a 
characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about 
that end.86 
Zagzebski describes several ways to distinguish skills from virtues: not all skills are worth 
having, but all virtues are; vices are the contrary to virtues, but skills have no contrary; and 
‘[a] skill need not be exercised, but a virtue does not exist unless it is exercised on the 
appropriate occasions.’87 Her examples of intellectual skills and virtues can be seen in Table 
4. 
84 Peter A Facione, “The Disposition toward Critical Thinking: Its Character, Measurement, and 
Relationship to Critical Thinking Skill,” Informal Logic 20, no. 1 (2000): 61–84. 
85 See Bailin et al., “Common Misconceptions of Critical Thinking.” and Robin Barrow, “Skill Talk,” 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 21, no. 2 (December 1987): 187–95. 
86 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)., 137. 
87 Ibid., 106. Zagzebski illustrates the distinction by contrasting the skilled hockey player that may 
choose not to play hockey in situations that call for hockey-playing and the ‘just’ person who does not 
act justly in occasions that call for justice. On these grounds, the latter would forfeit their claim to be 
just, whereas the former would not forfeit their claim to be a skilled hockey player. 
Table 4: Zagzebski’s distinction between intellectual virtues and skills88 
Intellectual virtues  
 the ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail 
 open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence 
 fairness in evaluating the arguments of others 
 intellectual humility 
 intellectual perseverance, diligence, care, and thoroughness 
 adaptability of intellect 
 the detective's virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts 
 being able to recognize reliable authority 
 insight into persons, problems, theories 
 the teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, including intellectual 
candor and knowing your audience and how they respond  
 
Intellectual skills 
 verbal skills: skills of speaking and writing 
 perceptual acuity skills, e.g., fact-finding skills; these are the skills of the detective or 
the journalist 
 logical skills: skills of performing deductive and inductive reasoning, the ability to 
think up counterexamples 
 explanatory skills, e.g., the ability to think up insightful analogies 
 mathematical skills and skills of quantitative reasoning 
 spatial reasoning skills, e.g., skills at working puzzles 
 mechanical skills, e.g., knowing how to operate and manipulate machines and other 
physical objects 
Much of the debate of the critical thinking literature is over whether it can be taught. The 
distinction between skills and virtues, therefore, has important educational implications, since 
both are engendered in different ways. 
Virtue epistemology provides a clear distinction between teaching approaches to both 
skills and virtues. As above, if critical thinking is seen in virtue terms, then it might be resistant 
to teaching; however, this does not necessarily mean that traditional critical thinking courses 
are useless, since they would provide lessons in the necessary skills of the critical thinker. 
Zagzebski sees this: 
What can be taught are skills such as the codified part of logic. Moral skills, such as procedures 
for grading fairly or processes for aiding famine-ridden countries that will have the desired 
effect can also be taught. What cannot be taught, or, at least, cannot be taught so easily, are 
intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, the ability to think up an explanation for a 
complex set of data, or the ability to recognize reliable authority… These qualities are no more 
teachable than generosity or courage. 
88 Ibid., 114. 
A further complication arises in the definition of ‘teaching.’ Zagzebski argues that virtues such 
as courage and open-mindedness cannot be taught; instead, they are developed or acquired:  
They begin with the imitation of virtuous persons, require practice which develops certain 
habits of feeling and acting, and usually include an in-between stage of intellectual self-control 
(overcoming intellectual akrasia) parallel to the stage of moral self-control in the acquisition 
of a moral virtue. In both cases the imitation is of a person who has phronesis.89 
Zagzebski therefore offers hope to the teacher of critical thinking who seeks to foster more 
than skills. Perhaps lessons in the skills of the critical thinker would increase the acquisition 
of intellectual virtues. Allowing a student to struggle with the fallacy of affirming the 
consequent, then gesturing towards the problems this poses for experiments or claims of proof 
of causation might provide the fertile soil for virtues such as carefulness to grow. Perhaps 
being taught by someone with intellectual virtues would provide opportunities for habituation 
and modelling. Indeed an account of phronesis is what is missing from act-based conceptions 
of critical thinking dispositions. Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is necessary to exercise 
dispositions appropriately. A good critical thinking instructor will illustrate the appropriate 
conditions under which one should point out the flaws in another’s argument; a poor critical 
thinking instructor risks turning students into skilful pedants.  
1.8 Conclusion 
Critical thinking faces a series of impasses in the existing literature. These can be roughly 
broken down into three related questions: ‘What is critical thinking?’; ‘Can it be taught?’ and 
‘Does it transfer?’ In this thesis, I argue that to overcome these impasses, the critical thinking 
and virtue epistemology literatures should be brought into contact with each other. Virtue 
epistemology and critical thinking share similar concerns: both are interested in the attributes 
of good thinkers and both are informed by shared terminologies. Further, important debates 
within critical thinking have analogues in virtue epistemology: virtue epistemology faces 
criticism from those who argue that enduring characteristics do not exist, there is question over 
89 Ibid., 150. 
how the virtues interact with each other, whether intellectual virtues can be taught, and what 
is the best way to teach them. Identifying these similarities affords opportunities for virtue 
epistemic insights to address concerns in critical thinking. By adopting the agent-based 
approach of virtue epistemology, we may hope to discover the aim or aims of critical thinking 
and, consequently, its core virtues. 
2. Virtue Epistemology 
In this chapter I contrast traditional epistemology with virtue epistemology. Virtue 
epistemology is typically divided into two areas: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. 
By using Jason Baehr’s taxonomy of the sub-positions within virtue responsibilism, I show 
that regardless of whether virtue epistemology solves traditional projects in epistemology, 
non-traditional projects related to epistemology have value. Defining the virtues of the critical 
thinker is one such project. I accept Baehr’s requirement that a virtue is a persisting, admirable 
character trait, the possession of which adds to one’s worth. I contrast two general approaches 
to the defining an act of virtue: those that require it to achieve its external aims, and those that 
do not. I argue that a virtuous act must be internally-successful, which I define as an act that 
exhibits excellence in its inner characteristics and would reliably achieve the external aims of 
the virtue under normal circumstances. Finally, I respond to recent situationist arguments 
against the intellectual virtues. I argue that these attacks are based on a misunderstanding of 
already tenuous findings in social psychology. 
2.1 Traditional epistemology 
Traditional epistemology is belief-based, in that it seeks to define knowledge in terms of belief. 
For example, epistemically-relevant terms, such as justification, are sometimes defined in 
terms of whether they are based on fundamental or irrefutable beliefs, or whether they cohere 
with other beliefs. Two major schools of thought dominate traditional epistemology: 
foundationalism and coherentism. In 1980, Ernest Sosa argued in The Raft and the Pyramid 
that both of these approaches encounter fundamental problems that are only soluble by 
appealing to the virtues. This introduced virtue theory, which had been enjoying success in the 
field of ethics, to epistemology.1 
1 Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of 
Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 3–25. 
For Sosa, the raft is the metaphor for coherentism, ‘a free-floating raft every plank of 
which helps directly or indirectly to keep all the others in place, and no plank of which would 
retain its status with no help from the others’2 and the pyramid provides the metaphor for 
foundationalism ‘every piece of knowledge stands at the apex of a pyramid that rests on stable 
and secure foundations whose stability and security does not derive from the upper stories and 
sections.’3 Sosa argues that both accounts are inherently flawed. 
Briefly, coherentism is flawed as it is ‘unable to account adequately for the epistemic 
status of the beliefs at the “periphery” of a body of beliefs.’4 As an example, he takes the belief 
that he has a headache. This belief must cohere with the rest of his beliefs in order to be 
justified; however, if he changes his belief to be that he does not have a headache, then this 
could be made to result in an unjustified ‘hypothetical system of beliefs’:5 
Let everything remain constant, including the splitting headache, except for the following: 
replace the belief that I have a headache with the belief that I do not have a headache, the belief 
that I am in pain with the belief that I am not in pain, the belief that someone is in pain with 
the belief that someone is not in pain, and so on. I contend that my resulting hypothetical 
system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs, and yet my 
hypothetical belief that I do not have a headache would not therefore be justified.6 
As coherentism derives justification from the coherence of other beliefs, the existence of an 
unjustified but coherent system of beliefs would show the view to be false. 
Foundationalism, according to Sosa, resolves into a dilemma. An extra-terrestrial may 
have experience X of what we call the colour red (that they call F), through processes or 
faculties that are unlike our own. Foundationalism commits us to the idea that the justification 
of the belief that a chair is red derives from ordinary visual experience; and the justification of 
the belief that the chair (or alien equivalent) is F derives from the experience X. The dilemma, 
according to Sosa: 
2 Ibid., 24. 
3 Ibid., 23-24. 
4 Ibid., 24. 
5 Ibid., 19. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
[R]egarding the epistemic principle that underlies our justification for believing that something 
here is red on the basis of our visual experience of something red, is it proposed as a 
fundamental principle or a derived generalisation?7 
The problem posed by this dilemma is described by John Greco and John Turri: 
If we say the former [that it is a fundamental principle], then the foundationalist is faced with 
a seemingly infinite multitude of fundamental principles with no unifying ground. There would 
be different fundamental principles for visual and auditory experience, for example, as well as 
possible principles for beings not like us at all, but capable of having their own kind of sensory 
knowledge. The more attractive alternative is to think of the foundationalist’s principles as 
derived, but then we need an account of some deeper, unifying ground.8 
This ‘deeper, unifying’ ground of justification, Sosa suggests, may be found in embodiment 
of stable virtues. He proposes virtue reliabilism, where ‘primary justification would apply to 
intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for belief acquisition.’ 9  This approach has 
justification defined in terms of the agent’s possession of intellectual virtues, rather than in 
terms of epistemically-relevant qualities of the belief.  
Greco and Turri describe this as a shift in the ‘direction of analysis’.10 This is a 
defining quality of virtue epistemology. Virtue theories, as a whole, differ from act-centred 
theories in that the qualities or attributes of a concept (be it justification or rightness) are 
derivative of the agent, rather than the act. Zagzebski summarises the strength of the virtue-
theoretic direction of analysis:  
Persons are ontologically more fundamental than acts; acts are defined in terms of persons. It 
is reasonable to think, then, that the moral properties of persons are ontologically more 
fundamental than the moral properties of acts, and the latter properties ought to be defined in 
terms of the former. Hence, virtues and vices are ontologically more fundamental than the 
rightness or wrongness of acts. The concept of right act ought to be defined in terms of the 
concept of virtue.11 
Virtue theories define acts in terms of agents. Virtue epistemology, as opposed to belief-based 
epistemology, takes the epistemic status of persons rather than beliefs to be fundamental.  
7 Ibid., 21. 
8 John Greco and John Turri, “Virtue Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, Winter, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/epistemology-
virtue/. 
9 Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.”, 23. 
10 Greco and Turri, “Virtue Epistemology.” 
11 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 79-80. 
According to Heather Battaly, virtue epistemic theories divide into two types: theories 
and anti-theories.12 A virtue epistemic theory is one that provides ‘a systematic account of the 
relationships between belief-evaluations, the epistemic good, and intellectual virtues and 
vices.’13  These virtue theories seek to answer questions in traditional epistemology. For 
example, some, such as Zagzebski’s account, claims to solve the Gettier problem. 14 
Alternatively, virtue anti-theories, according to Battaly, do not seek to solve the problems 
posed by traditional approaches of epistemology. Battaly divides virtue anti-theories into two 
types: virtue-eliminativism and virtue-expansionism. Both of these ‘deny that knowledge and 
justified belief can be systematically defined in terms of the virtues’ but virtue-eliminativism 
‘argues that epistemological projects other than exploration of the virtues should be 
eliminated: we should abandon discussions of knowledge and justification, and replace them 
with analyses of the virtues’ whereas virtue-expansionism ‘argues that there is room in 
epistemology both for analyses of the intellectual virtues and for analyses of knowledge, even 
though there won’t be systematic connections between these projects.’15 Greco and Turri have 
suggested similar divisions termed ‘conventional’ and ‘alternative’.16 Battaly’s divisions are 
similar to the taxonomy proposed by Jason Baehr in The Inquiring Mind. Baehr, however, 
only focuses on the responsibilist subvariety of virtue epistemology (I discuss this distinction 
below). Baehr’s categorisation of the field allows for greater precision: instead of Battaly’s 
‘anti-theory’ or Greco and Turri’s ‘alternative’ category, Baehr describes and further divides 
12 Heather Battaly, “Teaching Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom,” 
Teaching Philosophy 29, no. 3 (2006): 191–222; Heather Battaly, “Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophy 
Compass 3, no. 4 (July 2008): 639–63. 
13 Battaly, “Teaching Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom.”, 192-
193. 
14 For Zagzebski, knowledge is ‘a state of belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue.’ All Gettier 
cases have an agent acquiring true belief through epistemic accident, so none can be said to have 
knowledge as Zagzebski requires that the agent ‘acquires a true belief… through these features of the 
act [of intellectual virtue]’. The claim that virtue epistemology solves Gettier problems will be 
discussed below. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind. 270, 283-299. 
15 Battaly, “Virtue Epistemology.”, 642-643. 
16 Greco and Turri, “Virtue Epistemology.” 
autonomous virtue epistemology, which, rather than being opposed to traditional approaches 
to epistemology, seeks to either complement them, or concerns itself with non-traditional 
questions about knowledge and knowers. 
Virtue epistemology divides into two main types: virtue reliabilism and virtue 
responsibilism. Virtue reliabilism involves the claim that the intellectual virtues are those 
which, if possessed, are reliable in reaching the truth, for example: good eyesight, a large 
memory, and so on. Virtue responsibilism involves the claim that the intellectual virtues are 
epistemically-applicable character traits, such as open-mindedness, and conscientiousness.17 
Although it appears in the literature as though virtue epistemology is divided into two 
camps, Baehr argues that the distinctions between reliabilism and responsibilism are not as 
clear as they seem. For example, he paraphrases the virtue reliabilist’s claim that ‘a personal 
quality is an intellectual virtue only if it plays a critical or salient role in getting a person to 
the truth—only if it best explains why a person reaches the truth.’18 For Baehr, this conception 
provides room for the character virtues. For simple knowledge, such as knowledge that I am 
sitting at a chair in front of a computer monitor, or a consciousness that it is raining, or an 
awareness that the lights have suddenly gone out, then proper-functioning cognitive faculties 
indeed play the most important role in the formation of true belief.19 However, there are 
obvious cases where the possession of certain character traits provides the best explanation of 
how an agent came to reach true belief. Baehr offers the following example: 
An investigative reporter is researching a story on corporate crime and begins to uncover 
evidence indicating that some of the perpetrators are executives in the very corporation that 
owns his newspaper. The reporter believes that he and his readership have a right to know 
about the crimes, so he persists with the investigation, recognizing that it may cost him his job, 
and perhaps more. Undaunted even by personal threats, the reporter proceeds with his 
17 Lorraine Code, “Toward a Responsibilist Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 45, no. 1 (1984): 29–50. 
18 Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012)., 52. 
19 In fact, this point poses a problem for those, like Zagzebski who claim character virtues are 
necessary conditions for knowledge. This claim will be examined below. 
investigation. After several months of rigorous intellectual labor, he uncovers and exposes the 
executives’ misdeeds.20 
For Baehr, courage and autonomy are the reasons the reporter reached the truth, thus character 
virtues meet the conditions of intellectual virtue set by the virtue reliabilist.21  
To provide support for his claim that the character virtues can be included in the 
reliabilist project, Baehr also notes the interesting fact that the vices cited by reliabilists tend 
not to be cognitive flaws but rather flaws of character. For example, Baehr quotes reliabilists 
as labelling vices such as hastiness, and wishful- and superstitious-thinking.22 For Baehr, this 
shows that the reliabilist understands that character flaws can be a detriment to reaching the 
truth, and that they have not accepted the converse. Baehr concludes that ‘[r]eliability is not 
purely a matter of having properly functioning cognitive faculties,’ and, due to this, ‘a strictly 
faculty-based reliabilist epistemology is unsuccessful.’23 
It is obvious that faculty virtues vary in reliability based on the environment in which 
they operate. For example, the faculty of good eyesight is difficult to exercise in situations of 
low light or long distance; and the faculty of good hearing is difficult to exercise in situations 
of loud ambient noise (unless, of course, one wants to attend to the loud ambient noise). 
However, Baehr argues that the reliability of both character and cognitive virtues are relative 
to the environment. Some character virtues, such as open-mindedness, are detrimental in 
certain cases. However, he identifies a clear distinction between the two, in that ‘character 
virtues often are helpful for reaching the truth in the face of the very sorts of environmental 
conditions that tend to interfere with the performance of faculty virtues.’24 For Baehr, the 
character virtues  
20 Ibid., 54. 
21 Ibid., 54. 
22 Ibid., 55. 
23 Ibid., 61. 
24 Jason Baehr, “Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology,” The Philosophical Quarterly 56, 
no. 223 (April 2006): 193–212., 209. 
… are especially helpful for reaching the truth where the truth is hard to come by. And often 
what makes the truth hard to come by are precisely those environmental or situational factors 
that can undermine or interfere with the reliability of faculty virtues: a gap between appearance 
and reality, dubious interlocutors, incomplete or misleading evidence, and the like. This shows 
that when compared with faculty virtues, character virtues are reliable with respect to very 
different sorts of environmental conditions. In fact, the situational relevance of character 
virtues often picks up precisely where that of many faculty virtues leaves off.25 
Although Baehr sees a difference between the character and faculty virtues, the fact that 
concern for reliability does not end in situations where the latter are exercised shows the 
reliabilist’s project to be flawed—or at the least incomplete. Both reliabilist and responsibilist 
virtues help us when the truth is difficult to find. For Baehr, they both presuppose each other 
and are interrelated.26  
2.2 Baehr’s four variants of responsibilism 
Like Battaly, Baehr divides virtue epistemologies into subtypes based on the role they seek to 
play in the traditional account of epistemology (see  
Table 5 below). 27 However, Baehr restricts his divisions to responsibilist accounts of virtue 
epistemology. Baehr first divides the approaches into conservative and autonomous; divisions 
that roughly equate to Battaly’s theories and anti-theories. For Baehr, conservative virtue 
epistemology claims to be able to utilise the intellectual virtues to answer traditional problems 
in epistemology. Conservative virtue epistemology divides again into two parts, weak and 
strong depending on the strength of the role virtue plays in answering these traditional 
questions. For strong conservative virtue epistemology, the role in which it plays in solving 
traditional problems is fundamental; in weak conservative it is secondary. 
25 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 64-65. 
26 Ibid., 67. 
27 Henceforth, as does Baehr, I use ‘virtue epistemology’ to referring the responsibilist variety. Later, 
when I return to the question of whether critical thinking virtues are reliabilist or responsibilist, I will 
specify the varieties. 
 Table 5: Baehr’s varieties of character-based virtue epistemology (VE)  28 
Conservative VE: 
the concept of intellectual virtue is useful for 
addressing one or more problems in traditional 
epistemology 
Autonomous VE: 
the concept of intellectual virtue can form the 
basis of an approach to epistemology that is 
independent of traditional epistemology 
Strong Conservative 
VE: the concept of 
intellectual virtue 





VE: the concept of 
intellectual virtue 





VE: an independent 
focus on intellectual 





VE: an independent 
focus on intellectual 





The dominant example of a strong conservative virtue epistemology is found in the work of 
Linda Zagzebski. For Zagzebski, ‘[k]nowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality 
arising from acts of intellectual virtue,’29 and this formulation is offered as a solution to many, 
if not all, of the problems encountered in traditional epistemology. Baehr himself subscribes 
to weak conservative virtue epistemology; strong conservative virtue epistemology fails, as 
‘conditions for knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient.’30 For Baehr, the virtues play 
a secondary role in addressing the problems in traditional epistemology, but cannot replace all 
of them, nor can all of the problems be solved in terms of the virtues. 
A brief overview of the debate between strong and weak conservatism can be 
illustrated by Baehr’s claim that virtues are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. 
From Zagzebski’s above formulation, that ‘[k]nowledge is a state of cognitive contact with 
reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue,’ she hopes to solve the Gettier problem. 
Zagzebski claims that Gettier cases all have a similar pattern, a case of good epistemic luck 
replacing bad epistemic luck, and that Gettier cases are inescapable for all formulations of 
28 Ibid., 12. 
29 Linda Zagzebski, “Précis of Virtues of the Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 
no. 1 (2000): 169–77., 176. 
30 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 33. 
knowledge as true belief and justification or warrant, regardless of what form the justification 
or warrant takes.  
If knowledge is true belief + x, it does not matter whether x is identified with justification, 
reliability, proper function, conscientiousness, intellectual virtue, or something else… the 
problem arises out of the relation between x and the truth in any definition according to which 
it is possible to have a false belief that is x.31 
Consider a real Gettier case in which I am driving along a road, conscientiously attending to 
my speed and surroundings, and see a person wearing a high-visibility vest on the side of the 
road in the same location in which I have seen many police with radar-guns wearing similar 
clothing. I form the belief (with increased attention to my speed) that there is a policeman with 
a speed gun up ahead, only to discover with relief that the man in the vest was only a road 
worker (luck cancelling out the truth of my belief). A little further along still, past the road 
worker, there actually is a policeman with a speed gun (luck reinstating the truth of my belief). 
Assuming my behaviour or processes in reaching my belief meet the requirements of the 
multifarious types of justification or warrant, the fact my belief ends up being true means that, 
on standard formulations of knowledge conditions, I have achieved the sufficient conditions 
for knowledge without my belief being knowledge. Zagzebski argues that her conception is 
immune from this (and all) Gettier cases. In Gettier cases ‘the truth is not acquired through 
virtuous motives or processes. The truth is not obtained because of the virtues.’32 If luck is the 
reason I reached the true belief that a policeman is up ahead with a speed gun, then it is not 
knowledge: 
[A]n act of intellectual virtue is justified or epistemically right in a very strong sense. It is 
virtuously motivated, it leads to a belief that is acquired and sustained the way an intellectually 
virtuous person might do it, and the good of truth or cognitive contact with reality is 
successfully achieved by this motivation and process. Intellectual virtues, like such moral 
virtues as justice or compassion, include an aim that is partially external.33 
31 Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009)., 116. 
32 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 297. 
33 Ibid., 298. 
The ‘success component’ of Zagzebski’s conception of an act of intellectual virtue will be 
discussed below.  
Baehr points out examples where the use of the virtues still leads to knowledge, but 
luck is involved. He gives the example of a detective investigating arson: 
Suppose, then, that person A believes that her careless disposal of cigarette butts is the cause 
of a wildfire that has begun raging in the hills just behind her house. In a moment of desperation 
and appalling moral judgment, A decides to plant evidence around her neighbor B’s house and 
yard indicating that B is responsible for the fire. A detective is then dispatched to ascertain the 
cause of the blaze. He proceeds to conduct an intellectually virtuous investigation of the case. 
His work is motivated by a desire for truth and other virtuous ends. His actions are also 
characteristic of intellectual virtue; he handles all of the evidence with great care, thinks 
through the relevant possibilities, avoids drawing hasty conclusions, consults a wide range of 
reliable sources, and so on. Nevertheless, A’s engineering of the evidence is such that the 
detective is led to conclude that B is responsible for starting the fire. In the typical case, the 
detective's belief would be false but justified. In the present case, however, it turns out that 
unknown to A, B actually did ignite the blaze, and thus that the detective’s belief is true.34 
Zagzebski may reply that the detective does not simply believe that B started the fire, but that 
B started the fire in a particular way (the way A had framed it to look). This belief is clearly 
false, but the scenario could be altered such that the B lit the fire in the same way the detective 
believes through accident and use of the virtues (say, for example, that B had been concealing 
the very evidence that A, through a stroke of amazing luck, had planted—the detective would 
have acquired the true belief that B had started the fire in a particular way through application 
of virtue). In any case, for Baehr, this shows that epistemic virtue can satisfy sufficiency 
conditions for knowledge on Zagzebski’s formulation without the agent reaching knowledge.  
In terms of Zagzebski’s claim that intellectual virtue is necessary for knowledge, 
Baehr cites low-level knowledge, for example the sudden realisation the lights have turned 
off, or that one has been hit by a thrown sandwich. For Baehr, knowledge of these sorts of 
things requires no virtue whatsoever. 
It fails to offer a genuinely virtue-based account of the knowledge in question. This is because 
in its treatment of low-grade knowledge, the concept of intellectual virtue is not doing any real 
explanatory work.35 
34 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 37. 
35 Ibid., 41. 
Baehr notes that Zagzebski could reply that virtue is not doing much explanatory work in the 
case of simple knowledge, because by definition it is simple and does not need to; after all, the 
virtuous person can be exercising virtues by not overthinking the simple. However, this 
response would render Zagzebski’s formulation the intellectual virtues implausible, as they 
would apply too easily; one is not virtuous each time one succeeds in not overthinking 
something. Similarly, one is not being virtuous by failing to exhibit a vice.  
Baehr holds that ‘any attempt to give the intellectual virtues a central role in an 
analysis of knowledge seems bound to fail,’ but this may be too strong.36 His arguments thus 
far have shown that it is unlikely that truth gained virtuously will be necessary or sufficient 
for knowledge; however, the virtues may play a central role in an account of warrant or 
justification. Nevertheless, what is important for this thesis is that Baehr still finds relevance 
in the concept of an intellectual virtue to other areas of epistemology.37 He asks ‘Why not think 
that there are or at least may be other issues and questions neglected by traditional 
epistemology an exploration of which would require an appeal to intellectual virtue?’38  
In contrast to conservative virtue epistemology, Baehr describes autonomous virtue 
epistemology. In autonomous virtue epistemology, appeal to the intellectual virtues can form 
part of the answer to questions in epistemology that are independent of those typically covered 
in traditional epistemology.39 Baehr divides autonomous virtue epistemology into weak and 
strong versions: the strong holding that the problems found in traditional epistemology are 
insoluble; traditional epistemology is fundamentally flawed, and that it is not that virtue 
epistemology provides new solutions to old problems, but that it should be used to replace the 
36 Jason Baehr, “Character in Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 128, no. 3 (2006): 479–514., 480. 
37 Ibid., 480. 
38 Ibid., 496. 
39 c.f. Battaly’s anti-theory: ‘One need not construct a systematic theory to be a virtue epistemologist. 
One can take the intellectual virtues to be the central concepts and properties in epistemology but deny 
that knowledge and justified belief can be systematically defined in terms of the virtues… For anti-
theorists in virtue epistemology, exploring the intellectual virtues is the most important 
epistemological project, even though it won’t yield systematic connections to knowledge or 
justification.’ Battaly, “Virtue Epistemology.”, 642. 
old problems altogether. An example of a strong autonomous virtue epistemologist is Jonathan 
Kvanvig, who holds that virtue epistemology can only be successful outside the field of 
traditional epistemology. Weak autonomous virtue epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code, on 
the other hand, are not as ambitious.40  For them, the virtues can enrich a different approach to 
epistemology that is largely independent to the project of traditional epistemology. 
Here it is important to note that although the strong conservative, weak conservative 
and strong autonomous variants of virtue epistemology are incompatible, weak autonomous 
virtue epistemology does not conflict with any of these positions. Both Baehr and Zagzebski 
(weak and strong conservatives, respectively), both see value in applying the concept of virtue 
to separate, but related questions regarding the attributes of those involved in inquiry. Even 
Baehr’s weak conservative virtue epistemology has the virtues playing a background role in 
traditional epistemology, and this role will become apparent either through the development 
of an account of the nature of the virtues or the way in which they contribute to a good 
intellectual life.41 Baehr suggests that there is substantial philosophical work to be done to 
investigate these areas and lists areas which are ripe for investigation. As the work of this 
thesis takes place within the bounds of the weak autonomous project of virtue epistemology, 
whether the virtues provide a full or partial account of knowledge, or whether any attempt is 
flawed is not of immediate relevance. My interest is rather in how virtues arise and what they 
are, rather than their relationship to knowledge. 
2.3 Non-traditional projects for virtue epistemology 
A virtue epistemic approach to critical thinking is possible insofar as the positive claims of 
Baehr’s category of weak autonomous virtue epistemology (that there are philosophical 
40 See Jonathan L Kvanvig, “Virtue Epistemology,” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 
ed. Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (New York: Routledge, 2011), 199–207., and Lorraine 
Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1987). 
41 Baehr, “Character in Epistemology.”, 501. 
projects in epistemology that are open to the virtues beyond traditional concerns of knowledge 
and justification) is plausible.  
A way in which insights in virtue epistemology can provide benefits outside of the 
traditional concerns of the nature of knowledge is outlined by Lorraine Code. According to 
Code, traditional epistemology has inadequately allowed for analysis of cognitive 
interdependence. It is not that showing justification for one’s beliefs is socially irrelevant, or 
that it is unimportant to show how one’s beliefs are coherent or rest on solid foundations; 
rather, there is more to epistemology than only these and like concerns. As Code observes: 
‘What is known is just one aspect of a complex process of human interaction with other people 
and with the world.’42 Questions regarding what constitutes justification and knowledge are 
only part of a rich human intellectual life. A virtue responsibilist approach provides the 
‘missing complement’ to traditional approaches to epistemology. 43  Code provides some 
interesting avenues for further investigation. For example, she suggests that literature can 
provide rich exemplars of the intellectual life and that the ‘mirroring’ that literature provides 
‘sustains human community, both in its ethical and in its epistemic dimensions.’44 Examples 
in literature elucidate situations in which there is a moral aspect to the intellectual virtues in 
that one can not only be epistemically blameworthy for being ignorant, but morally culpable. 
Further to the directions recognised by Code, Baehr identifies five areas of inquiry for 
non-traditional virtue epistemology and provides and extensive overview of related 
philosophical questions for each:  
1. Intellectual virtues and other excellences. How are intellectual character virtues 
related to other cognitive excellences like intellectual skills, talents, temperaments, 
and faculties? Is the concept of an intellectual virtue reducible to that of (say) an 
intellectual skill? If not, how exactly do intellectual virtues and skills differ? And 
how do they depend on each other? Which (if any) intellectual skills must an 
intellectually virtuous person possess and why? How are intellectual virtues related 
to moral virtues? Are they a subclass of moral virtues? Or are intellectual virtues 
somehow fundamentally distinct from moral virtues? 
42 Code, Epistemic Responsibility., 254. 
43 Ibid., 8. 
44 Ibid., 223. 
2. The nature of an intellectual virtue. There is widespread agreement that traits like 
open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, 
courage, and tenacity are intellectual virtues. But what exactly makes these traits 
intellectual virtues? Is it something about their epistemic efficacy or reliability? If 
so, how exactly is this feature to be understood? Or is it rather something about the 
traits’ internal or psychological character considered in its own right? If so, what is 
this character and why exactly does it make the relevant traits intellectual virtues? 
Finally, must there be a single right answer to the question of what makes 
something an intellectual virtue? Or might there [be] multiple viable concepts of 
intellectual virtue? 
3. The psychological elements and structure of an intellectual virtue. Which (if any) 
psychological states or qualities are required for intellectual virtue? Is something 
like a “love of truth” required? If so, how exactly is this notion to be understood? 
For instance, should the “love” in question be understood in purely affective terms? 
Or does it also have [a] cognitive dimension? If so, what does this dimension 
amount to, and how is it related to the other psychological elements of intellectual 
virtue? 
4. The nature and structure of individual intellectual virtues. How exactly are we to 
understand the nature and structure of various individual intellectual virtues like 
open-mindedness, intellectual courage, creativity, or originality? What are the core 
psychological elements or processes involved with an exercise of these traits? What 
is it to display these traits at the right time, toward the right person or belief, for the 
right reason, and so on? What are the unique roles of these traits within the 
cognitive economy? How are they are related to other virtues? Which intellectual 
vices correspond to these virtues? And how exactly are they related? 
5. Applied virtue epistemology. Several of the examples and illustrations of 
intellectual virtue in the preceding chapters suggest that there are fixed and generic 
domains of human activity (e g. journalism, law, science, and education) success 
in which makes substantial and reasonably systematic demands on a person’s 
intellectual character. These demands would appear to be traceable and worth 
exploring and understanding from a philosophical standpoint. For instance, for any 
of the relevant domains, we might consider. What exactly is the (intellectual 
character-relevant) structure of this domain? What sorts of demands does success 
in this domain make on a person's intellectual character? Which intellectual virtues 
are relevant to meeting these demands? And how exactly are they relevant? Are 
there potential conflicts between the requirements of intellectual virtue and the 
requirements for success in this domain? If so, how should they be understood and 
adjudicated? Because it involves applying the concepts and standards of 
intellectual virtue to various domains of human activity, this approach is aptly 
referred to as “applied virtue epistemology.”45 
A large amount of the following section will address the questions posed in Baehr’s overview 
of the non-traditional projects for virtue epistemology. In particular, a clear conception of the 
difference between skill and virtue (outlined in area #1), casts light into related concerns in the 
field of critical thinking, as does understanding the nature of a virtue (areas #2 and #4) and its 
application (area #5).  
45 Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011)., 200-201. 
2.4 Conceptions of intellectual virtue 
In this section I compare three major approaches to defining virtue: Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
naturalistic account, Linda Zagzebski’s motivational account, and Jason Baehr’s personal 
worth account. I argue that a satisfying account of virtue must account for the internal success 
of the virtue, and this entails skill. I briefly mention two other accounts of virtue: Robert 
Adams’ intentional and Julia Annas’ eudaemonist accounts.  
2.4.1 Hursthouse’s naturalistic account of virtue 
In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse develops the view that ‘[a] virtue is a character trait 
a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.’46 For Hursthouse, this is a 
complex idea, comprised of three components:  
(1) The virtues benefit their possessor. (They enable her to flourish, to be, and live a life that 
is, eudaimon.) 
(2) The virtues make their possessor a good human being. (Human beings need the virtues in 
order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a characteristically good, eudaimon, 
human life.) 
(3) The above two features are interrelated.47 
 
Hursthouse compares the advice that leading a virtuous life will be beneficial to the counsel 
provided by a doctor that it is beneficial to regularly exercise, not to smoke, and not to drink 
alcohol in excess. Following the doctor’s orders will not guarantee that one lives a healthy, 
flourishing life, as a stroke of bad luck can (and does) cut short a the flourishing of an 
individual who dutifully leads a healthy lifestyle. Furthermore, not following the doctor’s 
orders does not guarantee that one will not thrive. The doctor’s orders, therefore, are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to flourishing, and yet we accept them as a good ‘regimen’. For 
Hursthouse, the counsel to act virtuously is to provide a similar ‘regimen’, and it provides the 
same benefit for the possessor as does the advice from the doctor: the advice to act virtuously 
46 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)., 167. 
47 Ibid., 167. 
does not provide a guarantee, but ‘is to claim that no “regimen” will serve one better—no other 
candidate “regimen” is remotely plausible.’48 
Given the medical analogy, the mere fact that some wicked people flourish—for example, 
some of the Nazis who ran concentration camps and then escaped to South America and lived 
(and perhaps, in a few cases are still living) the life of Riley, benefited materially by their past 
wickedness, and happily unwracked by any remorse—should be neither here nor there. 
Logically, their existence no more impugns the correctness of “The virtues benefit their 
possessor” than the existence of the few centenarians who have regularly smoked and 
consumed remarkable quantities of alcohol impugns the correctness of my doctor’s saying, “A 
regimen of not smoking, moderate alcohol intake, regular exercise, etc. benefits those who 
follow it.”49 
For Hursthouse, what would undermine either the doctor’s recommendation or the advice that 
being virtuous is ‘good for you’, is not a few surprising counterexamples, but instead a clear 
pattern to the contrary. Examples would include the discovery that people who smoke are more 
likely to live longer than those who do not, or that cowardly people live more fulfilled lives 
than those who are courageous. 
For her second component (the virtues make their possessor a good human being), 
Hursthouse describes ‘good’ in naturalistic terms. For Hursthouse, (roughly) a good plant is 
one that performs all the expected functions of that type of plant, without any defects to get in 
the way of proper functioning. Similarly, if a social animal, like a wolf, were to loaf off the 
kill of the rest of the pack, never engaging in the hunt or even behaving in ways that were 
counterproductive to the hunt, we would not call it a good wolf. Hursthouse says that the same 
thing can be said for humans. If a human acts in a way that is counter to the proper flourishing 
of himself or other humans, then he or she should not be called a good human. Like Aristotle, 
Hursthouse identifies that as we are rational and social beings, the proper functioning of a 
human is tied to our reason and ability to coexist well with others. 
A major concern with Hursthouse’s conception is that a virtue is an excellence; 
whereas she is interested in the measurement of ‘good’. We may label trees as good examples 
of their kind, and butterflies and wolves as good examples of their respective kinds, but in 
48 Ibid., 173. 
49 Ibid., 173-174. 
doing so we are describing typical representatives of each species. A virtue, by contrast, is not 
typical; as Spinoza puts it: ‘All things excellent are as difficult are they are rare.’50 Grounding 
the ‘worth’ of a virtue partially in terms of it being the realisation of a species’ nature provides 
an inadequate interpretation of ‘worth’. Certainly it is better to not be deficient in the attributes 
that are typical of one’s species, but we do not praise the typical, nor do we talk of this 
typicality providing ‘worth’ to the species.  
For Hursthouse, the naturalistic perspective avoids the dilemma of using purely an 
objective measure to discover the virtues (and thus not getting far), or simply trying to justify 
one’s prejudices that certain qualities are virtues. We are able to measure what it means to be 
human with the same sort of tools we would use to measure other animals, and from this 
assessment determine if a quality is ‘good’ or if a person is a ‘good’ human. However, an 
objection to naturalistic reductions is that ‘evil’ behaviour is also typically found in the normal 
behaviour of species. It is typical for males of many species to rape the females and form 
groups to murder members of other groups. Humans do have an evolved tendency to 
cooperate, and are much more social and much more rational (or have the capacity of being 
rational—and, on sober reflection, the capacity to be extremely irrational) than the lower 
animals, but identifying ‘rationality’ and ‘socialisation’ as unique features is simply cherry-
picking the best species-specific behaviours out of a list that includes many horrible species-
specific behaviours. Electing certain good behaviours as examples and then saying that people 
are good on the basis of their adherence to these good behaviours is inescapably circular. 
2.4.2 Zagzebski’s motivational account of virtue 
In Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski describes a virtue as ‘a deep and enduring acquired 
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end 
and reliable success in bringing about that end’51 The ends in question, according to Zagzebski, 
50 Spinoza, “Ethics,” in Spinoza: Complete Works, ed. Michael L Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002)., 382. 
51 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 137. 
are distantly the good, and proximately the aims of each of the particular virtues. Zagzebski 
identifies between three ways in which a virtue could be connected with the good: 
[W]hen we call a virtue good, we may mean that it makes a person good, or we may mean it 
is good for its possessor. In the former sense of good, a virtue is admirable in its possessor; in 
the latter sense, it is desirable. These senses of good are not equivalent, as can be seen from 
the fact that wealth is good in the latter sense but not the former, and although benevolence is 
good in the former sense, it is at least open to question whether it is good in the latter sense. 
Second, we may ask whether a virtue is also connected with good as a property of something 
other than the agent, such as the good of the world as a whole.52 
Zagzebski argues that virtues are always good for the possessor even if they make their 
possessor worse overall. For example, she describes the courageous Nazi, who is likely to do 
more harm than a Nazi without the virtue of courage. Typical responses to this situation 
involve stating that a courageous Nazi is not a candidate for courage at all—or we may call 
his behaviour an example of courage, but not virtuous courage. Zagzebski argues that these 
responses are wrong; that virtues ‘are always good to have, but the good-making properties of 
virtues and the bad-making properties of vices do not always add up arithmetically to yield a 
rating of the agent’s overall goodness.’53 The courageous Nazi ‘is closer to becoming a person 
with a high level of moral worth than he would be if he lacked the virtue, and this is the case 
even when the virtue makes him morally worse.’54  
I would therefore elucidate the sense in which virtue makes its possessor good as follows: 
Anyone who has it is closer to reaching a high level of excellence than one who lacks it, other 
things being equal, and it usually results in an actual increase in a person’s overall moral worth. 
The possession of a virtue does not necessarily lead to an increase in the quantity of right acts, 
because there are certain combinations of a virtue and a vice that tend to produce more 
wrongful acts than would be produced by the vice alone. This should lead us to be wary of any 
attempt to postulate a strict correspondence between the possession of virtue and the 
performance of right acts, but this is not to deny that virtue is the more fundamental concept.55 
Zagzebski points out, in her support of this claim, the existence of situations in which those 
with powerful admirable qualities that are being ‘misused’ undergo a rapid transformation 
52 Ibid., 89-90. 
53 Ibid., 92. 
54 Ibid., 96. 
55 Ibid., 96. 
when they acquire the missing virtue (or reverse the vice) to become pinnacles of virtue—the 
Damascene moments popular in fiction, in which a villain becomes a hero.56 
2.4.3 Baehr’s personal worth account of the virtues 
In The Inquiring Mind, Baehr defines the intellectual virtues as those character traits that 
contribute to the ‘personal intellectual worth’ of their possessor.57 Baehr explains that we 
already widely use the concept of personal worth (personal intellectual worth sans intellectual) 
in normal descriptions of others as being good or bad. By providing the example of how we 
describe Mother Teresa as good, even if she was a bad cook, shows that the descriptive use of 
‘good’ is ‘an inherently moral notion’.58 Baehr, suggests the existence of a spectrum: on one 
end are admirable faculties that do not make us good by having them (these are intellectual, 
but impersonal—eyesight, good hearing, for example), and admirable character traits that add 
to our personal worth by making us morally good (these are non-intellectual, but personal). It 
is at the confluence of these attributes that Baehr situates the qualities that confer personal 
intellectual worth, and thus the intellectual virtues. Here exist the qualities, such as intellectual 
perseverance and open-mindedness, which contribute to the personal intellectual worth of their 
owner.  
Like Zagzebski, the emotion of admiration plays an integral role in this demarcation: 
‘The best way to come at [the intellectual dimension of personal worth] is by way of some 
observations about our practices of intellectual admiration.’59 Intellectual admiration, Baehr 
points out, is present when we admire those who have good eyesight or memory—intellectual 
traits that he states have no influence on the personal worth of their owners. On the other side, 
there are character traits that increase the worth of their bearers but are not intellectual, such 
56 tvtropes.org refers to this use of this device in fiction as a ‘Heel-faced turn’ and cites examples such 
as Pussy Galore in the James Bond film Goldfinger, 
(http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/HeelFaceTurn) 
57 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 91. 
58 Ibid., 92. 
59 Ibid., 93. 
as courage, compassion, and so on. It is those character traits that exist in the middle of these, 
those that are at once admirable, worth-giving, and intellectual, where the intellectual virtues 
lie. As an example of a trait of this kind, Baehr suggests willingness to consider alternative 
viewpoints to one’s own. For Baehr, a person who has this trait 
… surely is admirable, and admirable in a way that is relevant to his excellence or worth qua 
person. Intuitively, he is a better person on account of the qualities just noted. At the same 
time, however, he is not necessarily a morally better person; rather he is better in a way that is 
at once personal and intellectual… This suggests the existence of an independent sphere of 
value that lies between the sort of value instantiated by the person with exceptional vision and 
a high IQ, one the one hand, and the value instantiated by the moral exemplars…60 
Baehr formalises his basis of personal worth as: 
(BPW) A subject S is good or better qua person to the extent that S is positively oriented toward 
or “loves” what is good and is negatively oriented toward or “hates” what is bad.61 
He offers his conception of intellectual worth as follows: 
(BIW) A subject S is intellectually good or better qua person to the extent that S is positively 
oriented toward or “loves” what is intellectually good and is negatively oriented toward or 
“hates” what is intellectually bad.62 
For Baehr, the intellectual virtues have an ‘integrated, two-tier structure’: the motivation 
towards (or ‘loving of’) intellectual goods and also, a ‘characteristic psychology’—a 
component he takes from Zagzebski to resolve each virtue into its own distinct variety.63 In 
sum, according to Baehr, ‘an intellectual virtue is a character trait that contributes to its 
possessor’s personal intellectual worth on account of its involving a positive psychological 
orientation towards epistemic goods.’64  
60 Ibid., 93 
61 Ibid., 97 
62 Ibid., 101 
63 Ibid., 103. Whereas Zagzebski differentiates the virtues by distinctive motivations: 
The motivational component is distinctive of the particular virtue, but a complete taxonomy of 
the virtues will probably reveal that the immediate ends of the particular virtues are not 
ultimate, but that several virtues have the same ultimate end. Zagzebski, “Précis of Virtues of 
the Mind.”, 172. 
64 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 102. 
Baehr is careful to be clear that ‘worth’ in his personal worth conception is not to be 
defined causally, that is, by the consequences of one’s actions.65 This is because success is too 
dependent on external factors for it to be a requirement of personal worth; in many cases 
success is dependent on the cooperation of the environment, and in many cases an external 
catastrophe may disrupt a virtuously-motivated agent on her way to bringing about positive 
consequences. Baehr’s account of the intellectual virtues can be seen as a purely motivational 
one. This is in contrast to ‘mixed’ motivational accounts, for example the account offered by 
Zagzebski, in which motivation and success are both necessary components.  
However, I contend that Baehr’s aversion to a success component of virtue misses the 
point that success can be defined in two ways; first, internally, so that an agent must both be 
motivated by and relatively-successful in the exercise of virtue; second, externally, so that an 
agent must both be motivated by virtue and be relatively-successful in bringing about the ends 
of the virtue.  
2.4.4 Internal vs. external successes of virtue 
There are two main ways in which the relationship between virtue and success has been 
described: theories which hold that intention or motivation is the only important component, 
and success is independent (for example, those offered by Michael Slote and Jason Baehr); 
and theories which claim that success is a necessary component of virtue (such as those offered 
by Linda Zagzebski and Christine Swanton).66 My contention is that both approaches conflate 
or equivocate between different types of success, or combine it with motivation in a way that 
is unclear. I argue success can be viewed as either internal or external. Internal success requires 
excellent action, external success requires achieving the aim of one’s excellent action. The 
account is similar to Robert Adams’ ‘excellence-based’ account. I argue that for an act to be 
65 Ibid., 97. 
66 See Michael Slote, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael 
Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 239–62., and Christine Swanton, “A Virtue Ethical 
Account of Right Action,” Ethics 112, no. 1 (2001): 32–52. 
virtuous, motivation alone is insufficient, but external success is unnecessary; rather that for 
an act to be virtuous, it must be successfully for the good—I refer to this as being internally 
successful.  
To illustrate the differences between motivation, internal success and external success, 
I will refer to the following scenario. Consider: 
Andrew, Ben, and Craig are all intensely motivated by a love of intellectual goods. All three 
are placed in a Town-Hall meeting in which a charismatic but deceitful politician is doing 
significant harm to intellectual goods. Unfortunately, the crowd is of a like nature to the 
politician, and not only are loudly agreeing with everything he says, but also appears to be 
hostile towards any view to the contrary. An opportunity arises to stand and speak on behalf 
of the intellectual good, and all can see that doing so will win over some of the crowd to a 
reasonable position. 
Andrew stands, but is crippled by social anxiety and starts to stutter. The crowd responds with 
jeering, and he retakes his seat, conscious of the fact that their jeering will only increase his 
anxiety. Ben then stands and speaks out, employing all relevant virtues in an attempt to 
persuade the town hall meeting to his case. He is honest, reasonable and not manipulative; he 
uses all of the argumentative virtues, there are no gaping holes in his evidence or errors in his 
reasoning; and he gives good replies to each of their objections. Unfortunately, all other 
members (besides Andrew and Craig, who are not candidates for persuasion, as they both 
already agree) remain dogmatically unpersuaded. Finally, Craig stands, and through use of 
lies and threats, manages to persuade some of the crowd to his point of view. 
 
When Andrew goes home, he is disgusted with his public speaking failure, but due to his 
intense motivation of intellectual goods, he attempts to make amends by posting his view on 
online forums. Furthermore, he takes steps to treat and reduce his social anxiety; he enrols a 
course in public speaking, visits a psychologist to help him overcome his fear, and in the 
interim, vows to practice oratory with pebbles in his mouth. 
Those who define virtue in terms of external success will have a different view as to which of 
the three men in the above example has acted virtuously from those who define virtue in terms 
of motivation. I will argue that both approaches are incorrect.  
For Zagzebski, successful action is embedded in her account of intellectual virtuous 
trait:  
It is clear that virtuous persons acting out of virtue have certain aims, and we generally think 
that it is not sufficient to merely have the aims in order to be virtuous, but that a virtuous person 
reliably produces the ends of the virtue in question. So compassionate persons are reliably 
successful in alleviating suffering; fair persons are reliably successful in producing fair states 
of affairs; generous persons are reliably successful in giving to those who are in need, and so 
on… [I]t does seem to me to be a plain fact about the way we ordinarily think of virtue that a 
virtuous person is someone who not only has a good heart but is successful in making the world 
the sort of place people with a good heart want it to be. The concept of a virtue, then, combines 
our commonsense moral interest in good motivations with our commonsense moral interest in 
moral success. So “virtue,” I will say, is a success term.67 
Baehr disagrees with this ‘success’ requirement (as he does with Julia Driver’s 
consequentialist account of virtue) on the grounds that actually achieving a goal often requires 
a conspiracy of forces outside one’s control.68 Robert Adams similarly identifies the problems 
with requiring external success:   
It is significant that we are often more confident in judging that a trait is or is not virtuous than 
in our judgment as to whether its consequences will be beneficial. In practice we seem ready 
to suppose that virtue is surer than its benefits. This is naturally explained if what we regard as 
decisive for virtue is not the value of a trait's consequences but its intrinsic excellence and 
whether its aim is toward something good. The point is important for the usefulness of the 
concept of virtue in evaluating character. For the well-known difficulty facing 
consequentialisms, that it is often difficult or impossible to determine the actual or expectable 
consequences, applies to traits as much as to actions. 69 
Baehr and Adams are right to deny the requirement of external success in Zagzebski’s account; 
however, it is not that she conflates success with motivation, but rather that she conflates the 
two accounts of success. This is illustrated in the following quotation (bold added), where it is 
possible that the type of success to which Zagzebski is referring is internal rather than external:  
The motivation to gain knowledge of a certain sort and to act in a certain way does not reliably 
lead to success, although it reliably leads the agent to do as much as is in her power to be 
successful. The connection between motivation and success may differ from virtue to virtue. 
For example, the motivation to be persevering may reliably lead to acting with perseverance; 
the motivation to treat others fairly (in argument or in other areas) may reliably lead to acting 
fairly. If so, some virtues already have a weak reliability component built into the nature of the 
virtue that is entailed by the motivational component alone. But it is doubtful that this is true 
of all virtues. It is not too difficult for a woman with a dependent personality to be motivated 
to become autonomous, but it is much harder for her to be autonomous. The motivations to 
integrity, open-mindedness, courage, compassion, and generosity are probably far more 
common than their successful achievement, and the same can be said in varying degrees of 
most other virtues. I conclude that the “success” feature of virtue is a component distinct from 
the motivation component. Virtue possession requires reliable success in attaining the ends 
of the motivational component of the virtue. This means that the agent must be 
reasonably successful in the skills and cognitive activities associated with the application 
of the virtue in her circumstances.70 
67 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 99-100. 
68 See Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 124-127. 
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69 Robert Merrihew Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good (Oxford University 
Press, 2006)., 60. 
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What is unclear is how near the ‘ends of the motivational component of the virtue’ are. If they 
are distant, such as in reaching the good, or flourishing, or a net epistemic improvement in 
one’s environment, then this is external success. If the success is rather in successfully doing 
those things that are characteristic of the virtue in question, then it is internal. Zagzebski’s 
formalisation clarifies that she requires both: 
An act is an act of virtue A just in case it arises from the motivational component of A, is 
something a person with virtue A would characteristically do in the circumstances, and is 
successful in bringing about the end of virtue A because of these features of the act.71 
For Zagzebski, virtuous traits and virtuous acts require external success. I think this 
requirement is too strong, and that instead what we find admirable is not the external success, 
but, as she puts it, whether an agent has been ‘successful in the skills and cognitive activities 
associated with the application of the virtue.’  
Zagzebski’s external-success requirement is echoed by Christine Swanton in her 
target-centred account of virtue. According to Swanton,   
To understand the idea of hitting the target of a virtue, recall our basic definition of a virtue.  
(V1) A virtue is a good quality or excellence of character. It is a disposition of acknowledging 
or responding to items in the field of a virtue in an excellent (or good enough) way. 
We can now present schematic definitions of an act from virtue and a virtuous act in the light 
of (V1). First, a definition of action from virtue:  
(V2) An action from virtue is an action which displays, expresses, or exhibits all (or a sufficient 
number of) the excellences comprising virtue in sense (V1) to a sufficient degree. 
In the light of (V1) also, we can understand what it is to hit the target of a virtue.  
(V3) Hitting the target of a virtue is a form (or forms) of success in the moral acknowledgement 
of or responsiveness to items in its field or fields, appropriate to the aim of the virtue in a given 
context. 
A virtuous act can now be defined.  
(V4) An act is virtuous (in respect V) if and only if it hits the target of V.
72 
In Swanton’s view, Ben from the Town Hall fails to be virtuous in respect to persuasion, as he 
fails to hit the target of persuasiveness, which is persuading others to accept his view. By 
Swanton’s assessment, Craig would also fail to have the virtues of persuasion, since although 
he succeeds in the aim, he does not achieve it excellently. To further clarify, external success 
71 Zagzebski, “Précis of Virtues of the Mind.”, 174. 
72 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)., 
222-223. 
is where the agent achieves the goal she sets out to achieve, be it bringing into effect positive 
maximum pleasure, or contributing to flourishing, and so on. If Craig’s speaking out, though 
persuasive to some people, also had the unforeseeable consequence of galvanising other 
members of the audience to burn down a library, then this may not meet the requirements of 
being externally successful, if the requirements are that the act ultimately adds to a net 
epistemic good. Furthermore, if Andrew’s stuttering inspired other silent-dissenting members 
of the audience to actively join the fray, and that their joining has a greater positive effect for 
intellectual goods than if Andrew had spoken well, we still would not return to Andrew and 
dub his act as an act of virtuous persuasiveness, despite the fact his act would now have both 
admirable motivations and external success. It is clear that such an account of virtue requiring 
external success is inappropriate. Therefore, I disagree with what would be Swanton’s and 
Zagzebski’s assessment of Ben; I contend Ben is worthy of admiration, although he does not 
achieve the external success of persuasion.  
It is not clear to what extent Baehr or Adams, as those who advance motivational 
accounts, require motivation to lead to action. According to Baehr, what differentiates the 
virtues is that each has its own ‘characteristic psychology’. However, although ‘characteristic 
psychology’ is useful for differentiating types of virtue where a motivation may not succeed 
(open-mindedness and carefulness both may have the same motivation of reaching the truth), 
it is not immediately clear whether the requirement of a ‘characteristic psychology’ helps us 
to differentiate acts that are virtuous from those that are non-virtuous. Andrew, Ben, and Craig 
are all motivated by a deep desire to persuade others of the deceit of the politician. All are 
motivated to persuade, all understand the importance of doing so, but Andrew fails to go 
through with the actions typical of the virtue of persuasion. If people with social anxiety are 
not the usual candidates for acts persuasiveness in social situations, it is because they fail to 
reliably succeed in acting in accordance with the virtue. The slipperiness of the term 
‘characteristic psychology’ here is similar to the slipperiness of ‘motivation’, in that it can be 
taken to as desiderative, or a force that impels one to act in a particular way that distinguishes 
the trait from other traits. Baehr contends that it is understandable to consider that an 
orientation towards a good must be of certain strength to be motivating; a weak orientation to 
intellectual goods may not actually lead to motivation, so it seems reasonable to expect that 
there is some sort of minimum threshold of orientation that needs to be reached in order to be 
motivating enough to contribute to personal worth. However, for Baehr,   
… in fact this requirement is too strong. For there are various ways in which even desires that 
do contribute to personal worth might fail to be motivating—as where, for instance, there is 
some countervailing value at stake or where one is prevented by external forces from acting 
on the relevant desire… [Instead,] the orientation appealed to in [the basis of personal worth] 
should be understood as being reasonably strong or intense, so that, when considered in its own 
right it will likely (though not necessarily) prove motivating.73 
Baehr here introduces a requirement that the orientation should be of a sufficient strength to 
prove motivating, all things held equally. Unfortunately it is unclear whether, how strongly, 
or in which ways motivation links with action.  
For Adams, (moral) virtue ‘is intrinsic excellence of persisting moral character, and 
excellence of moral character must be excellence in being for what is good.’ 74  Adams 
compares two approaches to theories of virtues ‘either in terms of its instrumental value for 
promoting human well‐being or in terms of its intrinsic excellence.’75 Adams’ approach is of 
the latter variety. He summarises what he means by ‘being for’ something: 
There are many ways of being for something. They include: loving it, liking it, respecting it, 
wanting it, wishing for it, appreciating it, thinking highly of it, speaking in favor of it and 
otherwise intentionally standing for it symbolically, acting to promote or protect it, and being 
disposed to do such things.76 
Adams, like Baehr, does not require the motivation to be necessarily tied to action in every 
instance, he claims that being for X does not mean ‘doing or being something that merely 
happens to be causally conducive to X.’ 77  However, rather than Baehr’s ‘psychological 
73 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 98-99. 
74 Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good., 14. 
75 Ibid., 14-15. 
76 Ibid., 15-16.  
77 Ibid., 16. 
component’, Adams presents a clearer and stronger link between intention and action, in that 
being for something must ‘engage the will’: 
The main qualification this point requires is that being for x must involve dispositions to favor 
x in action, desire, emotion, or feeling. In that broad sense it must engage the will. Thinking 
Smith is the best candidate is normally a way of being for her—but not if you really care not 
at all about Smith and not at all about the election, and are not disposed to do anything about 
it. Largely cognitive states, such as believings, assents, and views, can be ways of being for 
something, but only if they engage the will in the indicated way.78 
Adams’ ‘engaging of the will’ and his ‘acting to promote or protect’ the good provides a 
clearer link to action than Baehr’s probabilistic account. The fact that, for Adams, the will 
requires being engaged ‘in the indicated way’ suggests that it makes no sense to say someone 
is for open-mindedness if he consistently fails to act in an open-minded way. I could be 
motivated towards open-mindedness, but in moments of crisis, fall back on my prejudices and 
fail to recognise that I consistently give favourable treatment to beliefs that are my own. I have 
failed to achieve the internal success of open-mindedness. 
Adams recognises that there is a value in the excellent action that is independent of 
external success and he hints that there is a value beyond motivation. Virtue is being 
excellently for the good, and that being for means reliably acting for. He identifies that we 
admire trying, and the excellence in trying is independent to the achievement: 
To evaluate a person’s qualities as constituting virtue or virtues is to evaluate them as excellent 
in themselves.… The voluntary actions through which one worked to become virtuous, and 
the process of moral improvement of which they were part, may also be excellent in 
themselves. We may admire someone who strives unsuccessfully for moral improvement in 
certain respects, inasmuch as the excellence of the efforts is independent, to some extent, of 
the success of the improvement project.79 
If we take Adams striving as being towards an external good (in his example, moral 
improvement), and that this involves the internal success of relevant virtues, such as self-
awareness, then one can be admirable for having these virtues even if one fails to be externally 
successful. Adams states that ‘It is too well‐established and plausible a truism that virtue and 
78 Ibid., 17. 
79 Ibid., 164. 
success can lead in very different directions in particular situations.’80 Although there is no 
requirement for a virtue to be successful in achieving external success, we can expect that its 
possession will usually lead to external success: 
And the excellence of virtue typically includes traits such as courage, temperance, and practical 
wisdom, which are apt to insure that the virtuous will be disciplined and judicious in their 
efforts to do good. Merely human excellences cannot absolutely guarantee the success of such 
efforts. But these considerations do support the expectation that virtuous people will generally 
try to do good and will generally tend to be reasonably successful in doing good (relative to 
what their circumstances make possible).81 
In Adams’ view, though in practice we do see a link between virtue and external success, this 
is not a necessary link—it makes complete sense to say that one has the virtue of persuasion 
if one never convinces anybody. If Ben from our above example never manages to persuade 
anybody of anything important because he lives within a religious community where people 
refuse to take his views seriously, we would not say that he lacks the virtue of persuasiveness 
because he fails to reach its ends. Julia Annas offers a convincing example to distinguish 
between the value of virtue succeeding in itself and the value of external success: 
The brave person values his brave activity for its own sake, and does not regret it even if it 
failed to achieve the objective. Virtuous activity may well be valued instrumentally for what it 
enables the person to do, but if it is virtuous it is also valued for itself82 
Annas also notes that we find admirable the actions of others independent of their ‘worldly 
success’: 
Virtues are dispositions which are not only admirable but which we find inspiring and take as 
ideals to aspire to, precisely because of the commitment to goodness which they embody. I 
take it that this is a point which can be appreciated at an everyday level. We encourage children 
in schools, by means of posters, lessons, and books, to admire and aspire to be like some people 
and not others, and these are people whose characters are admirable and inspiring because of 
their commitment to goodness, regardless of whether in worldly terms they succeeded or failed, 
or were useful and/or agreeable to themselves or to other people. That is why it would be 
grotesque to have posters in elementary schools depicting Donald Trump as a hero for the 
young, rather than people like King, Gandhi, and Mandela.83 
80 Ibid., 55. 
81 Ibid., 54. 
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We admire those who are successful in their ‘commitment to goodness’, and that this sort of 
success has a bearing on character, rather than the external success, which is not admirable or 
character-making in the same way. 
 Returning to our Town Hall example, we have seen that requiring an external success 
component is unfair, as it would mean Ben fails to be virtuously persuasive simply because of 
bad luck. However, it is clear that virtues need something more than motivation. If motivation 
was enough, then Andrew would be virtuous. The difference between Ben and the others is 
not motivational—rather, it is due to the fact that neither Andrew nor Craig are internally-
successful in exercising the virtue of persuasion. I argue that a virtuous act is one that achieves 
internal success, and this requires one to succeed in being for the good; one must succeed in 
being for the good, in the way that Adams describes, but also and act in a way that would 
reliably achieve the external aims of the virtue in ordinary circumstances. In other words, to 
be internally successful one must both be for the good and act for the good. This addition 
makes the link between motivation and action more explicit than Adams and Baehr’s accounts; 
it refines Baehr’s reliability component and makes it a requirement of virtue, and describes 
two ways in which one can be for the good—one can honour the good in intention and in 
action. Whether each person from the Town Hall example meets each requirement can be seen 
in the Table 6: 
Table 6: Distinctions in virtuous acts from the Town Hall example 
 Internal Success External success Virtuous 
Act 
 
Being for the good 
(intention) 
Reliable action 
Andrew Yes No No No 
Ben Yes Yes No Yes 
Craig No Unclear Yes No 
 
Rather than defining virtuous motivation as the type of motivation that usually leads 
to action or that is motivating in a certain way, I argue that one must act for the good in order 
to act virtuously; one must act in a way that would reliably achieve the external goals of the 
virtue under normal conditions. To describe this in terms of the Town Hall example, although 
we could argue that Andrew has intentions towards the good, in that his behaviour shows he 
is motivated to achieve its aims, he does not act in a way that would be reliably persuasive in 
ordinary circumstances—speaking with nerves or a stutter is not normally persuasive. 
Although he might persuade every now and then in abnormal situations, say in cases where 
people were on the cusp of changing their mind and needed simply a show of opposition to do 
so—this would not be due to his persuasiveness, but due to his gesture of dissent. Ben acts for 
the good in the two requisite respects; he honours the good in that he shares the same intention 
towards the good as does Andrew, but he acts in a way that would reliably achieve its external 
aims—if his speech was to a more reasonable audience, it would have persuaded them. Craig, 
by using chicanery and falsehoods to achieve the external success, disqualifies himself for 
being for the good. He is not ‘standing for it symbolically’ in a way that is ‘worthy to be 
honoured, loved, admired… for its own sake.’84 His behaviour might be a reliable way to 
achieve the external aim of persuasion, as would brainwashing and hypnosis, but as it is not 
excellent, and we do not call it virtuously persuasive. 
 It appears as though Baehr should accept the requirement of internal success since he 
is committed to a personal worth conception of virtue. Worth is not dependent on accidental 
success or failure; we do not typically withdraw attributions of worth to those who try for good 
reasons, succeed in acting virtuously, but fail at achieving their intended goal. However, 
having the right motivation and acting reliably confers far more personal worth than merely 
having the motivation and failing to act, or acting unreliably. If we are to use ‘intellectual 
admiration’,85 as Baehr suggests, as a measure of personal intellectual worth, then surely 
having the right motivations and acting in the right way is more admirable than simply having 
the right motivations. The courageous soldier does not have to win the battle, he does not even 
have to make a difference in the outcome of the battle; if he jumps on a grenade to save the 
lives of multiple friends by sacrificing his own, but unbeknownst to him, everyone had cleared 
84 Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good., 24. 
85 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, 2012., 92. 
out of the range of the explosion, this is still an act of courage. In a list of heroes, Martin Luther 
King is not simply admired for his motivations; he is admired for his exemplary acts of 
intellectual courage and integrity; furthermore, we admire his persuasiveness, and this is a 
function of both intention and skilled-action.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I accept a personal worth account of virtue that 
subtracts the external success from Zagzebski and Swanton’s account and adds (or makes 
explicit) the requirement of internal success to Baehr and Adams’ motivational account. There 
is value in honouring the good, value in acting in accordance with the motivation, and value 
in the epistemic goods that this act intends to obtain. However only the former two add to 
personal worth, and actions need to be added to intention. Someone who is resistant to wishful 
thinking is somebody who is not only motivated towards lucidity and un-sentimentality in her 
self-reflections, it is somebody who has the requisite skills to resist wishful thinking—she is 
successful at least to a degree, in avoiding wishful thinking. We can imagine someone who 
satisfies Baehr’s conditions: a person who is orientated towards intellectual goods, concerned 
for the good, conscientious about the good, but fails at actually avoiding wishful thinking every 
time she sets out to do so. Indeed, there are a multitude of cognitive traps that make avoiding 
wishful thinking extremely difficult. The concern about an external success component in an 
account of virtuous action is that it looks too consequentialist and thus too dependent of 
happenstance outside of the control of the agent. This overvalues the importance of external 
success and undervalues the importance of simply being internally successful at exercising the 
virtue.  
2.5 The situationist attack against virtue epistemology 
Recently, situationists have extended their criticism of virtue ethics to both reliabilist and 
responsibilist varieties of virtue epistemology. Lauren Olin and John Doris argue that the 
account of intellectual virtue offered by reliabilism is not empirically supported, as studies in 
social psychology show that cognitive function is highly dependent on (or influenced by) 
context. Mark Alfano argues that responsibilism is untenable, as it depends on the existence 
of stable character-traits which are also empirically unsupported by studies in social 
psychology. As they deny the existence (or at least the importance) of enduring characteristics, 
and these are necessary components of a conception of critical thinking from a virtue theoretic 
perspective, it is important to consider the situationist critique.  
Claims from virtue ethics have been subject to a challenge from philosophical 
situationism which states that virtue ethics commits us to empirical claims regarding the 
existence of robust character traits, but experiments in social psychology show robust traits do 
not exist. As evidence, situationists cite studies such as those showing how people are more 
generous when in a room that has been recently cleaned with citrus-scented Windex. Since the 
virtue of generosity is so easily influenced by morally-irrelevant external situations, 
situationists argue, these have better explanatory power when it comes to understanding action 
than do any robust trait of generosity. Recently, two papers argued that the same attacks can 
be levelled at virtue epistemology. In the first of these papers, Mark Alfano argues that the 
major tenet of strong conservative responsibilism (that virtues are necessary for knowledge) 
is untenable, since studies in social psychology show that knowledge can be had through non-
virtuous means. This concern is not new—as discussed above, weak conservative virtue 
responsibilists have either rejected the necessary condition of virtues for knowledge, or 
described solutions to the problems it poses for low-level, sensory knowledge. Alfano’s 
argument for epistemic situationism (which I consider alongside that of Olin and Doris) is that 
epistemically-relevant faculties or traits are highly susceptible to external forces, so cannot be 
virtues. This attack can be repelled by re-envisioning the intellectual virtues as ideals (thus 
resistant to statements that not many people have them). 
Alfano offers his challenge against virtue responsibilism as an inconsistent triad, three 
propositions of which at most only two can be true: 
(non-skepticism)   Most people know quite a bit. 
(classical responsibilism)  Knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through 
responsibilist intellectual virtue. 
(epistemic situationism)  Most people’s conative intellectual traits are not virtues because 
they are highly sensitive to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational 
influences.86 
Since he believes that most would be unwilling to part with the first of these three propositions 
(non-skepticism), he focuses the rest of his paper explaining why we should reject classic 
responsibilism in favour of epistemic situationism. He cites empirical challenges from several 
studies in social psychology to support this thesis. 
The first study Alfano draws our attention to has implications for the virtue of 
creativity. Creativity, according to Alfano, is measured by performance on the Duncker candle 
task. If people are given a box of matches, some thumb-tacks, and told to stick the candle to a 
wall, they usually fail (only 13% of participants were successful in the study he quotes). The 
1987 study showed, however, if one improves people’s mood by showing them a pleasant 
short film or by giving them candy, their performance significantly increases: 75% solve the 
problem. Another study shows how candy also improves performance on the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT). People are more likely to detect a fourth, related word to three other 
words if they are given candy.  
These results, according to Alfano, are problematic for the responsibilist’s thesis that 
virtue is necessary for knowledge. He writes that ‘[t]he responsibilist seems to be committed 
to saying that [the increased number of people who were successful in these measures with the 
intervention] did not know the solutions.’87 It is important here to note that the percentages 
Alfano quotes are from the first of three experiments described in the 1987 paper, and very 
different to the results from the second. In the second study, more participants were used, and 
the results are far more modest than Alfano cites: 3 of 19 subjects were able to solve the 
problem without any intervention while the candy group had 5 of 20. The group who watched 
a comedy film were the most successful, with 11 of 19 people solving the puzzle. Interestingly, 
86 Mark Alfano, “Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 62, no. 247 (April 30, 2012): 223–49., 234. 
87 Ibid. 236. 
2 of 19 people who watched a ‘neutral film’ solved it, but 6 of 20 people who watched a 
‘negative film’ solved it (so watching a negative film is more conducive to creativity than is 
candy or a neutral film).88 Alfano uses these results to state that  
[m]ost people are not curious, flexible, or creative as such; instead, they are curious while in a 
good mood, flexible while in a good mood, and creative while in a good mood. This suggests 
that they lack the consistent motivation required for intellectual virtue.89 
It is good to remember that this statement largely hinges on the fact that in 1987, two more 
people who received candy, and six more people who watched a comedy film were able to 
solve a puzzle compared to the three in the group with no intervention.  
Concerns with the studies he cites aside for the moment, the most important worry for 
Alfano’s choice of evidence is that these studies are not showing increases in knowledge 
whatsoever, but rather increases in the amount of people who solve a problem. A linked 
concern is that creativity may not be a responsibilist virtue at all. Alfano anticipates this 
concern by saying this ‘shifts the burden of proof to the responsibilist. If creativity, flexibility, 
and curiosity do not belong to classical responsibilism, which traits do?’90 Popular candidates 
for traits that unequivocally belong to responsibilism, such as conscientiousness and open-
mindedness (both of which are considered extensively in the virtue epistemic literature) are 
not considered by Alfano. 
The aforementioned social psychological studies also, according to Alfano, lend 
positive support to the thesis of epistemic situationism, that ‘[m]ost people’s conative 
intellectual traits are not virtues because they are highly sensitive to seemingly trivial and 
epistemically irrelevant situational influences’91 and that these results ‘suggest that people are 
in fact pretty bad at the candle task and other tests of creativity unless seemingly trivial and 
88 Alice M Isen, Kimberly A Daubman, and Gary P Nowicki, “Positive Affect Facilitates Creative 
Problem Solving.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52, no. 6 (June 1987): 1122–31, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3598858., 1126. 
89 Alfano, “Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology.”, 235. 
90 Ibid. 237. 
91 Ibid. 234. 
epistemically irrelevant factors like mood enhancers come into play.’ 92  However, the 
administration of candy is not an epistemically irrelevant situational influence. Candy, as 
Alfano notes, was known by the original experimenters to increase the release of dopamine in 
the anterior cingulate cortex.93  Dopamine is a neurotransmitter, so plays a direct role in 
cognition—as does glucose, a likely component of the candy. Beyond plausibly giving the 
subjects a boost in cognitive power, receiving candy or watching a pleasant movie under 
experimental conditions before being asked to solve a problem may have caused participants 
to frame the situation more informally. A more important consideration is that, if one has been 
given a box of matches, a candle, and some tacks in a funereal manner, then there is a good 
chance one might hypothesise that the experimenter wants the box of matches returned 
unscathed so as to be used with the next subject. In contrast, viewing the problem informally 
may embolden subjects to break the unwritten social rule of not destroying experimental 
equipment. Solving the problem requires the small insight that a box can be used in the 
solution, rather than just a receptacle for the matches, so any ritual performed beforehand that 
increases the likelihood of this insight cannot be considered irrelevant. 
In case the virtue of creativity is praiseworthy for non-epistemic reasons, Alfano also 
describes a famous study in which subjects could be coaxed into exhibiting the vice of 
intellectual cowardice. If one asks people to determine whether a line is similar in length to 
three other nearby lines, they perform quite well. However, a series of studies by Solomon 
Asch in the 1940s and 1950s showed that if subjects were faced with a group of others who 
unanimously gave the wrong answer, then this increased the likelihood of the subjects also 
giving the wrong answer. Alfano interprets this result as evidence that people can be influenced 
by situations to be uncourageous: ‘Rather than being intellectually courageous, people are at 
92 Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)., 122 
(italics in original). 
93 F Gregory Ashby, Alice M Isen, and And U Turken, “A Neuropsychological Theory of Positive 
Affect and Its Influence on Cognition.,” Psychological Review 106, no. 3 (July 1999): 529–50., 529. 
best intellectually courageous unless faced with unanimous dissent of at least three other 
people.’94  
The problems with using the Asch studies as evidence for lack of intellectual courage 
are more obvious than the problems with his evidence against creativity. The first of these 
problems is that at least a quarter of people in the original Asch studies never yielded to group 
pressure at all; which, if failure on the Asch test is a signifier of intellectual cowardice, means 
that one in four people are still potential candidates for having the virtue of intellectual courage 
(this would not, of course, show that they have it, but just that they at least do not not have it). 
The second problem is that in post-Asch experiment interviews, the subjects who gave wrong 
answers gave two main reasons for doing so: one reason was that they actually believed they 
were wrong because the others must be right. This is consistent with intellectually-virtuous 
behaviour; the subjects have abandoned their own beliefs after acknowledging that their own 
faculties are prone to error and that it is unlikely they are right when six others unanimously 
report something different. Indeed this shows respect for knowledge rather than cowardice. 
The other reason subjects gave for answering incorrectly is that they knew they were right, but 
did not want speak out against the majority (either for fear of upsetting them or due to social 
pressure). This does seem closer to an admission of intellectual cowardice than the previous 
reason for giving a wrong answer, but intellectual courage should only be expressed during 
appropriate moments, and an undergraduate psychological experiment may not be on many 
people’s lists as a critical moment in which one should make an intellectual stand in defiance 
against six other men (there were no women in Asch’s original studies). More importantly, in 
the cases where the subject went along with the crowd but knew they were giving the wrong 
answer, their knowledge state was unchanged by the consensus—they merely (and possibly 
out of the virtue of politeness or prudence) chose not to publicly share their knowledge. The 
third problem for using the Asch studies as evidence against the existence of virtues is that 
94 Alfano, “Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology.”, 245 
(italics in original). 
Asch’s results have declined95 or notoriously been absent when subsequent attempts have been 
made to replicate his experiment, leading to the study in 1980 being (courteously) called ‘a 
child of its time.’96  
To summarise the problems with Alfano’s approach so far: The thesis he sets up to 
attack that ‘knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through responsibilist intellectual 
virtue,’ would at best affect one of four varieties of responsibilism; the studies he cites do not 
support his interpretations; the studies he cites also neither represent good measures of virtues, 
nor the virtues themselves; and he cites an irreproducible study from 70 years ago as empirical 
evidence. However, Olin and Doris think that Alfano does not go far enough.97 They believe 
that the situationist challenge applies to both responsibilist and reliabilist versions of virtue 
epistemology. For Olin and Doris, since they involve claims regarding the development of the 
virtues and define epistemological concepts in their terms, both responsibilism and reliabilism 
are empirically committed. They present their situationist challenge as a dilemma: virtue 
epistemologists (of both varieties) must either change their theory to accommodate empirical 
challenge (and thus lose the normative appeal of a virtue epistemology); or keep the normative 
appeal, but fall prey to empirical challenge. For Olin and Doris, the stakes are high as the non-
existence of the virtues implies scepticism, since if knowledge is only attainable through 
exercising virtue and there are no virtues, then there is no knowledge. It is unclear whether 
they themselves accept scepticism, since although it is clear that they reject the existence of 
virtues, it is unclear whether they agree with the formulation of knowledge in terms of virtue. 
Olin and Doris begin their critique with an attack on reliabilism. The reliabilist virtues 
include good faculties, such as eyesight, and processing abilities, such as the ability to draw 
95 Since the 1950s, there has been a decline in conformity, see Rod Bond and Peter B Smith, “Culture 
and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task.,” 
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Society, 32, (1980): 405-406. 
97 Lauren Olin and John M. Doris, “Vicious Minds,” Philosophical Studies 6, no. 19 (June 19, 2013): 
1–28. 
inferences, but cognitive functions, according to their reading of the results from social 
psychological experiments, are in fact anything but reliable. For Olin and Doris, ‘epistemic 
viciousness, rather than virtuousness, may best typify the human cognitive condition.’98 They 
cite three reasons for unreliability: the ‘transfer’ problem—people have shown to have trouble 
transferring skills in one field to another, even if the fields are surprisingly close; concerns 
with complex cognition—people are more likely to believe something is true if it is easier to 
read, or spoken quicker rather than slower; and that basic capabilities vary depending on 
priming—facial recognition decreases following the completion of a crossword, and people 
are more likely to judge a hill as steeper the more tired they are. They admit that, in the first 
instance, these concerns show ‘contextual variability’ rather than unreliability, but derive 
unreliability from the contextual variability. For example, diminished performance on a 
crossword puzzle would make faculties unreliable, and, since font-size is epistemically 
irrelevant, credulity on its basis can only lead to a decrease in reliably reaching the truth. Since 
virtues have a necessary reliability component, unreliability means a lack of virtue. 
So here, faced with the unreliability of faculty virtues, Olin and Doris predict that 
people will turn to responsibilism, as the responsibilist virtues could be those that safeguard 
against the ready errors of the faculties. However, they believe that this is problematic as 
people will not have any idea when to be vigilant, and quote studies that suggest people often 
overrate or underrate their confidence in dealing with epistemic problems. To paraphrase: for 
responsibilism to be a good supervisor of reliabilism it must be itself reliable; however, 
evidence shows it to be unreliable. 
To return to Olin and Doris’ dilemma: virtue epistemologists can accommodate the 
empirical evidence from social psychology (which would then cause statements in virtue 
epistemology to lose their normative appeal), or virtue epistemologists can keep their 
normative appeal in face of the empirical evidence. Accommodating the empirical evidence 
98 Ibid., 6. 
would cause virtue epistemologists to narrowly describe the virtues, for example, Intellectually 
Courageous when Faced with a Religious Doorknocker; however, this obviously loses the 
normative appeal of a catch-all Intellectually Courageous. Rather than address each of Olin 
and Doris’ studies in turn, as was done with Alfano’s paper, it seems appropriate to here 
attempt a more general (and ambitious) reply to the situationist challenge. If successful, this 
would have the benefit of impelling the situationists to reformulate their challenge rather than 
immediately returning with another study dug from the bowels of social psychology that shows 
that the behaviour of 40-or-so undergraduates was once influenced by an interesting 
independent variable.  
This reply involves showing first that any sort of evidence used by philosophical 
situationists has been empirically superseded by better theories; and that, second, the virtues 
would not lose their normative appeal even if the evidence showed them to be non-existent or 
very rare. Guy Axtell in his forthcoming Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice argues for the 
former. He agrees with the fact that virtue theory should not contradict empirical evidence, but 
points out that empirical situationism is not the leading theory in social psychology, nor has it 
been for some time. Instead, he suggests that if we are to seriously consider the evidence for 
virtues, then we should consider the best evidence available, and this comes from Dual-
process theory and Bounded Rationality theory.99  Neither of these theories, according to 
Axtell, contradict empirical commitments of virtue epistemology, and both may possibly offer 
support. 
Dual-process theory, for example, separates thinking into Type 1 and Type 2.100 Type 
1 thinking is automatic, quick, rough and cognitively inexpensive. Type 2 thinking, in contrast 
99 Guy Axtell, “Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice,” (Forthcoming), n.d., 
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types/systems of thinking. See Jonathan St B T Evans, “Dual-Process Theories of Deduction,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, ed. Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
is purposeful, slow, and cognitively expensive. 101  If we consider Type 1 thinking to be 
analogous to the ‘faculty’ thinking of reliabilism, and Type 2 thinking to be analogous to the 
metacognitive thinking of responsibilism, then this might provide an explanation to Olin and 
Doris’ concern that responsibilism is unreliable. The reason it is unreliable, is that it is not 
always ‘on’—it is cognitively too expensive to run all the time. In fact, it would be cognitively 
impossible to always be on. After completing a crossword, one may be so mentally exhausted 
that it is more difficult to recognise faces than if one had not been involved in crossword-
related activities. 
This imperfection of the virtues does not detract from their normative appeal, as they 
can be seen (and usually are seen) as ideals. Conceiving the virtues as ideals means they avoid 
any worry of not being found by empirical study—in fact we would expect them to be rare. In 
this interpretation, even if nobody exists who has pure open-mindedness, or intellectual 
courageousness, we can still know what it is to be fully virtuous in these ways, and we can 
still know when we are far from it. By conceiving virtues as exemplars or ideals, the 
situationists might retort that since knowledge is only obtained through the virtues, this would 
mean that knowledge must be impossible or at the least rare. However, this problem—if it 
exists—is a problem for strong conservative responsibilism; but we have independent reasons 
for rejecting that. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that an account of virtue requires both motivation and internal 
success components. I have addressed the situationist attack on the existence of intellectual 
virtues and found that it poses no risk. In the next chapter, I will investigate how the virtues of 
critical thinking differ from intellectual virtues in general by proposing a teleological 
conception of the critical thinking virtues. There are many things the critical thinking virtues 
101 Keith E. Stanovich and Maggie E. Toplak, “Defining Features versus Incidental Correlates of Type 
1 and Type 2 Processing,” Mind & Society 11, no. 1 (January 4, 2012): 3–13. 
can ultimately aim at, for example, truth, eudaimonia, and so on, however, by comparing the 
virtues of those involved in other intellectual pursuits, I will argue that the proximal aim of 
critical thinking is intellectual autonomy. 
3. The Aim of Critical Thinking 
In this chapter I argue that the aim of critical thinking is the achievement and maintenance of 
intellectual autonomy. This is achieved by situating critical thinking amongst other social 
intellectual endeavours, specifically communities of inquiry and the competitive-cooperative 
field of scientific pursuit. By comparing the aims of these endeavours to the aims of critical 
thinking, I identify the core virtues of critical thinking as self-awareness, prudent wariness and 
conscientiousness. The external success of these virtues jointly constitute intellectual 
autonomy.  
The virtues of the scientist, the member of a community of inquiry, and the virtues of 
the critical thinker are opposed at some points (though they may reconcile at a higher level—
such as a shared-commitment at finding the truth). They are opposed because critical thinking 
and scientific thinking belong to different social practices, and different spheres of activity. 
The reason the scientist comes into conflict with critical thinking in some ways is because the 
scientist is a risk-taking adventurer in the field of ideas. What counts for intellectual integrity 
for scientists will be different from what we seek to teach in a critical thinking class. If a 
member of a scientific community has a theory that she is pursuing, despite knowing it may 
not be right, it is epistemically worthwhile to suspend critical thought to some degree as other 
members of a scientific community will provide much of this. Similarly, the virtues of a 
cooperative environment are different from the virtues of intellectual self-defence needed by 
an individual who wishes to function with intellectual autonomy in a world of bad arguments.  
Once we establish the central focus of critical thinking, it will become clear that the 
concept has become contaminated with long lists of intellectual goods that are non-central and 
in some cases opposed to the core goals of critical thinking. Certainly, a great deal of good 
intellectual behaviour is involved in critical thinking, but we need to be specific about the 
goals of critical thinking to sort through the overabundance of positive intellectual qualities 
used in most definitions. The aim of this chapter is to provide this specificity. Furthermore, 
the central virtues of critical thinking will be compared to those which are not central, such as 
honesty and integrity. I examine the thesis of the unity of the virtues and show how the virtues 
of critical thinking are achievable in the absence of other intellectual virtues (such as honesty 
and integrity). I will argue that the virtues of critical thinking can be found in the ideals of the 
Enlightenment; critical thinking can be seen as part of the Enlightenment drive for intellectual 
autonomy.  
3.1 Goals of critical thinking vs. scientific thinking 
The goals of scientific inquiry expressed through the cognitive division of labour are at points 
opposed to the core goals of critical thinking. In scientific inquiry, the overarching goal is to 
find the truth (or another epistemic good, such as best explanation). However, as scientific 
inquiry is performed in a social setting where others are also searching for truth, the immediate 
goal of the scientist—the goal that guides her actions—is to investigate and search out the 
bona fides of her own hypothesis. In doing so, there are two ways in which the immediate goal 
of the scientist diverges from the goals of critical thinking. The first is in respect of protecting 
her own hypothesis from premature refutation, and the second is with respect to advancing her 
hypothesis in a field of other plausible (or indeed more plausible) hypotheses.  
To investigate her hypothesis, the scientist cannot be too critical, too often, too early, 
otherwise she may give up on good ideas and miss out on achieving epistemic goods. Lakatos 
identifies this as forming a ‘protecting belt’ of ‘auxiliary hypotheses’. For Lakatos, the 
successes of science are in part due to scientists’ efforts to shield the central core of a research 
project from the continual bombardment of refuting data.1 In order to properly investigate a 
topic, in fact, ‘[w]e may rationally decide not to allow “refutations” to transmit falsity to the 
hard core as long as the corroborated empirical content of the protecting belt of auxiliary 
hypotheses increases.’2 Success in a scientific setting depends upon the search for supporting 
1 I Lakatos, “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 69 (1968): 149–86., 170. 
2 Ibid., 134. 
evidence for a hypothesis despite the existence of evidence contrary to it. A good scientist is 
one who can make the best accommodating justifications for this contradictory evidence, and 
who is determined to push a theory as far as it can reasonably go. For Lakatos,    
[w]hile ‘theoretical progress’… may be verified immediately, ‘empirical progress’ cannot, and 
in a research programme we may be frustrated by a long series of ‘refutations’ before ingenious 
and lucky content-increasing auxiliary hypotheses turn a chain of defeats—with hindsight—
into a resounding success story, either by revising some false ‘facts’ or by adding novel 
auxiliary hypotheses.3 
These motivations provide a stark contrast to the motivations of critical thinking. When faced 
with strong evidence against a hypothesis, a critical thinker should ordinarily abandon it rather 
than add increasingly-complex assumptions that allow for the possibility that further empirical 
evidence will support the hypothesis. In this sense, critical thinking has the goal of not being 
fooled, whereas successful scientific research requires one to be sometimes fooled, or, more 
accurately, to proceed as if one were fooled; scientific progress benefits from the obstinate 
ingenuity needed to show how contradictory evidence does not overthrow one’s project. It is 
instructive here to return to the distinction between the agent-based conception of critical 
thinking and the act-based. A scientist may indeed be a critical thinker, and have the skills and 
dispositions to do critical thinking work. However, these skills and dispositions are 
circumscribed by a higher purpose, in that the scientist is more likely to utilise them to analyse 
the work of others, rather than her own. If the scientist was directly motivated to not be fooled, 
then she would turn her skills on her own work with at least as much rigor as on the work of 
others. Since scientists tend not to turn their critical thinking skills on their own hypotheses in 
this way, they must share an alternative goal to that of critical thinking—perhaps this goal is 
for their theory to triumph, or to seek to provide the most compelling support for it. 
The second way in which the goals of the scientist differ from those of a critical thinker 
is that it is reasonable for a scientist to pursue a hypothesis that a critical thinker would consider 
unlikely (rather than falsified or empirically challenged, as in the previous section). Philip 
3 Ibid., 134. 
Kitcher argues that in scientific inquiry there is a division of cognitive labour, and that seen as 
a social project, it is of more epistemic benefit for some members to be working on endeavours 
that prima facie show less promise than others. For Kitcher,  
We sometimes want to maintain cognitive diversity even in instances where it would be 
reasonable for all to agree that one of two theories was inferior to its rival, and we may be 
grateful to the stubborn minority who continue to advocate problematic ideas.4 
Again, this provides a contrast to the goals of the critical thinker; the stubborn pursuit of 
problematic or unlikely ideas is antithetical to the goal of not being fooled. Kitcher explains 
how different spheres of intellectual activity require different views of what is rational (or 
productive) intellectual activity: 
The idea that it is rational for a person to believe the better-supported theory seems, however, 
to be based on supposing that that person’s aim is to achieve true beliefs (or some other 
desirable epistemic state, the acceptance of empirically adequate theories, for example). In that 
case, however, it appears that the person should also pursue the better-supported theory, since 
pursuing a doctrine that is likely to be false is likely to breed more falsehood (or less of the 
desired epistemic state). Only if we situate the individual in a society of other epistemic 
agents… does it begin to appear rational for someone to assign herself to the working out of 
ideas that she (and her colleagues) view as epistemically inferior.5 
I contend that a critical thinker’s target is personal intellectual autonomy or rational autonomy. 
Kitcher differentiates between two approaches to individual rationality ‘one for belief and one 
for pursuit.’6 An individual scientist may personally believe that a particular theory has the 
best explanatory power or cogency, and in this sense it is rational for the scientist to believe in 
this theory; however, Kitcher shows that that does not mean it is rational for the individual 
scientist to pursue this theory. The scientist is part of a community in which there is a 
distribution of cognitive labour, and in this community, more epistemic goods are achieved by 
scientists pursuing a variety of theories in spite of what they personally believe is the most 
reasonable.7 If all scientists only pursued the most likely or promising of theories, scientific 
4Philip Kitcher, “The Division of Cognitive Labor,” The Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 1 (1990): 5–
22., 7. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
6 Ibid., 8. 
7 Ibid., 8. 
discovery would decrease and rigour would weaken. Michael Weisberg and Ryan Muldoon 
echo this sentiment: ‘a core tenant of strategic models about the division of cognitive labor is 
that what is epistemically good for individuals may differ from what is epistemically good for 
the community.’8 Critical thinkers should be impartial, but scientists, when in the pursuit of a 
theory, should be advisedly biased. 
What I am working towards is the claim that critical thinking grows out of the social 
practice of answering the question ‘What do I believe?’ rather than ‘What role am I playing in 
some greater social epistemic enterprise?’ By comparing the goals of critical thinking to those 
of other intellectual endeavours, we can see what other types of good thinking have clouded 
the conception of critical thinking and filter these out to reach clearer conception. This 
conception will be teleological—it is structured around a central goal or target of critical 
thinking—and will provide a basis on which to identify the key virtues and skills involved in 
critical thinking. 
3.2 Goals of critical thinking vs. communities of inquiry 
As with the social practice of a division of cognitive labour, the goals of critical thinking can 
also be contrasted with the goals of a cooperative community of inquiry. A community of 
inquiry seeks to reach a consensus or other epistemic goods, through supportive dialectic.9 
Lipman argues that the community of inquiry aims at fostering ‘multidimensional thinking’, 
which is comprised only in part by critical thinking. The other components, for Lipman, 
include ‘caring thinking’ and ‘creative thinking’. Contrasting each of these types of thinking 
against critical thinking will aid in delineating its goals. Lipman reminds us that ‘[i]n teaching 
for multidimensional thinking, one must be on one’s guard not to give the impression to 
students that critical thinking is equal to the whole of thinking.’10 However, the divisions 
8 Michael Weisberg and Ryan Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive 
Labor,” Philosophy of Science 76, no. April (2009): 225–52., 227. 
9 Lipman, Thinking in Education. 
10 Ibid., 201. 
between Lipman’s different types of thinking are complex and at times unobvious. 
Accordingly, he warns that ‘one should not give the impression that the three different 
modalities of thinking are independent rather than in continual transaction with each other.’11 
Of the types of thinking involved in multidimensional thinking, creative thinking has 
the most obvious differences to critical thinking in that it is typified by an absence or 
abandonment of the usual rules, whereas critical thinking typically seeks to utilise rules.  
The merely critical thinker is somehow conservative, in the sense that he or she is not content 
until finding a belief that dispenses with thinking. On the other hand, the creative thinker is 
essentially sceptical and radical. Creative thinkers are never so happy as when they have been 
let loose, like bulls in china shops, to smash to smithereens the bric-a-brac of the world.12 
Lipman’s running-together of the types of thinkers seems forced; anecdotally, I know more 
critical thinkers who are both sceptical and revel in the smashing of things than I do creative 
thinkers with the same qualities, but his point of differentiation is clear: the modes of activity 
are opposed—we think of critical thinkers as careful and methodical, and creative thinkers as 
those who seek to operate outside of method.  
The link between critical and creative thinking has long been controversial. Sharon 
Bailin contends that 
… there are serious conceptual and educational problems in this radical dichotomy between 
critical and creative thinking… [T]here are analytic, highly judgmental aspects to generating 
creative results, and imaginative, inventive aspects to being critical, and that it is exceedingly 
difficult to neatly separate out two distinctive kinds of thought.13 
Bailin argues that the dichotomy is unfounded on two main grounds. First, in regards to 
problem solving, creativity requires both novelty and suitability, and critical thinking is the 
arbiter of suitability—and indeed alerts one to the fact that a solution is needed. Second, 
creativity usually does not involve the breaking of all of the rules, and the guide to which are 
appropriate to break in the circumstances is provided by critical thinking.14 These objections 
11 Ibid., 201. 
12 Ibid., 254. 
13 Sharon Bailin, “Critical and Creative Thinking,” Informal Logic IX, no. 1 (1987): 23–30., 24. 
14 Ibid., 25. 
to the dichotomy between critical and creative thinking arise from a misunderstanding of goals. 
Certainly, good thinking requires the interaction of multiple domains of intellectual activity; 
however, this is not to say that they are inseparable. It makes complete sense to say 
disparagingly of someone that he is a creative artist, but not any good. It also makes sense to 
say that someone is critical, but lacks flair or imagination. If we view critical and creative 
thinking as components of a goal of good thinking, and remove simple-generativity from the 
goals of creative thinking, then the landscape is clear. The goals of critical thinking are those 
related to the consumption of reasons, not their creation. The goals of creative thinking are 
related to novelty and imagination. 
Lipman links caring to creative thinking in a similar amplificatory way to his linking 
of critical thinking and creative thinking.  
One student who does not care much about the change of seasons will paint the leaves as if 
they were one dull color. Another student, more caring, and therefore more perceptive, will 
see leaves as gold, green, brown, red, and so on. So, the caring produces more precise 
perception and more colourful depiction in this particular case.15 
It is obvious that a minimum requirement of ‘caring’ must be reached in order to invest oneself 
in any sort of intellectual endeavour, and it is uncontroversial to expect that there is a 
relationship between the amount of ‘caring’ for an activity, as Lipman uses the term above, 
and the effort one takes in pursuing its goal.16 Compare two friends, one of whom cares very 
much about fishing and can spend hours at the riverbank conceiving and experimenting with 
creative and critical tactics; whereas the other, who cares very little about fishing but is 
primarily motivated by a love for the outdoors and of friendship, is happy to employ the 
simplest and laziest approach. This use of the term ‘caring’ seems to simply be a measure of 
the amount of effort one is willing to employ in a practice. This type of caring—caring as 
carefulness—is inseparable from critical thinking. 
15 Lipman, Thinking in Education., 254. 
16 Zagzebski and Baehr’s motivational component of virtue and Adams’ engaging of the will are 
examples in which virtue theorists have accounted for ‘caring’ for a goal. 
There are other components of caring thinking that Lipman describes that deviate from 
caring as effort: the appreciative—which he describes to be typified by acts such as prizing, 
valuing, celebrating, etc.; the active—organising, participating, managing, building, etc.; the 
normative—requiring, obliging, compelling, etc.; the affective—liking, fostering, honouring, 
etc.; and the empathic—considerate, compassionate, nurturant, etc.17 It is a curious point that 
empathic thinking gets a list of adjectives rather than gerunds—perhaps this is gesturing 
towards the type of person one is if one is empathic rather than the types of activities one 
performs. In any case, attempting to find a goal for caring thinking from the list Lipman 
provides is difficult, as the items run together critical, caring and creative aspects of thinking 
(organising, valuing, building, etc.), as it is his thesis that these coagulate into his 
‘multidimensional thinking’.  
An interpretation, therefore, of at least one of the goals of the caring component of the 
social practice of thinking within a community of inquiry could be to ensure everyone feels 
encouraged to share their opinions. Speaking imagistically, the goal of caring thinking is to 
provide warmth to the cold of critical thinking. Though critical thinking and caring thinking 
may share in an ultimate goal (of reaching the truth, or realising the human potential, or the 
production of epistemic goods), their interim goals differ. If their ultimate goal was reaching 
the truth, then encouraging people to share their epistemic assets rather than self-consciously 
guarding them might contribute to this goal. We can say that Bob succeeded in being critical, 
but unfortunately failed in being caring—he found multiple salient errors in what people were 
saying, but he failed to take into consideration their feelings, and reduced several members of 
the group to tears. We can also say that Bob succeeded in being caring, but failed in being 
critical—in focussing too much on encouraging others to speak, he lost track of the purpose 
of discussion, and his nurturing and polite nature caused him many times to accept falsehoods 
on the basis of bad evidence, leave errors in reasoning unaddressed, and dubious assumptions 
17 Ibid., 271. 
unchallenged. The goals of the community of inquiry differ from the individual goals of 
critical thinking, caring thinking and creative thinking; in a community of inquiry, members 
must suspend many (not all) of their critical activities in order to provide the environment and 
time in which to work things through.  
3.3 Critical thinking virtues as the virtues of inquiry 
Recently, Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby have argued, as I do, that the critical thinking 
dispositions are best conceived from the agent-centred perspective that virtue epistemology 
offers. They further argue that these virtues are best described as the virtues or reasoned 
argument and inquiry: 
We maintain… that arriving at reasoned judgments is the central goal of argumentation/critical 
thinking. … [W]hatever the particular role or intention [of those involved in the argument], 
because the ultimate epistemological goal is to reach a reasoned judgment, the normative 
structure of the practice necessitates inquiry and thus the various virtues of inquiry.18 
Bailin and Battersby hold that the aim of all argumentation and critical thinking is reasoned 
judgement, regardless of the role played within the social argumentative environment. Bailin 
and Battersby use the example of a courtroom. They claim that the judge, jury, prosecution, 
and defence altogether are in the business of inquiry through reasoned-argument. However, it 
does not follow on this basis that individually each role has the aim of reasoned-argument. 
Simply because an entire practice can be characterised as aiming for a reasoned judgement 
does not mean every element in the practice must have the same aim. It might be argued that 
those with different roles within an endeavour know that they are playing a role, and know 
that their role requires specific behaviours to reach the aim of the endeavour—like the scientist 
who knows she is part of an enterprise involving the epistemic division of labour—however, 
it does not make sense to say we should characterise individual practices in terms of the 
practice of the overarching whole. Taking Bailin and Battersby’s example of the courtroom 
18 Bailin and Battersby, “Fostering the Virtues of Inquiry.”, 3.  Bailin and Battersby’s use of 
‘elsewhere’ refers to: Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby, “Beyond the Boundaries: Critical Thinking 
and Differing Cultural Perspectives,” Ethics and Education 4, no. 2 (October 2009): 189–200. 
having the goal of reaching a reasoned judgement: the goal of a good defence lawyer is not to 
come to a reasoned judgement, but to maximise the chances of his client’s case being 
appreciated by the magistrate or jury. This is not reasoned judgement, this is advocacy. A good 
judge, simply because she must apply the rules of evidence, will at times have aims that are 
necessarily opposed to reaching a reasoned judgement; a judge may exclude evidence which 
she knows to be epistemically relevant, but unfair or inadmissible. A good judge will not admit 
as evidence a confession obtained through torture, even if the confession could be used towards 
reaching a reasoned judgement regarding whether the defendant is guilty.19 
As seen in scientific pursuit, there is a division of labour in the courtroom; the overall 
institution has social purposes which the individuals do not share. At this stage it is valuable 
to consider at what times one is in the situation of simply wanting to reach a reasoned 
judgement. A contender from Bailin and Battersby’s courtroom might be those who find 
themselves in the jury, where one has a goal to reach a reasoned judgement based on the 
performances of the judge, prosecution and defence. A good jury should be discussing the case 
in the way in which Bailin and Battersby have envisaged: the 12 Angry Men model of inquiry; 
however, even the jury cannot seek evidence or clarification in reaching their decision. Bailin 
and Battersby’s goal of fostering the virtues of inquiry is excellent for the classroom. 
Removing bias and rancour, and democratically discussing controversies while seriously 
weighing one side and then the other, then filling in gaps of knowledge is an admirable 
educational aim. However, the world does not operate with such an Olympian view. 
A similar approach to Bailin and Battersby is offered by David Cohen, who argues 
that the ‘argumentative or critical virtues are the acquired habits and skills that help us achieve 
19 Of course, this is an over-simplification of the rules of evidence. Both epistemic and legal 
considerations are given to excluding evidence, such as hearsay or evidence obtained through 
unlawful means. However, these complications serve to reinforce the point that even the judge has 
aims beyond a ‘reasoned judgement’, or that the judge’s aim is a ‘reasoned judgement reached in a 
particular way’. 
the goals of critical thinking.’20 There is a clear overlap in the skills and habits that help one 
achieve the goals of critical thinking and argumentation, just as there is an overlap in the skills 
of many intellectual pursuits, but the goals of critical thinking and argumentation are not the 
same. Despite claiming argumentative virtues are those that achieve the goals of critical 
thinking, Cohen’s further explication places argumentative goals as the aims of critical virtues 
(which he holds to be the same as argumentative virtues). 
What are the critical virtues? Critical virtues can be defined by the goods that they help us 
procure and by the accomplishments that they help us achieve in the course of argumentation. 
That means we need to identify the positive goods that can be achieved by argumentation. 
Logic, rhetoric, and dialectic all have their own distinctive accomplishments: logical success 
is valid derivation; rhetorical success is rational persuasion; dialectical success is critically-
achieved consensus.21  
If argumentative virtues aim at argumentative achievements, then this is non-controversial. 
However, it is wrong to claim equivalence between argumentative virtues and critical thinking 
virtues, and argumentative aims and critical thinking aims. The aims of critical thinking are 
neither consensus nor persuasion of others (though the skills of critical thinking will help in 
these endeavours).  
Andrew Aberdein argues that ‘virtue argumentation holds out the possibility of a 
systematic basis for the frequently unanalyzed appeals to moral obligations to be found in 
many discussions of reasoning.’ 22  Moral obligations may or may not be present in 
argumentation, but my thesis is that they are a separate concern to critical thinking. Critical 
thinking is a far more individualistic activity; its value is not in convincing or agreeing with 
others, or being honest towards them, but in reaching a decision which is one’s own. 
The practice of inquiry, and argumentation to some extent, is necessarily social, but 
there are many different ways of being social. There is social inquiry, where genuine other 
20 Cohen, “Keeping an Open Mind and Having a Sense of Proportion as Virtues in Argumentation.”, 
54. 
21 Ibid., 55. 
22 Andrew Aberdein, “Virtue Argumentation,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of International 
Society for the Study of Argumentation, ed. FH van Eemeren et al. (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), 1–9., 
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interlocutors are present and to whom one is accountable, where all are sharing information 
and discussing a topic with the goal of reaching a reasoned consensus. There is the sociality 
of strangers arguing on the internet or intimate partners deciding the best place to spend the 
holidays. These are all different phenomena. There is also a social aspect to making one’s 
mind up for oneself in the sense that nobody is an epistemic island; there are social aspects to 
the inputs and outputs of one’s thinking. However, critical thinking ultimately is a matter of 
one deciding for oneself what one really believes. Being a good critical thinker is different 
from being a good judge or scientist or lawyer. Bailin and Battersby argue the goal is better 
thought of as social inquiry (or even sociable inquiry) and that the practice of critical thinking 
is exemplified when we form communities of inquiry and cooperate. However, my claim is 
that where there is advocacy, representation, or epistemological divisions of labour, as there 
are in communities of inquiry, then these aims are different to critical thinking. The practice 
of critical thinking is an individual practice. It occurs when one is deciding about matters that 
are important, ensuring that one has taken into consideration all of the relevant information, 
whether one has sought out any missing information, whether one has been hoodwinked by 
others, whether one has internally-consistent views, and so on. 
Those involved in the teaching of critical thinking worry about offending others or 
being a bully. They work in classrooms and have seen far too often the way group debates and 
discussions can descend into unfruitful, egotistical one-upmanship. There are good reasons to 
avoid these situations, and any good critical thinking class will be as encouraging as it is 
critical. It will involve instruction on how to best use argumentative skills to reach reasoned-
judgements, and to apply these skills in a collaborative way that does not cause undue offence. 
However, the individual has concerns that differ from that of the group. The next section will 
explore my claim that the goal of critical thinking is intellectual autonomy. 
3.4 The goal of Critical Thinking is Intellectual Autonomy 
In this section I argue that the critical thinking virtues aim at intellectual autonomy, an ideal 
that promotes intellectual self-governance. 23 To have control over one’s beliefs means that 
one is not controlled by forces outside oneself—simply put, one is not fooled. I argue that 
there are three directions from which one can be fooled: by others, by oneself, and by chance. 
The critical thinking virtues can be seen as those that promote a kind of intellectual self-
defence against those things that can hold power over our beliefs. 
Intellectual autonomy as not being fooled is consistent with Lipman’s characterisation 
of critical thinking: 
the role of critical thinking is defensive: to protect us from being coerced or brainwashed into 
believing what others want us to believe without our having an opportunity to inquire for 
ourselves.24 
Lipman here is speaking of defence against others. His ‘brainwashed’ is too strong—‘fooled’ 
is more appropriate, but one also needs to be on guard against people who, as they are self-
deceived, are unaware they are actively propagating their deception. The sincere but ignorant 
person is often as much a source of misinformation as the liar.  
However, actions taken to avoid being fooled need to be performed with a mind to 
context. If in an argument where one interlocutor, due to a desire to save time or make things 
simpler, advances a generalisation to support his argument that is imperfect but completely 
acceptable in context, the autonomous person should accept it, as long as its imperfections can 
be reasonably judged to be not important. In contrast, someone who is overzealous about not 
being fooled will seize upon and challenge unimportant imperfections, and in their derailment 
23 Siegel identifies the relationship between critical thinking and autonomy: 
A central dimension of critical thinking is its interrelationship with autonomy: in so far as a 
student is a critical thinker, she enjoys an independence of judgment that is of fundamental 
educational importance. That is, she is free to judge (and act) independently of external 
constraint, in accordance with her own reasoned appraisal of the matter at hand. Harvey Siegel, 
“Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXI, no. 2 (2005)., 357. 
24 Lipman, Thinking in Education., 47. 
of the exchange, destroy all possibility of fruitful discussion. The tragic pedant is not 
autonomous in the way in which one who is not fooled is autonomous—the tragic pedant is a 
slave to his inability to overlook unimportant errors or irrelevant (mis)information. He is 
especially vulnerable to being fooled as he continues to miss the point by focussing his 
resources on the wrong area. For example, consider someone who is provided a spurious 
argument that also has several factual errors and grammatical missteps. A pedant may become 
transfixed by these missteps and spend a great deal of time offering minute corrections. Once 
these are fixed, the pedant may conclude that the argument is fine—completely missing its 
spurious character. By allocating limited cognitive resources on unimportant minutia, one has 
less left over for what is important. We may easily be distracted by a laser-focus on the details 
or be misled by deliberate small mistakes which mask a larger ulterior motive. For example, 
if people know their manager is a fanatic for grammatical errors, they could cunningly disguise 
weaknesses with strategic errors, in the hope their supervisor’s critical faculties would be busy 
chasing and correcting the poor grammar and thus less likely to spot the larger concern in their 
proposals, budgets, or arguments.  
We can extend Lipman’s self-defence account of the ends of critical thinking to also 
include defence against the deceptions that originate from within. These sorts of self-
deceptions include biases, the misapplication of heuristics and a natural propensity towards 
wishful-thinking. Daniel Kahneman’s work on Type 1 and Type 2 types of thinking here 
outlines the many ways in which humans predictably make errors in their cognition.25 There 
are many well-known general thinking errors to which humans are prone, and one should be 
aware of these in order to not be their victim; however, in addition to these species-specific 
biases there are individual-specific errors of which a person must be cognisant in order to be 
25 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011)., and 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s work on biases and heuristics: Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, “Subjective Probability: A Judgement of Representativeness,” Cognitive Psychology 3 
(1972): 430–54; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgement under Undertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases,” Science 185 (1974): 1124–31; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 313–27. 
intellectually autonomous. For example, consider the person who knows she is prone to 
credulity when placed in confronting situations. Whenever an argument escalates to become 
socially-uncomfortable or if an opponent becomes aggressive, this person, out of a desire to 
keep the peace, will tend to agree rather than stand by their convictions, or attempt to find an 
unwarranted, but safe, middle-ground. The intellectually autonomous person will recognise 
the potential for this character flaw to undermine her autonomy and take steps to defend against 
its destructive impacts. Perhaps she will avoid unnecessary or unproductive situations that look 
like they may become unpleasant, perhaps she will develop ways in which she can approach 
arguments so as to not provoke others to aggression when asserting opposing views, perhaps 
she will simply notice the increased urge to agree and stop herself from doing so until she has 
time to reflect when the pressure has passed. 
There is also a positive component to intellectual autonomy. It is unrealistic to expect 
that this positive component involves building up the sure foundations of knowledge through 
private meditation; more realistically, it involves the disposition and skill to be responsible for 
one’s beliefs about things that are important. It is important to distinguish intellectual 
autonomy at play here from the type of autonomy characterised by one who is obstinately 
ignorant of the beliefs of others. A person who has formed a belief in his early years and 
deliberately ignores or instantly rejects all evidence to the contrary is in one regard his ‘own 
person’, but he is not intellectually autonomous as he is controlled by chance. His beliefs are 
ruled by the order in which he came across them. Intellectual autonomy does not mean one 
should stubbornly or fanatically stick by one’s own opinions no matter what. Instead it 
captures a different type of autonomy where one’s beliefs are one’s own based on one’s powers 
to convince oneself reasonably about things. We do not want to be someone who believes 
everything they were told when they were a child, or who has passively received all epistemic 
goods from others; conversely, we do not want to be a person who does not believe something 
unless they have personal sensory evidence of the event or fact in question. There is a golden 
mean: one seeks to be a person who decides who the experts are, and believes them insofar as 
their expertise warrants faith, and is guided to seek out more reasons.  
 In response to concerns raised by John Hardwig that by relying upon the expertise of 
others, one is—and should be—intellectually dependent on the intellectual activity of others, 
Harvey Siegel explains that this seeking out the expertise itself is a case of autonomy. 
[A]cceptance of… expert opinion, if it is to be rational, requires quite a bit of critical reasoning. 
[An agent] must establish that she is epistemically dependent in the case at hand, that she either 
is unable to remove her dependence or would be irrational to endeavor to do so, that the expert 
on whom she is dependent is indeed expert, etc. Even in genuine cases of epistemic 
dependence, then, it is not irrational for the non-expert to think for herself; nor does rationality 
require an uncritical or passive acceptance of expert opinion.26 
Although a person may be ‘epistemically dependant’ upon others, this does not undermine 
their autonomy, which exists in determining who the relevant experts are and what one’s 
response should be in the light of their testimony and one’s own evidence. The fact that 
knowledge comes from others is not a problem for the concept of intellectual autonomy—
action in a world in which experts exist demands that one should play an active role in seeking 
those experts out. However, this still allows for one to be epistemically-dependant on one’s 
past self. Scherkoske argues that 
Not all epistemic borrowings are from others; often our debt is to our earlier selves. We 
remember that we believe something but no longer know precisely why we believe it… In the 
regulation of our beliefs, we extend ourselves to borrow upon the resources of others as well 
as our earlier selves.27 
People who have been careful and conscientious in the formation of their beliefs should be 
confident when they face new or contradictory evidence to a degree dependent on the level of 
care they have taken in the development of their beliefs.28 
26 Harvey Siegel, “Rationality and Epistemic Dependence,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 1, no. 
20 (1988): 1–6., 3. 
27 Greg Scherkoske, Integrity and the Virtues of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013)., 111-112. 
28 A question has been raised whether the rules of rationality or reason could be a source of 
heteronomy, since they appear to be influences beyond the self. Mark Schroeder succinctly responds 
to this question with his own: “[H]ow could any heteronymous source of rules gain the kind of 
authority over every rational agent which we so readily take rationality to have?’(p 309). See his 
article for a full defence. 
A distinction must also be made between the intellectually autonomous person and the 
lazy agnostic: a person who does not actively seek out any reasons, and forms no belief unless 
sufficient evidence is laid at his feet. By emphasising the social role of autonomy we may see 
how the lazy agnostic is not autonomous. The lazy agnostic lives in a world in which one 
cannot be responsibly agnostic on important things. Decisions on important things are 
necessary in order to properly function as a member of society; and to properly make these 
decisions, one needs to acquire large amounts of information. Autonomy demands actively 
seeking evidence to best make inevitable and necessary epistemic choices: What diet and 
exercise regimen is best for my health? Is it moral to eat animals? For whom should I vote?  
Do I believe in human rights? Should I buy the product from the infomercial? Appropriately 
answering these questions requires one to actively seek out evidence. Passive recipients of 
arguments, rather than being autonomous, would be shackled by their ignorance and paralysed 
by a lack of knowledge; thus epistemic autonomy requires positive epistemic actions. The lazy 
agnostic who wishes to stay officially neutral and sceptical until somebody provides him with 
convincing evidence, who will not grant belief—but will not deny it either—but simply state 
he does not know, is not autonomous. He is entirely dependent on other people or luck to 
provide him with convincing arguments. 
One cannot be equipped to not be fooled if one is not curious or diligent in seeking 
out information. Those who attempt to engage with a topic with a few first principles in logic 
and innate scepticism seem to be bad critical thinkers because they simply do not know 
enough. Ignoring whether the premises are true forces one to pose hypotheticals—“If this were 
true, then this would follow.” To evaluate an argument one needs two things, not just a grasp 
of the logical structure but also a grasp of the plausibility of premises. Autonomy does not 
mean a complete withdrawal from the problems of the world; rather, intellectually autonomous 
persons can epistemically fend for themselves, and operate with independence in an epistemic 
Mark Schroeder, “Scope for Rational Autonomy,” Philosophical Issues 23, no. 1 (2013): 297–310. 
environment—and this requires the acquisition of epistemic goods, and to not leave this 
acquisition up to chance. There are certain matters which are so significant that one does not 
have a reasonable choice whether to have an opinion about them. Hoping that one’s parents 
were right, or the last person one spoke to was honest, or that one’s first reaction to a 
controversial question was the correct one, makes one’s beliefs entirely contingent on chance.  
This conception of autonomy has Kantian roots, where independence and 
imperviousness to others is not enough, but rather autonomy is a response to one’s own powers 
of reason. The Enlightenment tradition requires one to be one’s own person and to take on the 
crucial task of deciding for oneself rather than outsourcing all intellectual work for important 
matters. Kant describes it in this way. 
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is 
inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another. This minority 
is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without direction from another.29 
Critical thinking is the heir to, or at least a part of, a lasting tradition of Enlightenment thinking 
as a kind of personal and social practice, and the virtues of critical thinking are those virtues 
which are central for the internal rewards of the practice of intellectual autonomy. 
Autonomy has long been argued to be an educational ideal.30 Robert Dearden argues 
that in seeking to foster autonomy, 
… what is being aimed at is the development of a kind of person whose thought and action in 
important areas of his life are to be explained by reference to his own choices, decisions, 
reflections, deliberations—in short, his own activity of mind. … 
A person is autonomous to the degree, and it is very much a matter of degree, that what he 
thinks and does, at least in important areas of his life, are determined by himself. That is to 
29 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, Trans. Gregor, Mary J,” in 
Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
30 Harry Brighouse argues that autonomy is an essential component of living well, and thus it is 
essential to instil these attributes skills through education: 
Without autonomy-related skills we are easily lost in the moral and economic complexity of 
modernity. This does not imply that no-one will hit upon, or at least approach, good ways of 
life without their aid, nor that rational deliberation is infallible. As in other areas of 
knowledge, inspired guesses, trusting the reliable communication of another, and 
manipulation by reliable others, can help us to discover how to live well. And rational 
deliberation confronts barriers. But in the absence of fortunate guesses and well-informed 
parents, children will be much better placed to enter alternative good ways of life if they are 
well informed about alternatives and are able rationally to compare them. Harry Brighouse, 
On Education, Technology (New York: Routledge, 2006)., 19 
say, it cannot be explained why these are his beliefs and actions without referring to his own 
activity of mind. This determination of what one is to think and do is made possible by the 
bringing to bear of relevant considerations in such activities of mind as those of choosing, 
deciding, deliberating, reflecting, planning and judging. Autonomy is thus possible not only in 
the philosophically fashionable field of morals, where many writers do indeed speak of rules 
or a code of one’s own, but in any field whatsoever where a person can have his reasons—in 
political judgments, consumer spending, planning a holiday, choosing or shaping a job, 
appraising the suggestions or expectations directed towards us by others, forming an aesthetic 
or scientific opinion, deciding whether we believe in God, determining our stance in relation 
to the acts of various sorts of authority and so on. Personal autonomy is not just part of morality, 
or solely a condition of moral ‘authenticity’. It is a much more pervasive personal ideal. 31 
According to Dearden, the value in autonomy as an educational ideal is partly instrumental, in 
that many social roles require its exercise. Also, perhaps more importantly, it is to be valued 
due to the ‘satisfactions of exercising this kind of agency and dignity which it is felt to accord 
to the agent.’32 Autonomy is contrasted to heteronomy, a state in which one’s actions and 
beliefs are governed by external forces; Dearden describes two sources of heteronomy: 
Firstly, a man’s thoughts and actions may be governed by other people. This would be so when, 
consciously or unconsciously, he is passive or submissive towards compulsion, conditioning, 
indoctrination, expectations or an authority unfounded on his own recognition of its 
entitlement. A second form of heteronomy would consist in a man’s being governed by factors 
which are, in a sense, in himself, but which are nevertheless external to his activity of mind. 
Examples of this sort of heteronomy might include the various forms of psychosis and perhaps 
also neurosis, together with physiologically based addictions and derangements.33 
Heteronomy can have its source in the deceptions or control of others, and in self-deception. 
Dearden’s examples of self-deception are quite extreme, but self-deception can be caused by 
biases, heuristics, or simple cognitive imperfections as well as the extremes of physiological 
or psychological disorders.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The aims of critical thinking differ from those of other intellectual endeavours, such as those 
found in scientific pursuit, the courtroom, communities of inquiry, and in argumentation. The 
31 R F Dearden, “Autonomy in Education,” in Education and Reason, Part 3 of Education and the 
Development of Reason, ed. R F Dearden, P H Hirst, and R S Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972)., 70-72. 
32 Ibid., 72. 
33 Ibid., 63-64. 
aim of critical thinking is intellectual autonomy—it is deciding for oneself. Intellectual 
autonomy draws from the Enlightenment tradition and attempts to realise certain fundamental 
goods of that tradition. This Enlightenment tradition has grown from the idea of the 
independent-minded person who will not be, or who tries not to be, fooled again. Out of this 
tradition has evolved a set of standards and internal rewards that makes it an intrinsically-
worthy human pursuit. The locus of attention here is not necessarily truth or happiness—it 
might well turn out that people would be happier if heteronomous, these are different 
matters—critical thinking aims at the personal worth of intellectual autonomy. The 
intellectually autonomous person recognises that she is awash with people trying to convince 
her of things, that she is prone to be impelled by personal biases and prejudices, and that it 
might be impossible to eliminate all chance from her knowledge acquisition. She may not have 
perfectly rid herself of all such influences, but she is successful insofar as we admire her for 
being her own intellectual person.  
4. The Virtues of Critical Thinking 
In this chapter I contend that the virtues of critical thinking are those that contribute to the 
establishment and maintenance of intellectual autonomy. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
intellectual autonomy is not simply standing on one’s own feet, independent of all the work of 
others; it is not being crippled by an inability to let unimportant errors slide; it is being a critical 
consumer of the work of others, and of one’s own work, within one’s obvious limitations. 
Intellectual autonomy is not to have discovered all truths for oneself—an impossibility in a 
complicated world—but it is to exercise one’s full critical faculties in the review and 
acceptance of the beliefs that one has about important matters. It is about making up one’s 
own mind about one’s own beliefs, not because one has been browbeaten into believing them, 
or because believing them is easy and convenient, but because one is convinced by appropriate 
evidence and arguments from legitimate authority that have been adequately sought out. 
I argue that the aim of critical thinking is intellectual autonomy. Autonomy is often 
mentioned as an educational aim related to critical thinking. For example, Siegel notes that 
autonomy is a necessary trait of the critical thinker 
The critical thinker must be autonomous—that is, free to act and judge independently of 
external constraint, on the basis of her own reasoned appraisal of the matter at hand.1 
In a later clarification he claims that ‘autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
critical thinking’ and it is ‘not a sufficient condition… because such reasoned appraisal might 
be of poor quality, and thus fail to satisfy the “epistemic quality”’ demands of the reason 
assessment component.’ 2 In my formulation, autonomy is a sufficient condition for critical 
thinking, but critical thinking is not a sufficient condition for autonomy, as one can think 
critically but be under the control of external forces. In this section, I identify the critical 
thinking virtues as self-awareness, prudent wariness, and conscientiousness. I argue that each 
1 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 54. 
2 Harvey Siegel, “Neither Humean Nor (Fully) Kantian Be: Reply to Cuypers,” Journal of Philosophy 
of Education 39, no. 3 (August 2005): 535–47., 542-543. 
virtue aims at a particular type of external success; self-awareness aims in not being fooled by 
others, prudent wariness aims at not being fooled by others, and conscientiousness aims at not 
being fooled by chance.3 It is possible to have a critical thinking virtue without being externally 
successful in its aims, and it is possible to reach one or two of the aims without reaching 
intellectual autonomy; however, jointly, these three targets are constitutive of intellectual 
autonomy. I distinguish these constitutive virtues of critical thinking from other, non-
constitutive and ancillary virtues.  
4.1 Self-awareness 
The virtues of critical thinking are those that contribute to intellectual autonomy. As I 
mentioned above, an important part of intellectual autonomy is the dispositions and skills 
needed for not being fooled about important matters. Three virtues can be identified here: self-
awareness, which is a virtue needed to know and believe in accordance with one’s cognitive 
strengths and weaknesses; prudent-wariness, a virtue required to identify and avoid the 
deception of others; and conscientiousness, a virtue of belief acquisition. These virtues 
specifically address three causes of heteronomy—first, the external government of one’s belief 
or action by other people; second, the internal government by processes that are not a proper 
function of reason; and third, the governance of one’s belief by chance.4  
Self-awareness is a similar virtue to intellectual humility. However, I contend that it 
is preferable to identify self-awareness as the virtue required for intellectual autonomy, as 
conceptions of intellectual humility often contain non-autonomous components. Humility is a 
virtue in the Christian tradition that in part includes the disposition not to think too much of 
3 I discuss the concept of external success in section 2.4.4 
4 Zagzebski notes that ‘[t]he self is intellectually heteronomous in this way when it permits states of 
belief to change or continue without conscientious self-reflection’ (p 258). I argue that it is important 
to recognise that intellectual heteronomy can also arise from the influence of others. Zagzebski notices 
this, and although she does not go so far as to say that we can be intellectually coerced by others, she 
does admit others may influence our beliefs: ‘commercial and political advertising are common ways 
of pressuring people to form particular beliefs even though the beliefs are not literally coerced.’ Linda 
Zagzebski, “Intellectual Autonomy,” Philosophical Issues 23, no. 1 (October 25, 2013): 244–61., 246. 
oneself. Indeed, overconfidence is antithetical to the aims of intellectual autonomy; one of the 
reasons our biases escape us is that we are too self-assured in our own cognitive abilities. 
Humility reminds us we are fallible and thus should take sufficient care in approaching 
epistemic situations that expose our failings. However, although one should be alert to the 
pitfalls that one may fall into, one should not think less of oneself than one ought to. There is 
a long convention of using the term humility to describe a virtue characterised by acting in a 
self-deprecatory manner rather than displaying a simple awareness of one’s shortcomings. 
Norvin Richards identifies concerns with the self-deprecatory view of humility. 
… there do seem to be praiseworthy people in the world, and this is awkward, if to be humble 
is to have a low opinion of oneself. For, such people are logically capable of humility and 
perhaps even especially praiseworthy for it. But, in them, humility would be erroneous, a 
matter either of ignorance or of self-deception. It is hard to see how such a thing could be a 
virtue at all, let alone an especially admirable one.5 
Ignorance and self-deception are clearly at odds with intellectual autonomy. By contrast, the 
virtue of self-awareness contains the same positive components of intellectual autonomy that 
intellectual humility contains, but without the invitation to self-deprecatory ignorance and self-
deception. Zagzebski, also conscious of the possibility of humility undermining autonomy, 
identifies ‘trust’ as a component of intellectual autonomy, of which trust of one’s own abilities 
is an integral part.6 In this sense, the type of intellectual humility sought as a component of 
critical thinking is not one that contains an irrational distrust in one’s own abilities. Richards 
concludes that humility is best regarded as ‘appropriately positive feelings about oneself, 
feelings founded not in error—as with the improperly proud—but in self-knowledge.’ 7 
Zagzebski also argues that if one interprets intellectual humility as ‘the virtue whereby a 
person is disposed to make an accurate appraisal of her own competence’ then it can be 
5 Norvin Richards, “Is Humility a Virtue?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1988): 253–
59., 253. 
6 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 160. 
7 Richards, “Is Humility a Virtue?”, 258. 
understood as the ‘mean between the tendency to grandiosity and the tendency to a diminished 
sense of her own ability.’8  
Zagzebski outlines a case in which intellectual humility undermines autonomy 
[Consider] the closed-minded, nonautonomous person who is afraid of being misled into 
falsehood because of his lack of confidence in his own intellectual powers. Of course, there is 
always the possibility that such a person has made an accurate assessment of his own abilities, 
in which case his lack of investigation of contrary views may not exhibit a vice. But let us 
suppose that he has genuinely underestimated his ability, and his lack of intellectual autonomy 
is motivated by a fear of being led away from truth. Such a person is similar to the individual 
who attempts to maintain moral innocence by avoiding persons and situations that might tempt 
him away from his moral values. In a sense both of these persons display a kind of integrity, 
but their excessive cautiousness… prevents them from growing in knowledge in the first case 
and moral awareness in the other.9  
In Zagzebski’s example, the non-autonomous person fails to be autonomous as he has 
underestimated his ability. Therefore, when identifying the constitutive virtues of intellectual 
autonomy, rather than use the virtue of intellectual humility—which comes with a history that 
requires one to introduce caveats that we do not mean it to include the vice of inaccurate self-
depreciation—it is simpler to use the virtue of self-awareness. One’s awareness of one’s 
strengths can lead one to be confident and even righteously aggressive in one’s formation or 
protection of beliefs, but humbleness (by some interpretations) in regard to the possession of 
one’s strengths can lead one to downplay them. Self-awareness is not opposed to autonomy in 
the ways in which various interpretations of humility can be; furthermore, the virtue of self-
awareness is fundamental to the positive components of humility. Richards’ brief summation 
that ‘humility consists in taking oneself no more seriously than one should’ shows that self-
appraisal is necessary before one decides how seriously to take oneself.10  
The external aim of self-awareness is to not be fooled by oneself, and to be aware of 
and appropriately responsive to one’s biases. As argued in the previous chapter, a virtue 
requires internal success, which is a function of intention and reliability, but it is possible to 
have a virtue without achieving its external aim. In the case of self-awareness, one can imagine 
8 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 220. 
9 Ibid., 192. 
10 Richards, “Is Humility a Virtue?”, 258. 
a case in which someone had been under a post-hypnotic suggestion to feel a gross dislike of 
vegans but be unaware of this disposition. Such a person could be admirable in his efforts to 
become conscious of how his biases may impact his decisions, but find that every time he is 
confronted with a vegan his temper rises, which he (wrongly) attributes to the ridiculousness 
of the vegan’s behaviour. He may go to Herculean lengths to not allow bias influence his 
opinions, but every time an epistemic state involves a vegan, he automatically forms a decision 
that is not his own. However, as he may still have a virtuous intention towards the good, and 
act in a ways that would reliably achieve the external aim under normal circumstances, he 
could still be virtuous even though he does not achieve the external aim of the virtue. Being 
under a post-hypnotic suggestion to detest vegans is not a normal circumstance.  
A more troubling source of circumstances that undermine the external success of the 
virtue of self-awareness is described by psychologists who argue we have unconscious 
motivations which are not accessible to us in any straightforward way, and we have to interpret 
ourselves with considerable skill to understand what they really are. One could be motivated 
by self-awareness, and go through all the motions of being self-aware, but fail due to a hidden 
or repressed motivation that is incapable of being accessed. The virtue of self-awareness is an 
ideal that we all fall somewhat short of because we struggle to fully understand our 
unconscious motivations. Being under the influence of a post-hypnotic suggestion is a clear 
case of something preventing a virtue’s expression yielding external success, but unconscious 
motivations are not—perhaps—abnormal at all. The skills of self-awareness include skills of 
self-interpretation and also the skills of listening to other’s reasonable views about ourselves. 
4.2 Prudent wariness 
The second virtue of critical thinking is that of prudent wariness. This is the virtue Lipman is 
referring to when he states that a part of critical thinking involves avoiding being 
‘brainwashed’. At its heart is an alertness to, a wariness of, the bad arguments of others, which, 
as it involves the skills and dispositions to avoid being hoodwinked, contributes to its owner’s 
intellectual autonomy. It has obvious links to self-awareness; by knowing that we are capable 
of making lazy cognitive choices, have the capability of deceit and the propensity to exaggerate 
if it is beneficial to our ambitions, we are more likely to identify these things at play in the 
epistemic life of others. A further way in which self-awareness and prudent wariness are 
linked is that self-awareness is often required in order to properly allocate one’s wariness 
resources. For example, if we know that we are more easily swayed in belief by those who 
wear suits, then we can allocate more wariness to situations in which we are confronted by 
suit-wearing persuaders, and perhaps give the arguments of non-suit-wearing persuaders a 
closer look.  
 Prudent-wariness has not being fooled by others as its external success condition. As 
before, one can have the virtue but never be externally successful. For example, consider 
someone who is motivated towards the good and who does all she could reasonably be asked 
to do to detect and avoid trickery, but who happens to meets an expert in illusion and 
misdirection and is fooled. In any normal situation, her wariness would have reliably achieved 
the goal of not being fooled by others, but this is not a normal situation—and other situations 
where she is not at the mercy of an expert illusionist tend not to fool her. She has the virtue of 
prudent-wariness without, on this occasion, managing the external success of it. She has failed 
to obtain perfect intellectual autonomy in this regard, but she is still virtuous and has acted 
virtuously.  
The virtue of prudent-wariness includes the capacity to identify when people have 
agendas, and what these are; that they will often provide glib reasons and apply a great deal of 
pressure to accept their agendas. The intellectually autonomous person will have both the skills 
and dispositions to epistemically respond to these pressures without giving away their 
autonomy. The vices at play here are gullibility, as typified by the person who agrees with the 
last person he talked to; and paranoia, as roughly typified by the conspiracy theorist. The goals 
of prudent wariness and self-awareness are not perfect epistemic infallibility, but rather a 
response to reasons in a manner that establishes and maintains intellectual autonomy. One 
should be aware that no matter how careful one is to avoid the deceptions of others, there will 
always be cases in which one will be fooled; and no matter how aware one is of one’s biases, 
there will always be cases in which one’s biases distort the interpretation of evidence. I will 
discuss the latter below in terms of the virtue of integrity. 
4.3 Conscientiousness 
As we saw above, rather than being an intellectual hermit or a stubborn fanatic, intellectual 
autonomy requires one to rely on the intellectual work of others. The virtues of critical thinking 
also are those that add to the acquisition of, and search for, best belief. Perfection in this regard 
is not the goal. We should know that we are fallible, and that others may succeed in fooling us 
despite our best efforts. So ‘best belief’ is best belief in the circumstances, and should be seen 
as an ideal to strive towards. Intellectual autonomy does not mean that after a brief survey of 
the arguments of experts that one is capable of casting a clear judgement about a complicated 
matter, but neither does it mean that decisions should be left to the experts alone. Lipman states 
that 
… autonomous thinkers are those who “think for themselves,” who do not merely parrot what 
others say or think but make their own judgements of the evidence, form their own 
understanding of the world, and develop their own conceptions of the sorts of persons they 
want to be and the sort of world they would like it to be.11 
The intellectually autonomous person cannot be one who leaves all intellectual work to others, 
as autonomy requires one to decide for oneself, and this involves determining who the experts 
are, what evidence is missing and what is appropriate belief or action given the circumstances. 
So in addition to the negative virtues of avoiding being fooled about important matters, there 
are virtues of critical thinking which are also positive, in that they are involved in self-initiated 
acquisition of beliefs. 
 The aim of conscientiousness is not being fooled by chance. As with the other virtues, 
there are ways that this can occur which prevent one from achieving the aims of the virtue of 
11 Lipman, Thinking in Education., 25. 
conscientiousness while still retaining the virtue. Say, for example, that you are motivated to 
find the answer to a question, and this requires you to survey the relevant literature. You are 
diligent and make an exhaustive search of all relevant articles, print them out and leave them 
on your desk. However, in a turn of bad luck, a cleaner spills your coffee while you are away 
onto a few papers, and covers his tracks by throwing them out. The removal of these papers 
causes you to conclude the wrong answer, or to not make an accurate appraisal of the relevant 
articles; so we cannot say you achieve the external goal of having your epistemic state not 
under the control of chance or circumstance. However, your behaviour is such that under 
ordinary conditions it would have led to an accurate appraisal of the literature. As such it is 
still virtuous. 
 The virtues of acquiring best belief are better represented in the virtue epistemic and 
critical thinking literatures than are the virtues of avoiding bad belief. Virtues that involve the 
search for belief include: open-mindedness, conscientiousness, intellectual perseverance and 
diligence. James Montmarquet claims that of these, conscientiousness is fundamental. In fact, 
as he defines conscientiousness as ‘a concern to find truth and avoid falsehood,’ Montmarquet 
would consider its full realisation would be inclusive of the virtues of prudent-wariness and 
self-awareness.12 Indeed, Montmarquet holds that the other intellectual virtues are regulatory 
of the overarching goal of the virtue of conscientiousness.13  
Fundamentally, the epistemic virtues (besides epistemic conscientiousness itself) are forms by 
which the latter may be regulated. Unregulated by these, bare conscientiousness (as we have 
seen) may degenerate into some form of intellectual dogmatism, enthusiasm, cowardice, or 
related evil.14 
Montmarquet describes three categories of regulatory virtues: the virtues of impartiality (that 
include ‘an openness to the ideas of others, the willingness to exchange ideas…, the lack of… 
personal bias directed at their ideas, and the lively sense of one’s own fallibility’); the virtues 
12 James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1993)., 59. 
13 Ibid., 25. 
14 Ibid., 25. 
of intellectual sobriety, (that ensure that one does not become too excited in one’s search for 
truth that one ‘embrace(s) what is really not warranted’); and the virtues of intellectual 
courage, (which Montmarquet describes as ‘the willingness to conceive and examine 
alternatives to popularly held beliefs, perseverance in the face of opposition…, and the 
determination required to see such a project through to completion.)15 A distinction at this 
juncture needs to be drawn between describing virtues as regulatory in the sense that they are 
necessary for the full realisation of an overarching virtue; regulatory in the sense that they are 
subordinate virtues, constitutive parts of an overarching virtue; and regulatory in the sense that 
they are causally influential, in that they are often seen in conjunction with the overarching 
virtue—or are usually useful in achieving its aims—but are neither constitutive of, nor 
necessary for the realisation of that virtue.16 Montmarquet subscribes to the former of these 
interpretations. For Montmarquet, ‘mere conscientiousness is not enough’; as 
conscientiousness is the pursuit of truth, this follows readily from observation of the many 
who dogmatically and passionately pursue truths that are plainly worthless. It is the regulatory 
virtues that Montmarquet cites that elevates the unvirtuous search and ‘love for truth’ to its 
virtuous form. Conscientiousness is the overarching virtue that is only realised—only becomes 
virtuous—with the proper functioning of other virtues, and it is they that are defined in its 
terms, not it that is defined in theirs. The regulatory virtues are ‘forms of conscientiousness.’17 
Montmarquet argues that by failing to exhibit other virtues, even if a person may be 
motivated to seek the truth (thus conscientious), she fails to be fully conscientious. However, 
there is reason to define conscientiousness as its own virtue, rather than to say that a person 
fails to reach full conscientiousness because of the failings of a separate virtue. Montmarquet’s 
configuration has conscientiousness as bare attitude of a love of truth; the remaining virtues 
15 Ibid., 23. 
16 Take courage as an example of a regulative (sometimes referred to as structural) virtue. Courage, 
roughly, helps us to achieve the goals of the other virtues when facing danger. One could be honest 
without being courageous, and one could be courageous without being honest. 
17 Ibid., 23. 
being the skills and performances involved in transforming the love of truth into the virtue of 
conscientiousness. However, one cannot say of others that they love the truth unless they are 
genuinely responsive to it, or turn away from it towards comforting self-deceptions; and 
neither can one say others have a love of the truth if they refuse to adequately seek it out. A 
virtue must have implicit in it competencies and dispositions, and the fact that one can fail at 
conscientiousness suggests that it does so too. Therefore, we should consider 
conscientiousness as its own virtue rather than a bare attitude that is regulated by other virtues. 
The other virtues are independently valuable—not just valuable because of their contribution 
to conscientiousness.  
Montmarquet has chosen conscientiousness to be a higher good, of which other 
intellectual virtues help in the realisation. However, conscientiousness can be defined more 
narrowly to mean something more like diligence, not simply a desire for truth, but the 
motivation and skill to investigate and acquire information to the extent demanded by the 
situation. If a student claims to have had an experience with a teacher in which the teacher 
acted unprofessionally, a conscientious investigation by university administrators does not 
require Montmarquet’s ‘love of truth’ but rather the ability and determination to diligently 
attempt to get to the bottom of the situation based on the severity of the allegation. 18 
Furthermore, a ‘love of truth’ by itself may lead people to bury themselves in unimportant 
minutia, endlessly and aimlessly collecting facts purely for the joy of collection.  
Conscientiousness, defined as the disposition to apply appropriate diligence to the task 
of acquiring knowledge is a vital component in the achievement of intellectual autonomy. 
Zagzebski observes that conscientiousness gives rise to trust in oneself. 
A conscientious person has evidence that she is more likely to get the truth when she is 
conscientious, but she trusts evidence in virtue of her trust in herself when she is conscientious, 
not conversely. Her trust in herself is more basic than her trust in evidence, and that includes 
evidence of reliability.19 
18 Ibid., 23. 
19 Zagzebski, “Intellectual Autonomy.”, 255. 
Trusting that one has been diligent and has canvassed all the relevant evidence is closely-
related to the trait of carefulness. When inevitably confronted by complicated situations and 
competing claims, the autonomous person requires the ability and motivation to acquire and 
process information, rather than being paralysed by ignorance and waylaid by the unreliability 
of information acquired by chance. The virtues of critical thinking are those that lead to 
intellectual autonomy, they are not simply those that contribute to conscientiousness—though 
diligence in obtaining truths and avoiding falsehoods is certainly a component. For this reason, 
conscientiousness should not be seen as the overarching virtue of critical thinking, but rather 
a component. The other virtues of self-awareness and prudent wariness are separate from 
conscientiousness, and should not be seen as merely regulating it.  
In defining conscientiousness more narrowly, it is useful to consider its opposites, 
which are laziness, lack of carefulness, and apathy. The lazy person does not take the time to 
discover the truth; he cuts corners and does not properly investigate important matters. Thus 
perseverance is a quality that is at times necessary to be conscientious. A further way in which 
one may fail to be conscientious is by failing to be open-minded. The conscientious person 
must face up to facts that may be unpleasant, and many situations require one to examine 
deeply-held personal beliefs. The intellectually autonomous person is prepared to hear 
opinions that she may not like and judge them on their own merits. One must be curious as to 
how good the premises are, what alternative premises there might be—one way of being fooled 
about principles is not thinking about what alternative principles might exist, and a great deal 
of epistemic life has to do with judging what the missing or alternative premises of an 
argument might be.  
 The three virtues of critical thinking I have described are those whose targets are 
constitutive of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual autonomy is a matter of having one’s beliefs 
governed by one’s own best reason, rather than influenced by one’s bias or others’ deception. 
Part of this includes the responsibility to attempt to acquire best beliefs. Many intellectual 
virtues are missing from this list. These, like in the case of intellectual courage and honesty, 
are regulative rather than constitutive. The next section addresses this distinction: most 
conceptions of critical thinking include a long list of positive intellectual qualities, of which 
honesty is almost always one. By not including it and others as integral virtues I am departing 
from a long tradition of including most positive intellectual activities as critical thinking 
dispositions. It is my claim that critical thinking is not about the entire compass of intellectual 
life, and thus does not include every positive intellectual aspect of life. The ideal critical 
thinker, though sharing many similarities, is not the equivalent of the ideal scientist, the ideal 
student, the ideal teacher, the ideal judge, or the ideal member of a community of inquiry.  
 To clarify the relationship I propose between the critical thinking virtues and 
autonomy, consider the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between the critical thinking virtues 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the virtues of critical thinking are interlocking—one cannot really have 
one without some measure of the other. Battersby and Bailin describe how self-awareness is 
at times necessary for conscientiousness:  
No one escapes the historical context in which he or she lives. Everyone can, however, become 
much more self-aware about this context and its influence on their point of view. We reject the 




‘‘view from nowhere,’’ striving for the regulative ideal of objectivity is one that can be 
facilitated by personal, intellectual and cultural self awareness.20 
Zagzebski, too, argues that ‘higher degrees of conscientiousness require considerable self-
awareness and self-monitoring.’21 The virtue of conscientiousness requires one to be wary of 
one’s self and others in one’s search for best belief; the virtue of prudent-wariness requires 
one to be conscientious in formation of one’s belief but also aware of one’s weaknesses to 
certain types of deception; and the virtue of self-awareness requires one to be conscientious in 
one’s introspection and cognisant of others’ appraisal of one’s weaknesses and strengths. 
However, as described above, each of the virtues of critical thinking also contain an 
independent component, in that there is a great deal more involved in their full realisation than 
is involved in the parts that interlock. For example, some introspective parts of the virtue of 
self-awareness do not require one to exercise the virtue of wariness of others, and so on. The 
aims of each of the critical thinking virtues are jointly constitutive of intellectual autonomy. 
For clarity, this relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. 
20 Mark Battersby and Sharon Bailin, “Critical Inquiry: Considering the Context,” Argumentation 25, 
no. 2 (April 9, 2011): 243–53., 251. 
21 Zagzebski, “Intellectual Autonomy.”, 255. 
 Figure 2: The relationship between the aims of the critical thinking virtues and 
intellectual autonomy 
Recall that there is also an active component to conscientiousness, and that not being fooled 
by chance requires one to actively seek out evidence for beliefs about important matters—this 
design does not build up the picture of an the intellectually autonomous person in a purely 
negative way, as we are describing one who achieves these aims in the course of living a rich 
epistemic life. If one has been successful in doing so while not being fooled in one’s 
acquisition of belief, then one has achieved intellectual autonomy—one is self-governed.  
4.4 The relationship between the critical thinking virtues and other 
intellectual virtues 
In this section I situate the virtues of critical thinking amongst other intellectual virtues that 
are ancillary, but non-constitutive, or that supervene on the critical thinking virtues. In the next 
chapter, my aim is to order a list of positive qualities in the vicinity of critical thinking into 
those qualities and skills that are central and those that are supportive. The aim is to provide a 
teleological conception of the social practice of maintaining intellectual autonomy to the extent 
one can. We will never have perfect introspective powers of self-awareness, and we will never 
catch every deception of others. An intellectually autonomous person would not outsource her 
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opinions to others about things that matter; but on the other hand she would accept when she 
is not an authority and that she does really depend on the cognitive labour of others in all sorts 
of ways. However, depending on the cognitive labour of others is not outsourcing one’s views 
to them. The intellectually autonomous person is one who is the critical consumer of the 
opinions and views of others, while on guard against deceptions both foreign and domestic. 
There are many virtues of critical thinking that are regulatory, in that they are causally 
influential in achieving the goals of intellectual autonomy without constituting them. For 
example, politeness is an admirable quality that is, most of the time, conducive to the goals of 
the critical thinker. Politeness may aid in accessing valuable reasons that would not be 
available through impoliteness. However, politeness is not constitutive of critical thinking as 
there are many cases in which politeness is detrimental—or of little use—to the achievement 
of intellectual autonomy. For example, the virtue of politeness may obligate someone to take 
the time to listen to lamentable arguments simply because they are deeply-held by a sensitive 
person. This may range from being trapped at a dinner party by a family-member who wishes 
to share with you their abhorrent political views, or enlighten you on the details of an intricate 
conspiracy theory, to the more subtle trend in science-reporting in which equal time is given 
to opposing views with little thought to the relative credibility of each of these views.22 Indeed, 
a person may need to at times be extremely impolite in order to maintain her intellectual 
autonomy. In this sense, although politeness is a virtue which provides benefits for intellectual 
autonomy in many cases, other situations exist in which the aims of intellectual autonomy and 
politeness are clearly opposed. This is not the case with the three virtues of critical thinking 
previously listed; we cannot imagine a situation in which the virtue of being self-aware 
undermines intellectual autonomy, neither a situation in which the virtue of prudent wariness 




or the virtue of conscientiousness are counterproductive to the attainment of intellectual 
autonomy. 
A different relationship can be seen between the virtue of open-mindedness and the 
virtues of critical thinking. Rather than being a constitutive virtue, or an ancillary virtue, the 
open-mindedness that is necessary to achieve intellectual autonomy supervenes on the virtues 
already described. Baehr notes that open-mindedness must be moderated by other virtues:  
Open-mindedness, intellectual caution or intellectual tenacity, for example, are unlikely to be 
very helpful for reaching the truth if possessed in isolation: open-mindedness typically must 
be tempered by a kind of mindfulness and adherence to arguments and evidence, intellectual 
caution by a firm commitment to discovering the truth, and intellectual tenacity by a 
willingness to revise a belief or course of enquiry if the evidence finally calls for it.23 
Conscientiousness engages open-mindedness, but the other critical thinking virtues provide it 
with direction to ensure it does not lead to gullibility. People who fully realise the virtues of 
conscientiousness and self-awareness will already be open-minded to the extent that is needed 
for intellectual autonomy; they have the self-awareness of their biases that normally close their 
mind, and they have the conscientiousness to face these despite the pain or discomfort of doing 
so. One who is open-minded in this way will also have the dispositions and skills to seek out 
alternative information, and these are inherited from conscientiousness. 
People who are self-aware, who know their own imperfections and realises they are 
blinkers, and who wants to find the truth will be open-minded to the extent that open-
mindedness is necessary to be a critical thinker. There is open-mindedness about relevant 
evidence one encounters or should seek out regarding a belief that one is concerned about; 
however, this does not mean there is not an extreme or further part of open-mindedness that is 
not part of critical thinking on the basis that it does not contribute to intellectual autonomy. 
For example, creativity, or creative problem-solving may require an open-mindedness that 
may be separate—or even opposed—to the project of intellectual autonomy. Classroom 
23 Baehr, “Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology.”, 210. 
brainstorming activities require open-mindedness, with many expressly admonishing students 
not to be critical during the process. 
Intellectual courage—taken as the courage to stand up to and not be intimidated by 
strong, articulate, charismatic and bullying people when they do harm to one’s beliefs—is 
again not a virtue constitutive of intellectual autonomy. It is certainly the case that we probably 
could not succeed in manifesting the critical thinking virtues without having some measure of 
courage. However, it makes complete sense to talk of the cowardly critical thinker, or one who 
is intellectually autonomous but who does not engage in confrontations, even when it would 
be virtuous to do so. There is a separate aspect of intellectual courage as the ability and 
disposition to turn one’s critical faculties diligently towards painful or deeply-held beliefs, 
though this is closer to the virtues of open-mindedness and perseverance, which as above were 
seen to supervene on other conscientiousness and self-awareness. 
All other virtues, like courage, as a practical matter, are needed in most circumstances 
to exercise the constitutive virtues of critical thinking; however, there are circumstances in 
which you might not need any courage to be a critical thinker. This is different from the 
constitutive virtues of prudent-wariness, conscientiousness, and self-awareness—there is no 
way that an ordinary person could be intellectually autonomous without these virtues. These 
virtues are necessary, whereas the others are contingent. What is important about the critical 
thinking virtues is that they are not simply bare attitudes, but they have competencies attached 
to them. To be prudently wary of others is not just to be reliably on one’s guard, but requires 
one to have sophisticated powers of assessment. Without these powers of assessment, one is 
not really wary. To be conscientious does not merely mean that one sincerely professes a love 
of truth; and to be self-aware, one cannot simply be committed to untutored introspection. The 
competencies that are part of the full realisation of these virtues are the most teachable aspect 
of them. Critical thinking teachers attempt to teach the attitudes involved in the virtues of 
critical thinking, however we are on much more solid ground teaching the competencies—one 
reason being that the competencies are easier to measure than the attitudes. This will be 
investigated further in the section 6.2 where the critical thinking debate is revisited. 
The virtue of integrity poses a more complicated problem. Integrity in part means that 
one is true to one’s word, and in another means that one is true to oneself.24 Stan van Hooft 
holds that ‘[i]ntegrity… can be expressed in honest actions or in authentic reflection about 
oneself.’25 Though honesty is clearly a virtue, there is nothing contradictory in saying that 
someone is intellectually autonomous, that he is his own person, but he regularly lies, and fails 
to follow through with his promises. In this sense, the first aspect of integrity is non-
constitutive of critical thinking; however, the latter component is, as it contributes to 
intellectual autonomy. If one does not have a minimum level of consistency, what is there to 
be autonomous about? Someone who is he ‘own person’ must be conservative to some extent 
in her beliefs; she should not be in the habit of simply abandoning a belief if the most recent 
piece of evidence is bad for it. Somebody who does not have consistency of belief, to an extent, 
will not really be a candidate for intellectual autonomy. If one has the critical thinking virtues, 
and one is successfully realising them, then integrity will also obtain to the extent it is relevant 
to intellectual autonomy. As with open-mindedness, there are plenty of other important parts 
of integrity that go beyond critical thinking. Integrity is its own excellence. 
The question remains as to the extent one should be conservative about one’s beliefs. 
At what point does conservatism turn into bias, and thus impinge upon the virtues of self-
awareness and conscientiousness? There is a risk that conservatism leads to fanaticism; 
however, without it, one simply ends up at the whim of the most recent evidence. The value 
of the conservatism of integrity consists in not throwing away hard-won epistemic victories 
due to recent reversals. For example, if I receive word that a close friend of mine whom I hold 
in high regard, acted cruelly towards a toddler, and all my previous dealings with my friend 
24 Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael P Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 81 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003). See also Stan van 
Hooft, “Integrity and the Inchoate Self,” Philosophy Today 39, no. 3 (1995): 245–62. 
25 Stan van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics (Chesham, U.K.: Acumen, 2006).128. 
have not in any way suggested that he has the propensity to act in such a way, the story should 
not be sufficient to overthrow my high-opinion. However, if another person who is a mere 
acquaintance of my friend hears the story, then she has a greater reason to allow it to shape 
her opinion. One obvious explanation of the difference in belief is that I have more evidence 
about my friend than does the mere acquaintance. I will discuss this below. A separate 
explanation may be that I have a loyalty to my friend, and thus ought not to automatically 
countenance any bad news about him, whereas the mere acquaintance does not have this 
obligation. However, this introduces a moral component to doxastic conservatism. Whether 
there is a moral component of integrity that compels one to act against intellectual virtues is 
an interesting question. Damian Cox argues that the moral virtues lead (and should lead) to 
epistemic vices.26 We often admire people who stand up for their beliefs and even who display 
a measure of irrationality in doing so; however, this loyalty to belief or to others is not part of 
the virtues of the critical thinker. For our purposes, the moral aspect of conservatism of belief 
can be considered to be separate to intellectual autonomy. If in the name of loyalty I deny a 
preponderance of evidence that my favoured political party’s policies are on the whole 
misogynistic, or that my friend is a habitual toddler-tormentor, I am ignoring evidence for a 
non-intellectual reason—whether or not doing so is a moral or an immoral thing is another 
matter. If the denial of evidence originates from a rejection of my own powers of reason due 
to an allegiance to a creed, friend or belief, then I am not intellectually autonomous; I am 
instead ruled by obligations of loyalty. 
 The second component of integrity—being true to oneself—is a component of 
intellectual autonomy; however, drawing the line between instances of doxastic conservatism 
that are due to stubborn bias and those that are due to a proper conservatism of belief is 
difficult. Richard Paul highlights this point in that ‘… people often cannot distinguish moral 
26 Damian Cox, “Judging Character,” American Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2013): 387–98. 
from religious conformity, or demagoguery from genuine moral integrity.’27 However, in the 
previous example involving my friend and an alleged tormented toddler, a distinction between 
me and the mere acquaintance hearing a story about my friend can be drawn. For me, the story 
is new evidence that must be judged in the light of the old; for the acquaintance, perhaps the 
only thing she has heard about my friend is that he picks on toddlers. We have different 
doxastic histories; my ‘net balance’ of evidence needs to be updated in light of the new 
information, but in doing so I need to consider the possibility that I have only seen my friend 
during his best moods, or may have interpreted acts as assertive that may rightly be called 
cruel. If my friend comes up clear on all accounts, and I cannot detect any bias in these, the 
single disconfirming story would be insufficient for me to change my opinion.28 It makes sense 
to respond to evidence in different ways if one has previously encountered a different set of 
reasons. However, the concept of integrity goes further than a simple prudent recognition of 
the epistemic status of past beliefs; without some level of consistency of belief, autonomy is 
undermined. This conservatism of belief, rather than being grounded in its power to preserve 
identity, can be grounded in what Greg Scherkoske describes as ‘well-placed self-trust’. 
Scherkoske argues that reliance on the epistemic work of others and one’s past self is an 
inseparable part of our intellectual life: 
… [I]t is fair to characterize our epistemic and practical agency as an economy that would not 
function but for debt. We borrow on the expertise, knowledge and skill of others; our future 
selves borrow on the epistemic work of our present selves. Our beliefs, intention, plans and 
convictions are shot through with such debt and reliance. While our live, epistemically 
conservative response courts risk, self-trust is a virtually indispensable condition, allowing us 
the capacity and skill needed for judgment and planning and leading to more or less settled 
convictions about what to believe and do. Self-trust, then, forms the basis for having a settled 
set of convictions, values and plans that we call our own.29 
27 Richard Paul, “Critical Thinking: What, Why, and How,” New Directions for Community Colleges, 
no. 77 (1992)., 14. 
28 Unless, of course as Hume states ‘the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more 
miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.’ David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)., 83. 
Siegel, “Neither Humean Nor (Fully) Kantian Be: Reply to Cuypers.” 
29 Scherkoske, Integrity and the Virtues of Reason., 128-129. 
It is interesting at this juncture to draw attention to the similarities of the language used by 
Scherkoske and that of Ennis, who defines critical thinking as ‘reasonable reflective thinking 
focused on deciding what to believe or do.’ 30  For Scherkoske, the ‘settled convictions’ 
afforded by self-trust are ‘virtually indispensable’ for the type of activity Ennis describes. 
For Scherkoske, ‘self-trust is trust in the reliability of one’s opinions, or in the things 
in one’s self that generate those opinions—one’s cognitive faculties, one’s judgement, one’s 
epistemic habits and practices.’ 31  Self-trust is a normal and necessary component of 
intellectual life, as 
… most of us, most of the time, are epistemic conservatives. Even though the balance of 
reasons for our beliefs and intentions would likely improve if we bothered to get more 
information and consider it carefully, we typically don’t. Such conservatism might suggest a 
largely passive phenomena, a kind of laziness or diffidence. But this would be misleading, for 
in fact epistemic conservatism involves dispositions to positively avoid revising these 
attitudes: it is expressed, in part, as a positive bias in favor of an agent’s present beliefs and 
intentions. Of course, given our limited time and cognitive capacities, this couldn’t be 
otherwise for most of us. We have many cognitive and practical goals, limited time and 
resources, and in regulating our beliefs, convictions, intentions and plans, at any given moment 
we often have no choice but to go with what we’ve got. With limited powers of memory, we 
cannot keep track of most of the evidence we have for our beliefs. It may even be irrational, 
imprudent or simply self-indulgent to lavish more time subjecting our convictions, intentions 
and plans to further reflection.32 
Scherkoske is careful to note that though this conservatism may come at the expense of 
forming better beliefs, ‘epistemic conservatism is neither a counsel of willful ignorance nor 
obviously sinister: it is simply an economical (though defeasible) disposition to not engage in 
continued evidence-gathering and deliberation once beliefs and intentions have been 
formed.’33 Rather than a defence of bias, or special-pleading for the epistemic superiority of 
one’s own beliefs, integrity requires well-placed self-trust. According to Scherkoske, self-trust 
is well-placed if the convictions ‘were formed and maintained by a set of capacities for 
judgment that reliably support reasoned and defensible convictions.’34 Furthermore, well-
30 Ennis, “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Abilitites and Dispositions.”, 10. 
31 Scherkoske, Integrity and the Virtues of Reason., 125. 
32 Ibid., 116-117. 
33 Ibid., 117. 
34 Ibid., 129. 
placed self-trust ‘involves the weighing of considerations for reconsideration.’35 The well-
placed self-trust component of integrity is thus compatible with the virtues of critical thinking 
hitherto described: an agent with well-placed self-trust has no strong reason to believe that 
they have formed their convictions through non-virtuous processes, or that they are deluded 
or brainwashed. The virtue of conscientiousness requires an agent to assess one’s convictions 
and one’s conviction-forming processes, and the virtue of self-awareness requires an agent to 
be aware of personal weaknesses in conviction-forming processes. As mentioned previously, 
self-awareness is not entirely negative, but also provides the courage to rely on one’s 
convictions on the basis that one would be aware under what epistemic conditions they were 
formed. The well-formed self-trust of integrity therefore supervenes on the virtues of 
conscientiousness and self-awareness. The consistency of belief we expect from integrity is 
thus contained in the virtues of critical thinking.  
Impartiality poses an interesting problem, as failing to be impartial in a particular way 
means one is under the influence of external or internal forces and thus not autonomous; 
however, it makes no sense to treat one’s own values from a fully-impartial perspective as this 
is basically not having values and is not a positon of autonomy as one is alienated from one’s 
stance. If one is going to achieve intellectual autonomy, it is best not to start acting as if one’s 
beliefs are not one’s own. To address the concern of whether there is a way to be intellectually 
autonomous and exercise the critical thinking virtues while being impartial, consider a 
situation in which your values are being challenged. The critical thinking virtues appear as 
though they demand that you step aside and assess the relative merits of one side and the other. 
However, on what basis can you do this? Value questions cannot be addressed with a view 
from nowhere and a person in possession of the critical thinking virtues is not going to do this. 
Critical thinkers assess reasons to see whether they are strong from their perspective. Given 
they believe certain things, they will determine whether there has been anything raised that 
35 Ibid., 131. 
should change their mind. If a contradiction in their belief is pointed out, they would have 
grounds to address this; if it is pointed out that their belief led to consequences they do not 
accept, they would have to address this as well. If it is pointed out that the belief was based on 
a lie or self-deception that they had not noticed, or a genealogical history that they do not 
accept, they should revisit their belief. However, if the challenge to their values simply takes 
the form of offering an alternative, then this provides little reason to revisit their belief. One 
must be fair about one’s own beliefs without abandoning them or pretending they are not one’s 
own. To exercise personal autonomy, we need not abandon who we are and suddenly take a 
god’s eye view. There is no autonomy without some preservation of oneself. Autonomy means 
being open-minded, but it also means to have a level of doxastic conservatism proportionate 
to the degree of care one has taken in forming one’s belief. 
This leads us to an interesting question: “Can X be critical thinkers?” where X is ‘the 
religious’, ‘the conspiracy theorists’, ‘alternative medicine proponents’, and any of the other 
usual categories of people that draw fire from sceptic societies for their irrationality.36 Harvey 
Siegel identifies the impact of indoctrination on autonomy: 
If I have been indoctrinated, and so have developed or had fostered in me a non-evidential style 
of belief, I have been significantly harmed. My autonomy has been dramatically compromised, 
for I do not have the ability to settle impartially questions of concern to me on the basis of a 
reasoned consideration of the matter at hand. I am in an important sense the prisoner of my 
convictions, for I cannot decide whether my convictions ought to be what they are, and I am 
unable to alter them for good reasons, even if there are good reasons for altering them. Indeed, 
lacking the disposition to seek reasons, I am doomed to an unawareness of the desirability of 
aligning my beliefs and actions with the weight of relevant evidence. Consequently, my life is 
limited; options with respect to belief and action—and indeed of basic aspects of my lifestyle 
and beliefs about the worthwhile life (if I have any)—are forever closed to me, due to my 
predisposition against the contemplation both of challenges to my unreasoned but presently 
held convictions and of alternatives to them. I have been trapped in a set of beliefs I can neither 
escape nor even question; this is how my options, and my autonomy, have been limited. I have 
been shackled, and denied the right to determine, insofar as I am able, my own future. In being 
indoctrinated, I have been placed in a kind of cognitive straightjacket, in that my cognitive 
movements have been severely restricted. Worse, like the typical straightjacketed person, I 
have also been sedated—drugged—so that I don’t even realize my restricted plight. Such a 
36 Jim Mackenzie amusingly puts it: 
It is generally thought desirable that citizens should be able to think critically; a rough 
measure of the quality of education in a community is that it is inversely proportional to the 
sales of von Däniken’s works. In this respect there is reason to be concerned that our 
education systems are not doing very well. Jim Mackenzie, “On Teaching Critical Thinking,” 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 1991, 56–78., 56. 
limited life cannot be what we desire for our children, any more than we desire it for 
ourselves.37 
More specifically, Sharon Bailin describes religiosity as antithetical to the critical thinking 
project: 
… the value of critical thinking does seem to be an issue of dispute in contemporary society. 
Indeed, a flight from reason is evident in many ways, from the spread of religious 
fundamentalism to the proliferation of new age philosophy.38 
Furthermore, Stefan Cuypers suggests that critical thinking is opposed to some sorts of 
ideologies: 
… the enlightenment ideal of liberty is to live according to one’s rational knowledge, in 
contrast with living according to inarticulate custom and habit, suffocating ideology or 
religious taboo. In the same vein, critical thinking is independent thinking, free from external 
pressures.39 
Our view of autonomy does not require perfection but rather the exercise of the critical 
thinking virtues in response to reasons, and this response requires interpretation in the light of 
salient reasons one has encountered in the past. A new convert to a religion who fails to be 
wary of the seemingly-convincing deceptions of others, who fails to notice her own propensity 
to wishful thinking about the promise of an afterlife, and who is un-conscientious in seeking 
out the relevant counterarguments to the arguments put to her, is clearly not a critical thinker. 
This should come as no surprise, as one who buys a house while failing to be wary, self-aware 
and conscientious is also not a candidate for critical thinking; neither would someone who 
abandons their religion without wariness, self-awareness or conscientiousness.  
Furthermore, the person who believes in religion simply for the reason that it is what 
he were taught to believe by their parents, has left the matter to the luck surrounding his birth. 
Bertrand Russell accuses Kant of this type of heteronomy: 
You all know, of course, that there used to be in the old days three intellectual arguments for 
the existence of God, all of which were disposed of by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure 
37 Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education., 88. 
38 Sharon Bailin, “The Problem with Percy: Epistemology, Understanding and Critical Thinking,” 
Informal Logic 19, no. 2 (1999): 161–70., 169. 
39 Stefaan E. Cuypers, “Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 38, no. 1 (February 2004): 75–90., 79. 
Reason; but no sooner had he disposed of those arguments than he invented a new one, a moral 
argument, and that quite convinced him. He was like many people: in intellectual matters he 
was skeptical, but in moral matters he believed implicitly in the maxims that he had imbibed 
at his mother’s knee. That illustrates what the psychoanalysts so much emphasize—the 
immensely stronger hold upon us that our very early associations have than those of later 
times.40 
However, if someone has an entire history of belief in a religion and meets an argument against 
it, as long as he does not ignore it, or attempt to square it with respect to his previous beliefs 
in a manner that is un-conscientious or self-aware of his weaknesses, then he may well deserve 
the title of critical thinker—his parents may have, after all, been right, and the virtues of critical 
thinking may reveal this. Others may claim that this sort of activity by the religious person is 
vicious apologism; that, to be a critical thinker, he would need to reject his core tenets, rather 
than engage in a creative introduction of complicating premises that allow for his core tenets 
and his disconfirming evidence to coexist. Richard Paul expresses concern for these cases; that 
teaching critical thinking as merely a set of skills can actually make people less likely to 
overthrow their beliefs, as they now have a sophisticated set of skills with which to rationalise 
their biases.41 However, although this is a risk, there is a more optimistic alternative view 
found in Toulmin, Rieke and Janik: 
[Upon moving to university, i]f a roommate challenges one of [your religious beliefs], we may 
find that we have no very solid reasons to offer in its support—we have never had, before now, 
to go beyond the fact that “everybody believes it.” Since our roommate will find this statement 
neither true nor sufficient, we shall need other reasons that may not be readily available. The 
result, according to the social psychologists, is that we are liable either to abandon the position 
rather quickly for lack of appropriate reasons or to fall back on some inflexibly dogmatic 
position. If we want to hold on to the beliefs in a critically defensible way, we must now 
provide ourselves with “reasons” of a new kind, more appropriate to this time and context. In 
fact (the psychologists suggest), a suitable process of “inoculation,” by which we expose our 
most cherished ideas to systematic attack and begin on the task of building up a more adequate 
body of reasons in advance of a serious challenge, may allow us to develop our own critical 
faculties in a way that prepares us to deal more robustly with future attacks on our beliefs.42 
40 Bertrand Russell, “Why I Am Not a Christian,” in Why I Am Not a Christian: And Other Essays on 
Religion and Related Subjects, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Touchstone, 1967). 11-12. 
41 Richard Paul, “Teaching Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’ Sense: A Focus on Self-Deception, 
World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis,” Informal Logic 4, no. 2 (1984): 2–7., 3. 
42 Stephen E Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York, 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979)., 10-11. 
Practically, there might not be an easy way to differentiate vicious apologism from virtuous 
investigation and justification; indeed, a great deal of argument consists of accusing one’s 
opponent of doing the former and proving that one is doing the latter. Similarly, there might 
not be an easy way to differentiate vicious premature-overthrows of long-held beliefs and 
virtuous awakenings from dogmatic slumbers. However, when wanting one’s worldview to be 
confirmed, there is a difference between bias and rational response to reasons; a person is not 
biased if she updates her worldview in response to reasons through exercise of the critical 
thinking virtues. The virtues of critical thinking include how one manages the reasons one 
already has and how to encounter new reasons.  
A critical thinking response to the evidence of the age of the earth will be different for 
the Christian fundamentalist and the secularist. The question remains, at which point does a 
belief disqualify one from being a critical thinker? A straightforward answer is any in which 
the belief precludes one from the exercise of the critical thinking virtues. Explicitly, this is 
obvious: if belief in a fundamentalist version of a religion denies people the ability to be open-
minded, or to conscientiously question certain tenets, then this would also preclude them from 
being critical thinkers. Brighouse argues that ‘autonomy with respect to one’s religious and 
moral commitments requires exposure to alternative views’; thus if one shuts oneself off from 
these views, one cannot be taken to be autonomous.43 Philip Henry Gosse’s infamous response 
to the evidence that the world is much older than is suggested by the Old Testament is a less-
explicit example. Accommodating this evidence with the hypothesis that God created the 
world with the appearance of being old, does not demonstrate a form of unquestioning belief 
explicitly, but it does so implicitly. Gosse has intelligently found a compatible accommodation 
of the appearance the earth is old with his beliefs that it is young—and to some extent this is 
compatible with the virtues of critical thinking—but he fails to be conscientious, as his 
hypothesis shows he is more concerned with protecting his belief than finding the truth. 
43 Brighouse, On Education., 24. 
Although Gosse appears to have not ‘shut himself off’ by attending to evidence that would 
refute his belief, on closer inspection he has done this in a way that shows he has shut himself 
off from the possibility it could refute his belief. A fully conscientious person would realise 
that the sheer implausibility of his hypothesis means that if one accepts it, one would accept 
almost any other hypothesis in the name of protecting one’s belief. In this sense, the belief is 
not being merely protected, it is held unfalsifiably—a behaviour which under normal 
circumstances would not lead to intellectual autonomy. This also follows for any of the Xs 
previously mentioned: if a conspiracy theorist believes with unquestioning commitment that 
9/11 was an inside job, and every piece of evidence to the contrary is creatively accommodated 
to the point where there is no possible evidence that could refute his belief, then he is not a 
critical thinker as he fails to be both self-aware and conscientious.  
Thus far the analysis has been mainly focussed on empirical matters, and conditions 
under which an agent may exercise conservatism of belief in virtuous or non-virtuous ways. 
However, axiological matters require a special mention, as, typically, one’s values are held 
more closely and are thought of to be a more important part of one’s identity that one’s 
empirical beliefs. Does this suggest that integrity differs in type between axiological and 
empirical matters? Scherkoske holds that this is not the case: 
If we understand integrity as a virtue of epistemic agency—as an excellence of the myriad 
ways in which people form, revise and express their convictions—then there is no need to posit 
distinct types of integrity. Integrity is a virtue of epistemic agency as it is manifest in 
judgement. There is no need to wonder what, if anything, is common to personal, moral, 
artistic, political, intellectual, professional and other kinds of integrity. Integrity has to do with 
the manner in which a person’s moral commitments are acquired, maintained, revised and 
expressed. In moral contexts, integrity is expressed in the way a person develops from being a 
passive recipient of moral testimony and training to being a morally competent, emotionally 
perceptive judge of ethical requirements and their application. This view of integrity handles 
moral convictions no differently than aesthetic, prudential or empirical beliefs.44 
Different types of integrity are not necessary for different types of conviction, even though the 
critical thinking response to an opponent’s rejection of one’s empirical belief will differ from 
the critical thinking response to an opponent’s rejection of one’s axiological belief. However, 
44 Scherkoske, Integrity and the Virtues of Reason., 139-140. 
this difference in response is unsurprising, as the appropriateness of response is determined by 
context. An empirical matter of life or death will warrant a different type of response than an 
empirically unimportant matter. The alternative-medicine practitioner will find an attack on 
the efficacy of their craft more painful than the person with little to no beliefs on the matter, 
as he derives more of his identity (and income) from this belief. Axiological commitments, 
such as that one should not eat meat, or that it is wrong for the government to provide 
healthcare, may lend themselves to being more deeply-held than empirical beliefs, and may 
often find themselves as more central to one’s identity. Indeed, the more one derives one’s 
identity from a belief, be it axiological or empirical, the more careful one must be to maintain 
one’s autonomy—at the least, one needs to ensure that the strength of one’s belief is not 
unfairly distorting one’s appraisal of evidence. We have pet beliefs as well as pet values, and 
it is partly through conservatism of these that we derive our identity. However, for it to 
contribute to autonomy, this conservatism must be formed, maintained, and updated through 
the use of the critical thinking virtues, and these virtues are sensitive to context.  
The virtuous conservatism of belief as a part of autonomy alerts us to the fact that 
creation, revision and exchange of convictions occur in an environment in which established 
convictions already exist. True impartiality is probably quite rare. If one is put in a situation 
in which one’s values are being challenged, it may be more difficult to step outside one’s view 
and blindly assess its merits. Autonomous people will not assess the position as though they 
have no belief; though, to benefit from a clear view, they may conscientiously follow the steps 
one would follow if one did not have a belief, paying close attention to possible pitfalls of bias 
and blind spots in their self-awareness. There is a difference in proceeding with an examination 
of relative merits in an impartial way and being truly impartial. We admire judges who are 
impartial in their processes, applications of the law, and judgements even if we know them to 
be personally biased—it may even follow that we admire their impartial conduct more if we 
also know them to not be privately impartial.  
In many cases, doxastic conservatism may lead someone to hold their beliefs, 
confident that they were formed with good epistemic practices, until an external challenge 
gives her reason to change her mind. This may occur if a contradiction in her beliefs is 
identified, or if her beliefs are shown to lead to unacceptable consequences, or to be internally 
inconsistent. Scherkoske argues that the appropriate response when facing a challenge from 
an ‘epistemic peer’—one who has access to the same evidence and is equally careful when 
forming beliefs, but has reached a different conclusion or opinion—is to either suspend 
judgement, or ‘revise downward the confidence you have in the judgement.’45 
The virtue of integrity in the sense of being appropriately doxastically conservative 
supervenes on the virtuous response to reasons insofar as it is contributive to intellectual 
autonomy. The virtues of critical thinking express or capture the right kind of responsiveness 
to reasons. We are not trying to describe a perfect logical machine, but a person who obtains 
intellectual autonomy through exercising virtues, and persons come complete with a history 
of epistemic activity and established beliefs and values. That means that a measure of doxastic 
conservatism is essential, as it describes a response to reasons as an updating of the reasons 
one has already encountered and a trust in one’s past epistemic processes. The virtue of self-
awareness involves recognising one’s propensities to dogmatism and tendencies to doxastic 
weakness. The virtue of conscientiousness involves attending to past reasons and ensuring that 
interpretation of new evidence is not unduly distorted by previous experience. However, the 
remaining component of integrity mentioned at the beginning of this section, being true to 
others, is not necessary for intellectual autonomy. We can easily imagine a lawyer who is a 
good critical thinker but who is also regularly dishonest; she is diligent in her acquisition of 
information, she is not being fooled by anyone, including herself, but she often uses her skills 
of deception to mislead others and trick them into believing things that are untrue. Passmore 
45 Ibid., 122. Scherkoske also notes that of course not all challenges will arise from epistemic peers, so 
in cases in which one has a superiority to others, their challenges should have less of a power to 
‘unsettle one’s confidence.’ Ibid., 123. 
would argue that the lawyer is not misusing the critical spirit, but rather misusing her critical 
skills—stronger still, that she does not have the critical spirit, since the critical spirit, 
according to Passmore, is something that cannot be misused.46 However, Passmore’s critical 
spirit conflates critical thinking with intellectual integrity. Indeed, the lawyer may fail in other 
aspects of intellectual life, such as in her duty to the truth; however, she has not failed to be a 
critical thinker. There is nothing in the concept of intellectual autonomy that demands for its 
achievement that one not stand in the road of others achieving their own. One may be a terrible 
person by doing so, but one would be terrible in a particular way.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, by differentiating types of intellectual pursuits, I have shown that a great deal 
of what counts as excellent practice in the competitive pursuit of science and cooperative 
communities of inquiry are unrelated—and at points opposed—to the goals of critical thinking. 
The differences are best explained by the fact that scientists and members of communities of 
inquiry are working in different environments to the critical thinker; one is searching for 
epistemic success in a competitive environment, another is looking for success in a cooperative 
environment, and the critical thinker is looking for best personal belief. The search for best 
personal belief requires the establishment of intellectual autonomy. The establishment of 
intellectual autonomy requires achieving the aims of three key virtues: self-awareness, 
conscientiousness, and prudent wariness. Some virtues supervene on this list; for example, 
open-mindedness (insofar as it is necessary for the establishment of intellectual autonomy) 
supervenes on the achievement of conscientiousness and self-awareness; and the doxastically 
conservative component of integrity supervenes on self-awareness. Some virtues are non-
constitutive, but regulatory in the achievement of intellectual autonomy: politeness and 
honesty are examples of such virtues—these are sometimes necessary, most of the time 
conducive, and sometimes opposed to the goals of critical thinking. Critical thinking is a good 
46 Passmore, “On Teaching to Be Critical.”, and see my previous discussion in 1.2. 
thing, but it is not the only good thing. With a clearer account of what critical thinking is—
and is not—we can better understand how to teach it to our students. 
5. Theoretical Implications of a Virtue Epistemic Approach to Critical 
Thinking 
This chapter will outline the theoretical implications of the virtue epistemic approach to critical 
thinking. I have argued that act-centred critical thinking definitions have conflated critical 
thinking with good thinking. Good thinking in science differs from good thinking in, for 
example, law and journalism; the virtues are different and the practices are different. I have 
argued that the critical thinker is one who has the critical thinking virtues of self-awareness, 
prudent wariness, and conscientiousness. The external aims of each of these virtues are not 
being fooled in specific ways, and their achievement is constitutive of intellectual autonomy. 
In this chapter I compare this agent-based, teleological approach to critical thinking with the 
idealistic conception offered by Richard Paul, and the act-based approach offered by Robert 
Ennis. 
I argue that the portrait of the fully-virtuous, ideal critical thinker provides an 
unrealistic and unhelpful aim. Certain moral virtues are irrelevant—and sometimes opposed—
to certain intellectual pursuits. The ideally virtuous person does not provide a suitable aim in 
non-ideal contexts. In situations where there is a division of intellectual labour, or where one 
must operate with imperfect information alongside imperfect others, intellectual autonomy 
provides a more appropriate aim than perfection. I revisit the lists of dispositions and skills 
from chapter 1 and show that the agent-based account offered by the virtue epistemic 
conception of critical thinking provides greater clarity and order. The teleological conception 
of critical thinking, and the limiting of the critical thinking virtues to the three that contribute 
to intellectual autonomy, provides a powerful alternative to an open-ended, act-based approach 
in which critical thinking is described as wholly-satisfactory reason responsiveness. The act-
based approaches that dominate the critical thinking literature are too broad, and their open-
ended nature generates cumbersome and incoherent lists of dispositions and skills that must 
include contradictory and loosely-attached items to achieve completeness. What distinguishes 
my account of critical thinking from others, such as those offered by Ennis, is that it provides 
an ordered discipline that is best articulated from a clear teleological account of the practice. 
Some critical thinking theorists have been trying to make sense of what I claim is a virtue-
theoretic concept, so I argue that the best conceptions have been those that have been closest 
to offering the conception in virtue-theoretic terms, for example, those offered by Sharon 
Bailin and Mark Battersby, Harvey Siegel, and John Passmore. 
Finally, I turn to the question of whether the critical thinking virtues are always good 
to have. Extant conceptions of critical thinking have been preoccupied with concern about its 
misuse. Moral virtues and dispositions have been added to mitigate the harmful effects that 
may flow from those who misapply critical thinking. I argue that the critical thinking virtues 
are always good to have as they increase their possessor’s personal intellectual worth. Those 
with virtues have increased capacities, and these capacities may be used to do harm; however, 
I argue that this is a misuse of skills, rather than a misuse of virtue. The preoccupation with 
harm has led some conceptions of critical thinking to wrongfully undervalue elements of 
critical thinking which may pose a threats to others, such as scepticism and criticism, and 
overvalue elements that are non-constitutive of critical thinking, such as honesty and empathy.  
5.1 Benefits of a teleological approach 
In this section I compare my teleological approach to the idealistic conception offered by Paul, 
and the act-based approach offered by Ennis. I argue that full virtue is an inappropriate aim 
for an imperfect world. A realistic aim is intellectual autonomy, which is able to be approached 
in imperfect situations. This aim has the added benefit of consolidating lists of skills and 
dispositions.  
5.1.1 A teleological approach is preferable to aspirational idealism 
Richard Paul offers one the most influential conceptions of critical thinking that makes use of 
virtue terminology. However, I think Paul makes two errors by the lights of the virtue theoretic 
approach offered in this thesis. First, he subscribes to an implausible unity of the virtues thesis, 
in that he holds that the virtues of critical thinking he identifies cannot exist without all other 
virtues; and second, it is through this implausible conception of virtue that he develops the aim 
of critical thinking as the ideal thinker with full-intellectual virtue. It is my claim that this ideal 
is unrealistic and unhelpful, and that the aim of intellectual autonomy provides a better goal 
for people in an imperfect world.  
The ideal intellectual agent provides an inadequate teleology as the operation of a fully 
intellectually-virtuous agent Paul describes requires intellectually perfect contexts. Paul’s 
vision is a vision for people living in an ideal intellectual community, but in the real world, in 
the competitive world, the problem-solving world, in the economically-fraught world, in the 
world in which we divide intellectual labour, we do not always want or require people like 
this. However, even in an imperfect world, intellectual autonomy is still a worthwhile goal. In 
fact, intellectual autonomy is an important goal precisely because we live in a world which is 
epistemically imperfect; the importance of intellectual autonomy is proportional to the level 
of epistemic imperfection. Intellectual autonomy is not an important goal for a student in a 
primary-school mathematics class as there is little room for one to be one’s own person in 
matters of basic arithmetic and geometry, and the risks of a deceptive teacher or polluted 
sources of information are low. It is not an opportunity for the explicit expression of virtue; 
indeed the possession of the critical thinking virtues would lead one to not exercise them under 
such circumstances. Not every moment is an opportunity for courage, and the importance of 
courage is proportional to danger. I further develop this argument below after addressing 
Paul’s unity of the virtues thesis. 
Paul differentiates between ‘weak sense’ critical thinking (which is characterised by 
the critical thinking skills sans moral integrity), and ‘strong sense’ critical thinking (which is 
characterised by the critical thinking skills intermixed with other intellectual and sometimes 
moral virtues). He offers a picture of the critical thinker in terms of the virtues, and, as 
mentioned in section 1.7, Paul takes a pessimistic view of any education that is not intimately 
involved in teaching for the intellectual virtues. For Paul, this includes presumably the 
majority of college courses, as ‘the present structure of curricula and teaching not only strongly 
discourages their development but also strongly encourages their opposites.’1 He argues that 
education is failing even our ‘best students’, because 
[s]uperficially absorbed content, the inevitable by-product of extensive but shallow coverage, 
inevitably leads to intellectual arrogance. Such learning discourages intellectual perseverance 
and confidence in reason. It prevents the recognition of intellectual bad faith. It provides no 
foundation for intellectual empathy, nor for an intellectual sense of fair play.2 
Even the social psychologists behind the Dunning-Kruger effect do not offer as bleak an 
outlook of the pitfalls of minimum instruction as Paul.3 Indeed, one of the benefits of a ‘weak 
sense’ critical thinking education is that it would at the very least provide one with the skills 
to appreciate and avoid the slippery slope fallacy. It is at least not clear what perils a shallow 
but extensive coverage of poetry or algebra pose for our typical undergraduate; it is hard to 
imagine a renegade mathematician, arrogantly un-empathetic due to the vice-fomenting 
qualities of an introductory course in calculus. It is understandable that one may wish to stress 
the importance of a rich education, but since Paul does not provide any evidence or further 
argument in support of the undesirable consequences of the typical college curriculum, this 
alarmism seems more to be leading the reader to believe that the moral virtues are inseparable 
from intellectual pursuits, and, by extension, the intellectual virtues. A far more reasonable 
position is held by Siegel, who argues that ‘[t]he fostering of virtues generally—and of 
epistemic virtues in particular—is central to education.’4 Others also stress the importance of 
fostering the virtues without exaggerated rhetoric.5 
1 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.”, 164. 
2 Ibid., 164. 
3 Dunning et al.’s eponymous Dunning-Kruger effect is that those who are incompetent are more 
likely to overestimate their ability (due to an ignorance of their ignorance), and experts are more likely 
to underestimate their ability, partly because of their lack of ignorance and partly because they 
estimate (incorrectly) that other people are as competent as they are. 
David Dunning et al., “Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence,” Current Directions 
in Psychological Science 12, no. 3 (June 2003): 83–87. 
4 Siegel, “Is ‘Education’ a Thick Epistemic Concept?”, 462. 
5 To name a few: Jason Baehr, “Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice,” Journal 
of Philosophy of Education 47, no. 2 (May 16, 2013): 248–62; Harvey Siegel, “What (good) Are 
Thinking Dispositions?,” Educational Theory 49, no. 2 (1999): 207–21; Bailin, “The Problem with 
 Paul subscribes to a strong unity of the virtues thesis: ‘each intellectual (and moral) 
virtue in turn is richly developed only in conjunction with the others.’6 This variety of theory 
holds that to have one of the virtues, one must have them all. This differs from the weak unity 
of the virtues thesis that I defend, according to which the relationship between the virtues is at 
times contingent rather than necessary, and at times the existence of some implies the existence 
of others.7 Paul argues that it is not just the intellectual virtues that are unified, but both moral 
and intellectual virtues: 
Our basic ways of knowing are inseparable from our basic ways of being. How we think 
reflects who we are. Intellectual and moral virtues or disabilities are intimately interconnected. 
To cultivate the kind of intellectual independence implied in the concept of strong sense critical 
thinking, we must recognize the need to foster intellectual (epistemological) humility, courage, 
integrity, perseverance, empathy, and fairmindedness… 
The problems of education for fairminded independence of thought, for genuine moral 
integrity, and for responsible citizenship are not three separate issues but one complex task. If 
we succeed with one dimension of the problem, we succeed with all. If we fail with one, we 
fail with all.8 
Paul’s mélange of virtues does not make for conceptual clarity; nor does it help form the basis 
of a curriculum. Paul argues that teaching critical thinking in a ‘strong sense’ is a ‘necessary 
Percy: Epistemology, Understanding and Critical Thinking”; Christopher Winch, “Developing Critical 
Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 38, no. 3 (2004): 467–84. 
6 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.”, 168. 
7 Van Hooft identifies a psychological allure to the unity of the virtues, in that it is difficult to imagine 
cases in which an agent has one virtue but not others. 
I do not believe that this approach of positing a unity of virtues is of much help in the task of 
understanding what virtue is and of distinguishing one virtue from another. There is, however, 
an interesting psychological claim that is inherent in this approach: the claim that if a person 
is virtuous in one area of life then they are likely to be virtuous in other areas of life also. If a 
person is kind and caring towards those that are close to her, she is likely to be responsive to 
the needs of strangers as well. And this will give her a keen sense of fairness that might 
motivate her to act diligently and even courageously if the circumstances demand it, in order 
to pursue justice for all. Having some virtues very often leads to having others. To put the point 
negatively, it is difficult (although not impossible) to imagine a person who is selfish and 
unpleasant in some areas of life but who is kind and considerate in other areas of life. If these 
observations are correct (and they are empirical claims dependent on support by factual 
evidence), there would seem to be a psychological unity of the virtues. A virtuous person is 
likely to exercise a number of different virtues as different situations call for them. Moreover, 
as we shall see below, the exercise of one virtue very often also involves the exercise of others. 
But this does not imply that it is not useful to understand the individual virtue terms that we 
use and to distinguish them from other virtue terms. van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics., 
134 
8 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.”, 166. 
means to moral integrity and responsible citizenship.’ Therefore, we are no closer to a clearer 
conception of a critical thinker, but instead understand that, according to Paul, without certain 
attributes, all critical thinking is guaranteed to be selfish; and only the fair-minded person (and, 
thus the person with the entire gamut of virtues, since, for Paul, one virtue means all virtues), 
is unselfish.9 What is clear about Paul’s conception is that he believes that critical thinking 
does not exist unless it is either unselfish, or fully virtuous. This conceptions shares similarities 
to Ennis’ account, in that the ‘ideal’ or the ‘fairminded’ critical thinker is the real critical 
thinker and critical thinking that is not ‘fairminded’ or ‘honest’ is not critical thinking.  
The moral and intellectual virtues of the critical person, according to Paul, are as 
follows: 
1. Intellectual Humility: Having a consciousness of the limits of one’s knowledge, 
including a sensitivity to circumstances in which one’s native egocentrism is likely to 
function self-deceptively; sensitivity to bias, prejudice, and limitations of one’s 
viewpoint. Intellectual humility depends on recognizing that one should not claim 
more than one actually knows. It does not imply spinelessness or submissiveness. It 
implies the lack of intellectual pretentiousness, boastfulness, or conceit, combined 
with insight into the logical foundations, or lack of such foundations, of one’s beliefs.  
2. Intellectual Courage: Having a consciousness of the need to face and fairly address 
ideas, beliefs, or viewpoints toward which we have strong negative emotions and to 
which we have not given a serious hearing. … 
3. Intellectual Empathy: Having a consciousness of the need to imaginatively put 
oneself in the place of others in order to genuinely understand them, which requires 
the consciousness of our egocentric tendency to identify truth with our immediate 
perceptions or long-standing thought or belief. … 
4. Intellectual Good Faith (Integrity): Recognition of the need to be true to one’s own 
thinking; to be consistent in the intellectual standards one applies; to hold one’s self 
to the same rigorous standards of evidence and proof to which one holds one’s 
9 Ibid., 170. Paul writes: 
Let us now consider the interdependence of these virtues, how hard it is to deeply develop 
any one of them without also developing the others. Consider intellectual humility. To 
become aware of the limits of our knowledge we need the courage to face our own 
prejudices and ignorance. To discover our own prejudices in turn we must often empathize 
with and reason within points of view toward which we are hostile. To do this, we must 
typically persevere over a period of time, for learning to empathically enter a point of view 
against which we are biased takes time and significant effort. That effort will not seem 
justified unless we have the faith in reason to believe we will not be “tainted” or “taken in” 
by whatever is false or misleading in the opposing viewpoint. Furthermore, merely believing 
we can survive serious consideration of an “alien” point of view is not enough to motivate 
most of us to consider them seriously. We must also be motivated by an intellectual sense of 
justice. We must recognize an intellectual responsibility to be fair to views we oppose. We 
must feel obliged to hear them in their strongest form to ensure that we do not condemn them 
out of our own ignorance or bias. At this point, we come full circle back to where we began: 
the need for intellectual humility.  
 
antagonists; to practice what one advocates for others—and to honestly admit 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in one’s own thought and action.  
5. Intellectual Perseverance: Willingness and consciousness of the need to pursue 
intellectual insights and truths in spite of difficulties, obstacles and frustrations… 
6. Faith in Reason: Confidence that, in the long run, one’s own higher interests and 
those of humankind at large will be best served by giving the freest play to reason, by 
encouraging people to come to their own conclusions by developing their own 
rational faculties… 
7. Fairmindedness: Willingness and consciousness of the need to treat all viewpoints 
alike, without reference to one’s own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or 
vested interests of one’s friends, community, or nation, implies adherence to 
intellectual standards without reference to one’s own advantage or the advantage of 
one’s group.10 
According to Richard Paul and Linda Elder, the ‘opposites of the intellectual virtues’ 
(inexplicably evading using the word ‘vices’) are the traits of the undisciplined mind are shown 
in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Paul and Elder’s ‘opposites of the intellectual virtues’11 
Recall that Paul believes that ‘the present structure of curricula and teaching… encourages 
[these] opposites.’ Paul argues that the development of his critical thinking virtues ‘is an 
essential goal of critical thinking instruction.’12 However, this holism is problematic: these 
virtues are useful for many intellectual practices, and thus do not adequately describe critical 
10 Ibid. 169-170. (See Appendix 4 for the unabridged list.) 
11 Richard Paul and Linda Elder, Critical Thinking Skills for College Life: Tools for Taking Charge of 
Your Learning and Your Life, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2014)., 
26. 
12 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.”, 168. 
thinking. One who is an ideal member of a community of inquiry could well be said to be one 
who follows Paul’s regimen; though the case is not clear for the ideal scientist, who has less 
use for fairmindedness when pursuing her hypothesis. The intellectual virtues of different 
practices are obviously closely-allied with each other; an ideal teacher may have many or most 
of the attributes of the ideal student, but the fact that the ideal teacher is neither necessarily the 
ideal student, the ideal scientist, nor the ideal critical thinker shows that there are differences 
in the core constitutive virtues of each practice. Furthermore, different practices place different 
importance on different virtues; the ideal detective and the ideal social-worker may both 
require the virtue of conscientiousness in getting to the bottom of a ‘case’, but the detective 
can get by without the virtue of empathy—or even thrive despite (and, often as a result of) the 
vices (or ‘opposites of intellectual virtues’) of arrogance or insensitivity. 13  Providing an 
inflated description of critical thinking with the core constitutive virtues intermixed with all 
other virtues leaves the key excellences of the practice of critical thinking ill-defined. 
Specifically, components of Paul’s intellectual humility are unnecessary for critical 
thinking, as are components of his intellectual good faith. The requirements to not be 
pretentious, boastful or conceited; to honestly admit inconsistencies in one’s actions; and to 
practice what one advocates for others are not necessary for the critical thinker. By our 
formulation, these are regulatory virtues as at best they are causally-influential in the practice 
of critical thinking; they are not constitutive of it. Paul’s fairmindedness is unrealistic and his 
intellectual empathy is unjustifiably cynical. As shown in the previous chapter, a well-placed 
self-trust in one’s previous decisions and decision-making processes implies the unfeasibility 
in engaging an issue from a fully-neutral standpoint. A requirement of full impartiality is 
antithetical to the maintenance of intellectual autonomy, thus antithetical to the goals of critical 
thinking. A well-placed self-trust need not be egocentric or selfish, and long-held beliefs are 
not necessarily a source of bias.  
13 Conan-Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes and the more recent Saga Norén from the TV Series The Bridge 
provide fitting fictional examples of such detectives. 
Not only is it the case that not every one of Paul’s virtues are necessary for critical 
thinking, his picture of a fully intellectually-virtuous person makes for an unrealistic aim. As 
I have argued in previous chapters, full intellectual virtue is inappropriate in many contexts. It 
is not only that some virtues are more relevant depending on context, but that some virtues are 
opposed to the achievement of certain intellectual pursuits. Having full intellectual virtue is 
good for certain practices, but not others. The fully-virtuous person Paul describes is not 
necessarily an aim for every context, as in some situations, the fully-virtuous person would be 
ineffective. This person would not be one’s first choice as a lawyer to acquit one of a murder 
charge, nor would he be the best person to seek for a cure for a terrible disease. We want a 
Philip Marlowe type to help us solve a case of attempted blackmail, even if he is at many times 
incapable of intellectual fairmindedness and humility—in fact, we may want his help precisely 
for his unique combination of vices and virtues. We do not admire those who are intellectually 
empathetic towards those who do not deserve empathy and empathy misapplied in these 
situations does not increase personal worth. We do not admire scientists who give equal time 
to alternative hypotheses—we admire those who strive to advance their own with the 
knowledge that others are doing the same with theirs.  
Paul’s characterisation of the fully-virtuous critical thinker is not tied to a set of 
valuable—or realistic—practices. Paul’s ideal critical thinker suits an ideal intellectual 
situation, his virtues are exactly those that would suit a supportive, inclusive and community 
of inquiry made up of other ideal critical thinkers; in perfectly uncomplicated epistemic 
circumstances, surrounded by other perfect and happy participants who have no biases or 
hidden motives. In a non-ideal world, however, it is not helpful to set standards at this height, 
as at the very least, we know that not everybody else will reach them. The advantages of the 
teleological conception I advance, is that it is suitable for a non-ideal world as it is focussed 
on a goal of intellectual autonomy. This goal is generally achievable to a certain extent, and 
always adds to personal worth; personal intellectual worth is achievable insofar as the context 
allows for intellectual autonomy. 
I have argued that critical thinking aims at establishing intellectual autonomy, whereas 
Paul provides an aspirational picture of the ideal: for Paul, being a critical thinker is to have 
all of the intellectual (and some moral) virtues. Instead of imagining every intellectually-
admirable quality, and then building a picture of the exemplar of all of these virtues, it is better 
to first consider the practice. Different intellectual practices have different goals and virtues 
are tied to what is conducive to these goals. Autonomy is one of these goals, but being fully 
virtuous is not. The design of an ideal thinker for an ideal world that does not exist, 
furthermore, has less pedagogical use—we do not want to teach students to be perfect, what 
we want is to teach them to be their own person. In the real world, autonomy is a better aim 
than perfection. Paul’s position regarding the unity of the virtues can be interpreted as a 
concern for the misuse of critical thinking virtues. This is a concern which also appears in the 
act-based conception offered by Ennis, which I address below. 
5.1.2 A teleological approach is preferable to act-based conceptions 
Many influential critical thinking conceptions have hitherto produced lists of skills and 
dispositions which describe critical thinking, or build up the concept of the critical thinker out 
of competencies and attributes. In section 1.7.1, I argued that this act-based approach is 
ineffective on two main grounds: there is little coherence or coordination between these items; 
and building up a picture of a type of person with lists of dispositions is bound to be either 
incomplete or circular. The correct level of analysis is provided by an agent-based, teleological 
approach with the target of critical thinking being intellectual autonomy, the intellectual 
independence that one achieves by seeking out adequate evidence and by successfully not 
being fooled either by oneself or others. This approach is stronger than simply compiling a list 
of all of the different intellectual attributes that appear valuable in any encounter with reasons; 
critical thinking needs to be demarcated from other intellectual accomplishments. In this 
section, I return to some influential critical thinking conceptions to show the benefits of an 
agent-based, teleological approach.  
In section 1.1.1 we encountered Ennis’ lists of critical thinking dispositions and skills. 
Ennis argues that  
Ideal critical thinkers are disposed to: 
1. Care that their beliefs be true, and that their decisions be justified; that is, care to ‘get 
it right’ to the extent possible, or at least care to do the best they can. This includes 
the interrelated dispositions to do the following:  
a. Seek alternatives (hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources), 
and be open to them 
b. Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified 
by the information that is available 
c. Be well-informed 
d. Seriously consider points of view other than their own 
2. Represent a position honestly and clearly (theirs as well as others’). This includes the 
dispositions to do the following: 
a. Be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written, or otherwise 
communicated, seeking as much precision as the situation requires 
b. Determine, and maintain focus on, the conclusion or question 
c. Seek and offer reasons 
d. Take into account the total situation 
3. Be reflectively aware of their own basic beliefs 
4. Care about the dignity and worth of every person. This includes the dispositions to: 
a. Discover and listen to others’ view and reasons 
b. Take into account others’ feelings and level of understanding, avoiding 
intimidating or confusing others with their critical thinking prowess 
c. Be concerned about others' welfare.14 
Items 1 Care that their beliefs be true, and that their decisions be justified and 3 Be reflectively 
aware of their own basic beliefs from Ennis’ conception clearly are commensurate with the 
virtues of conscientiousness and self-awareness. However, Ennis has missed the virtue of 
prudent-wariness: none of his dispositions involve a concern for those who seek to impinge 
on one’s autonomy with poor arguments or trickery. This is a perplexing omission; instead of 
being wary to avoid the bad or misleading arguments of others, Ennis has his dispositions of 
the critical thinker overly concerned with not deceiving anyone else. Dispositions 2 Represent 
a position honestly and clearly (theirs as well as others’) and, particularly, 4 Care about the 
dignity and worth of every person are admirable traits: they are covered in the list of regulative 
virtues of critical thinking, and they are certainly components of good behaviour in terms of 
the social exchange of reasons; however, they are not components of critical thinking. If one 
wants to stress the point that one is morally obligated to behave with a mind to others, and that 
14 Ennis, “Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability.”, 171 (Ennis’ abilities 
appear in full in 1.1.1). 
there are certain pitfalls one can fall into while exercising one’s critical thinking powers (for 
example: arrogance, sophistry, dishonesty, ignorance, intimidation, and so on), then this is 
certainly a valid thing to do. It is not of value to add these to the dispositions of critical thinking 
on the basis that they are good behaviours. One may respond to this criticism by noting that 
Ennis is describing the ideal critical thinker. In citing components which differentiate the 
honest critical thinker and dishonest critical thinker, Ennis might be specifying what it takes 
for someone to be an ideal critical thinker. One might also argue that the friendly critical 
thinker is more ideal than the unfriendly one, just as the physically-fit critical thinker is more 
ideal than the critical thinker who maintains an unhealthy lifestyle. However, this approach 
does more to define ‘ideal’ than it does ‘critical thinking’. It is neither useful for conceptual 
clarity nor does it distinguish between the ideal thinker simpliciter, the ideal scientist, or the 
ideal member of a community of inquiry.  
Ennis explains why he has introduced these additional dispositions to his list of critical 
thinking dispositions and skills in terms of harm. Without them, critical thinking can become 
useless or ‘harmful’: 
The disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person is not required of critical 
thinking by definition, but in order that it be humane. I call it a “correlative disposition,” by 
which I mean one that, although not part of the definition of critical thinking, is desirable for 
all critical thinkers to have, and the lack of which makes the critical thinking less valuable, 
perhaps of no value at all, perhaps even harmful. … 
A criticism of critical thinking for a definitional omission of caring for the worth and 
dignity of every person could well be based on the unreasonable assumption that the concept, 
critical thinking, should represent everything that is good, an overwhelming requirement 
indeed. On the other hand, any educational program that includes critical thinking but not the 
correlative disposition to care about every person’s worth and dignity would be deficient and 
perhaps dangerous. The power of critical thinking unaccompanied by this correlative 
disposition could lead to serious trouble.15 
Ennis is therefore running together in his characterisation of critical thinking attributes he 
regards as definitional of critical thinking and attributes that he thinks make critical thinking 
attributes worth having. What Ennis is providing, is a moral argument for an extended 
characterisation of critical thinking. An unhealthy critical thinker is not dangerous in the way 
15 Ibid., 171-172. 
in which one who does not care about the dignity of people might be, and we do not want to 
inadvertently turn our students into villains by sending them out into the world with a set of 
sophisticated skills and a propensity to misuse them. It seems that Ennis is worried about the 
danger of strengthening the argumentative or rhetorical skills of people who may then go out 
and convince people on spurious grounds to believe or do bad things. A person who wins 
arguments they have no right to win could well be dangerous for this reason; however, the 
concept of critical thinking I am advancing is not about winning arguments, but is instead 
about the achievement and maintenance of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual autonomy is a 
valuable aim—it is not the only valuable aim, but it is also not a danger; somebody who has 
conscientiousness, self-awareness and prudent wariness is not necessarily a master rhetorician. 
She may have negative qualities, but this does not undermine the value of her critical thinking 
virtues. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the achievement of the critical thinking 
virtues at least is contingently tied to the achievement of other virtues. One who is virtuously 
conscientious, prudently wary, and self-aware has many excellent powers which make them 
more likely to believe and do well than someone without these powers. In short, the untutored 
amplification of skills may be dangerous or worthless, but the amplification of virtues is not.  
An analogy may be helpful here to illustrate the distinction between Ennis’ approach 
and the one I offer. In the interest of personal safety, a university might introduce a self-
defence course. One might argue that proper teaching of students to handle weapons or identify 
weak-spots in an attacker requires imparting both the skills and dispositions to not use them 
in a way that puts themselves or others at risk of harm—we would obviously not want to only 
drill students in kneeing groins and striking at jugulars. However, were we to develop an agent-
based, teleological account of the virtues of self-defence, physical integrity and safety would 
be the telos and obtaining that telos would require the establishment and maintenance of a set 
of virtues—say, for example, carefulness, tenacity, vigilance and courage. Their establishment 
is of value in that their possession adds to personal worth; these virtues in themselves do not 
pose any dangers. Some skills may be useful for the achievement of these goals—and weapon-
handling may be one of them—but as this would be learned with a mind to the establishment 
of personal security, it would come along with the propensity not to put oneself at risk. A self-
defence course may need added instruction to capture the ‘do-not-unnecessarily-put-others-at-
risk’ behaviours we would want from someone who knows how to skilfully weaponise an 
iPhone. There is nothing problematic about this. A good self-defence course may, if necessary, 
teach more than self-defence; it may teach ethics as well. But it should be clear that the two 
are distinct. 
The same thinking applies to critical thinking courses. A good critical thinking course 
will probably alert students to the value of being fair and cooperative with others, but this is 
achieving a separate goal than intellectual autonomy. It might be Ennis has caught himself 
adding the caveat of ‘proper use’ to his account of the dispositions of a critical thinker because 
of his propensity to set up these lists of skills and dispositions which include items that could 
be dangerous in the hands of an ill-motivated person. However, a virtue-theoretic approach to 
critical thinking ameliorates this problem. 
 Early definitions of critical thinking were criticised for focussing too much on skills, 
which are useless if not applied and dangerous if misapplied. Critical thinking dispositions 
were added to solve both of these concerns. However, my conception can be employed to draw 
out the distinction between dispositions as motivation to act, dispositions as being for the good 
of the virtue, and dispositions as being for the good as a whole. The shift in Ennis’ early 
dispositions, which clearly were dispositions as motivations to use critical thinking skills, 
towards those that include those that are moral can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7: Summary of Ennis’ 1987 and 1996 critical thinking dispositions 
1987 16 1996 17 
1. Seek a clear statement of the thesis or question  1. Care that their beliefs be true, and that their 
decisions be justified; that is, care to ‘get it 
right’ to the extent possible, or at least care to 
do the best they can.  
2. Seek reasons  
3. Try to be well informed  
4. Use and mention credible sources  
5. Take into account the total situation  
16 Ennis, “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Abilitites and Dispositions.” 
17 Ennis, “Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability.”, 165-182. 
6. Try to remain relevant to the main point 2. Represent a position honestly and clearly 
(theirs as well as others’).  7. Keep in mind the original and/or basic concern  
8. Look for alternatives  
9. Be open-minded  3. Care about the dignity and worth of every 
person. 10. Take a position (and change a position) when 
the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so  
11. Seek as much precision as the subject permits  
12. Deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a 
complex whole  
13. Use one’s critical thinking abilities  
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, 
and degree of sophistication of others 
 
The issues with dispositions that aim towards the moral have been discussed. Ennis’ 1996 
disposition #1 is closest to the type of excellence in being for the good that I am advancing, as 
it would be similar to the type of motivation that underlies the critical thinking virtues of 
conscientiousness, self-awareness and prudent wariness. However, critical thinking can and 
does occur without honesty and without ensuring dignity is preserved. A virtue approach 
simplifies matters—it is coordinated with success, so accounts for the motivation to act, and 
the action must be towards the good of the virtue, so accounts for right motivation—but it does 
not go as far as having the motivation towards aims unrelated to critical thinking. 
A further benefit from the teleological, agent-based approach I defend is that it affords 
rich guidance as to how the characteristics of critical thinkers should operate and interact with 
each other. For example, Ennis’s item 1(d) Seriously consider points of view other than their 
own does not give any clear idea to what extent one should seriously consider other views. 
Clearly, there must be a minimum of serious consideration of others’ views, but one should 
not seriously consider the views of others if they are of a type that should not be seriously 
considered. It is unclear which conditions should trigger this disposition, and what exactly is 
meant by ‘serious’. What are missing (although the qualificatory ‘serious’ gestures towards 
this) are appropriateness-conditions for the exercise of critical thinking dispositions and these 
are best provided by the conceptions of the end of the virtue. In a teleological conception of 
critical thinking, the value of the serious consideration of others’ views is contained in the 
virtue of conscientiousness, and conscientiousness is virtuous only insofar as it establishes 
personal autonomy. This provides a simpler way of dealing with potential counterexamples 
that can be directed towards lists of dispositions.  
A teleological conception of critical thinking with the aim of intellectual autonomy 
has several advantages to act-based conceptions, such as offered by Ennis, and those that aim 
towards the ideal of full intellectual virtue, such as offered by Paul. The addition of moral 
virtues or dispositions to the concept of critical thinking leads to confusion. If the aim of the 
critical thinker is to reach ideal virtue, then this does not distinguish critical thinking from any 
other intellectual activity. A concern of the misuse of critical thinking skills has led to the 
addition of supervisory moral dispositions and virtues, which steer the skills away from core 
critical thinking activities of sceptical analysis and criticism. This is an overreaction. With a 
clear aim of establishing intellectual autonomy, worries whether critical thinking is dangerous, 
immoral, or harmful dissipate—harm and immorality are separate concerns. Paul’s concern is 
with the misuse of virtues, or the worthlessness of some virtues if others—or all—are not 
present. In the next section, I argue with respect to Passmore and Siegel’s accounts of the 
critical spirit that the worry of the misuse of virtue proves to be misplaced. 
5.2 Can the critical thinking virtues be misused? 
The previous sections illustrated how certain critical thinking theorists’ worry about misuse of 
critical thinking leads to conceptual confusion and the presentation of unrealistic aims. To 
address the concern of misuse, Ennis posits non-critical thinking dispositions to oversee the 
others and the critical thinking skills; and Paul argues that the critical thinking virtues are only 
instantiated if it is the case that no other moral and intellectual virtues are breached—indeed 
that all are present. In contrast, Passmore and Siegel’s account of the critical spirit provides a 
clear distinction: skills are capable of misuse, but the critical spirit cannot be misused. I 
compare the incapability of misuse of the critical spirit to Zagzebski’s conception of virtue, 
and conclude that the virtues are valuable to have in all cases, as their possession always 
increases personal worth. Intellectual autonomy is a good thing; at least this is what the 
Enlightenment tradition tells us—it is a way of being grown up. I argue that the concern of the 
misuse of critical thinking virtues is misguided; establishing intellectual autonomy is always 
a valuable endeavour, even if achieving it temporarily results in a net amount of bad belief or 
action. Unlike some other intellectual goods, intellectual autonomy does not require a 
conception of the moral, though there is good reason to believe its achievement will increase 
the chances of the acquisition of other virtues. 
Zagzebski, in order to answer ‘the question of whether virtue is always a goodmaking 
quality of a person (i.e., it makes its possessor admirable)’ provides an example of a 
courageous Nazi. Due to the fact that the Nazi’s courage would allow him to commit greater 
evil than if he did not have the virtue, it is tempting to hold that the Nazi is ‘worse overall than 
if he were cowardly.’18  Paul clearly has a similar concern; a person would have greater 
capacity to do worse—or might even be worse—if the agent had some of the virtues and not 
the others. Zagzebski, however, argues that there are several ways to respond to this case: first 
by denying that the trait of the Nazi is courage; second, by holding that the trait is courage, but 
not of the virtuous kind; third, by holding that the trait is courage, but also holding that ‘virtues 
are not goodmaking in every instance’; fourth, and the response that Zagzebski regards as 
correct, holding that  
the [trait] exhibited by the Nazi… [is] courage… and that courage [is] always [a virtue] and… 
[is] always good to have, but the good-making properties of virtues and the bad-making 
properties of vices do not always add up arithmetically to yield a rating of the agent’s overall 
goodness.19 
Zagzebski’s reason for holding this position is that it takes less ‘moral work’ for the 
courageous Nazi to reach a higher level of ‘moral worth’ than the uncourageous Nazi. 
Although the courageous Nazi commits more evils than the uncourageous Nazi, and thus the 
uncourageous Nazi might be closer, arithmetically, in his lack of evil-makings to the 
18 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind., 91-92. 
19 Ibid., 92. 
courageous non-Nazi, the courageous Nazi is closer in terms of moral work needed to reach 
the courageous non-Nazi. 
A person with a virtue is closer to becoming a person with a high level of moral worth than he 
would be if he lacked the virtue, and this is the case even when the virtue makes him morally 
worse. … [S]ometimes when a person who is courageous, persevering, and loyal but is also 
committed to an evil cause is converted and embraces a good end, he excels morally in a very 
short time. Presumably this is because his courage, perseverance, and loyalty are qualities that 
make him learn virtuous living more quickly. He may even go from a paradigm of evil to a 
moral hero very rapidly.20 
For Zagzebski, virtues are always valuable to have, even if they make an agent worse overall. 
In this sense, virtues are capable of ‘misuse’—the courage of the Nazi is used to commit 
greater evil, but this is a problem with the Nazism rather than the courage. Zagzebski’s claim 
is that the one virtue is always good even in cases where it amplifies vices, as there is less 
moral work to do to in order to reach full virtue. I agree with this conclusion, but not on this 
basis. If virtues are characteristics that increase personal worth, as I have been arguing, then it 
is unclear how having less work to do provides greater personal worth than having more work. 
A personal worth conception of virtue, by contrast, provides a clearer rationale: virtues are 
always good to have, as their possession increases personal worth.  
In the previous section, I introduced Paul’s concern of the misuse of some intellectual 
virtues, if others were not also held. For Paul, critical thinking in the ‘weak sense’ can lead to 
misuse of critical thinking capacities, and that ‘strong sense’ critical thinking is a better aim. I 
agree. However, Paul’s claim that ‘… each intellectual (and moral) virtue in turn is richly 
developed only in conjunction with the others’ suggests that either intellectual virtues are 
impossible to exist in insolation, or that one is not good to have in isolation.21 In contrast, I 
argue that the critical thinking virtues are always good to have as they always increase one’s 
personal worth. 
The associated skills of critical thinking are quite clearly capable of misuse, whether 
it be those suggested by Ennis, or those that are acquired to achieve and maintain intellectual 
20 Ibid., 94-95. 
21 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.”, 168 
autonomy. Indeed, Passmore distinguishes between the skills of the critic and the critical spirit 
on the grounds that the skills of the critic are capable of misuse: ‘[A]n expert in the detection 
of fallacies can use his skill in order to conceal the fallacies in his own case, by drawing 
attention away from them, rather than in a disinterested attempt to arrive at the truth.’22  
However, for Passmore, although ‘[t]he skills of a judge, or the skills of a critic, can be used 
or misused; justice or the critical spirit can be neither used nor misused. And this is because 
neither being just nor being critical is a skill.’23 A Nazi with the skills of a critic, or the skills 
of a judge, would have a greater capacity for committing evil than the Nazi without these skills. 
The unskilled Nazi is far less dangerous. Passmore argues that ‘“[b]eing critical” is, indeed, 
more like the sort of thing we call a “character trait” than it is like a skill’, and his character 
trait of ‘being critical’ is to his ‘critical spirit’ as ‘being just’ is to ‘justice’.24 I contend that 
Passmore’s ‘being just’ and ‘being critical’ are actually virtues, and as virtues, they are also 
capable of misuse in the sense identified by Zagzebski; that they, in the same way but to a 
lesser extent as courage, have the capacity to amplify vicious qualities of the agent. For 
Zagzebski, misuse arises if the virtue is instrumental in the achievement of evil; whereas, for 
Passmore, a virtue cannot be misused, not because the virtue implies it cannot be employed in 
reaching an evil end, but that it cannot be employed at all—character traits are not ‘used’ in 
the way in which skills are ‘used’.   
Rather than being a virtue, intellectual autonomy is a state worth aiming at and 
achieving, like health, or happiness. Conceived in this way, intellectual autonomy is not 
something that can be misused or used in either Zagzebski’s or Passmore’s sense. Intellectual 
autonomy, like health, can be attained in the contexts of many other bad things—one who 
develops physical fitness can perform a higher number of violent acts, in a shorter time and 
with greater ferocity than someone who tires after one or two. In this sense, the concern of 
22 Passmore, “On Teaching to Be Critical.”, 28. 
23 Ibid., 28. 
24 Ibid., 28. 
misuse that Zagzebski addresses and that plagues Ennis and other critical thinking theorists is 
not a concern for intellectual autonomy.  
The critical thinking virtues may be part of the cause of being worse overall, but never 
the sole cause or primary cause. In the chapter 4 we saw that this can be the case when one of 
the critical thinking virtues is held without the others; conscientiousness in the absence of self-
awareness may lead one to diligently justify a bias. Having all of the critical thinking virtues 
does not inoculate against all forms of misuse. Consider the intellectually autonomous agent 
who is under the employ of the oil or tobacco companies. She is self-aware, so capable of 
successfully identifying her own intellectual weak-points and strengths; she is prudently-wary, 
so can successfully identify the chicanery of others, and also identify the goals, strengths and 
weaknesses of others; and she is conscientious, so can successfully gather convincing 
evidence. The fact that she may do this to promote an agenda she may not agree with does not 
convert her virtues to vices, nor does it impinge on the worth of these virtues. The acquisition 
of the virtues that lead to the establishment and maintenance of intellectual autonomy does not 
rule out the fact of the acquisition of other powers; acquiring the critical thinking virtues may 
have several effects—some undesirable and some desirable. The critical thinking virtues may 
make one a great debater, or excellent at writing essays, or selling cars. Some of these side-
effects are what are aimed at in the critical thinking courses that focus on improving academic 
skills and written composition.  
The upshot is that someone with the virtues of critical thinking will often be a more 
formidable intellectual opponent than one without them. If they have an evil purpose, then the 
effect will not just be that they possess intellectual autonomy, but that they are capable of 
committing greater evil. However, Passmore’s point can still stand. These are not cases in 
which the virtues of critical thinking are being misused. They are cases in which certain powers 
that often develop alongside the development of critical thinking virtues are exercised for bad 
ends. An act of virtuous prudent wariness, for example, must be motivated towards the goods 
of prudent wariness and be of the kind that would be reliably successful in normal 
circumstances. It might be that we prefer Nazis that can be fooled, and a Nazi who is wary is 
more dangerous than one who is not. However, it is not that the Nazi is misusing his virtue of 
prudent wariness. Prudent wariness aims at spotting deceptions, and if deceptions are spotted 
the virtue reaches its internal aim. A Nazi who is good at spotting deception has the power to 
do greater evil than the imprudent, unwary Nazi. But the power to do greater evil does not 
arise through a misuse of the virtue.  
A person with the critical thinking virtues who does terrible things is still better for 
having the virtues than not, in that the possession of the critical thinking virtues contributes to 
personal worth—being better in one respect does not mean being better in every respect. The 
Nazi with the critical thinking virtues is better than the craven, intellectually-dependent Nazi, 
all else being equal. The Nazi who uncritically accepts the propaganda of Aryan racial-
superiority may behave in the same way in which the Nazi who has independently reached the 
conclusion that it is right to make economic space for the development of his own race. The 
actions of both are reprehensible, as are their beliefs, but the Nazi with the critical thinking 
virtues has a greater personal intellectual worth. The critical thinking virtues certainly do not 
make them good, and these virtues perhaps would not count as much as they would in another 
person. I am not making the claim that personal-worth judgements are context-independent. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate fully the fine details of the process 
of assessment of personal worth. Simply, my claim is that the critical thinking virtues 
contribute to personal worth and they cannot be misused as this would mean they do not reach 
their internal aims. The critical thinking virtues cannot be misapplied, because if they are being 
misapplied, then it is not a virtuous act. Skills can be misapplied, and virtues nonetheless give 
people certain powers which can be misused.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Through the teleological conception to which I subscribe, I have argued the virtues cannot be 
misused, though those with the virtues may have the skills to do considerable evil. Virtues will 
tend to push in a normative direction, but one virtue does not necessarily mean or require all. 
Concern over the misuse of skills has led theorists to oversell the requirement for critical 
thinking to be moral and supportive; it also has led theorists to undersell major aims of critical 
thinking, which are criticism and defence against others. This underselling and overselling are 
both mistakes. As I have argued, good thinking varies depending on context, and perfect virtue 
provides an unrealistic goal. A clearer and more realistic aim for critical thinking is the 
establishment of intellectual autonomy. This teleological conception has benefits in the 
practical affair of teaching people. It is not that teachers would walk into a critical thinking 
classroom and say that they can teach justice or honesty—we want students to be honest and 
just, but the aim of critical thinking is to think for oneself.
6. Teaching critical thinking 
In this chapter, I investigate some ways in which a virtue approach would inform pedagogy. 
Additionally, I address McPeck’s complaint that it is empty to claim that critical thinking can 
improve thinking. McPeck’s complaint dissolves when the telos of critical thinking is 
established; its practice and its excellences become well-defined rather than promises to 
improve thinking simpliciter. There is a growing list of those who wish to see a greater role 
for the intellectual virtues in education. Baehr, for example, argues that the intellectual virtues 
should be seen as the main aim of education: 
Conceiving of education as properly aimed at nurturing growth in intellectual character virtues 
provides a much better way of capturing the putative meaning and purpose of teaching and 
learning. Again, if a teacher is educating for intellectual virtues, his aim will be to mould and 
shape his students as persons—to impact their fundamental orientation toward epistemic goods 
and the practices that facilitate these goods.1 
Being clear about the goal of critical thinking, which I identify as intellectual autonomy, allows 
critical thinking to be more clearly defined and thus more effectively taught. I argue that 
critical thinking, seen as a set of virtues that have the aim of achieving intellectual autonomy, 
provides solutions to the critical thinking debate. The critical thinking debate is a debate over 
whether critical thinking can be taught, which has at its heart a question of transfer. A critical 
thinking class fails if what is taught in it is never applied outside the class.  
In this chapter I also argue that a course in critical thinking might legitimately include 
materials other than those focused on the virtues of critical thinking. There are other things 
worth teaching in a critical thinking class, even if the core of the class should centre on the 
virtues of critical thinking and their telos. I have argued that many critical thinking theorists 
conflate critical thinking with good thinking, or sociable thinking, or encouraging thinking, 
and this has led to an unclear conception. However, this does not mean that some of these 
elements cannot be taught alongside critical thinking in a course that bears its name. Many 
1 Baehr, “Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice.”, 253. 
lessons, such as in the application of the principle of charity in interpretation, and avoiding 
making unnecessary ad hominem claims, find natural places in a critical thinking course. This 
is all for the better. In teaching the skills associated with critical thinking, we can be wary of 
turning students into pedantic nightmares. A good sharpshooting course involves more than 
simply teaching how to use firearms; a great deal of it should be spent on safety and weapons 
handling; but the aim of the practice of sharpshooting is not safety, the aim is hitting difficult 
targets.  
I have been arguing that critical thinking is more akin to the virtues of intellectual 
consumption rather than production. The virtues of intellectual consumption no doubt have 
elements that aid in production; the critical thinking virtues in general, and conscientiousness 
in particular, are important elements of creative intellectual activity. Furthermore, once one is 
not fooling oneself, one’s capacity to write coherent, logical, well-structured arguments is 
greatly enhanced. There are many skills in a critical thinking course which transfer to other 
intellectual pursuits. Proficiency in formal and informal logic can help students detect mistakes 
in their own arguments, in the arguments of others, and uncover hidden premises and 
assumptions. These are skills required to achieve the internal success of the critical thinking 
virtues, but they are also skills that help students write essays and win debates. Identifying the 
problems with fallacies such as affirming the consequent, hasty generalisation, or confusion 
of correlation and cause have applications in a scientific methodology class. Identifying these 
links to other areas in which the skills can be applied is at least efficient, and at most 
contributive to the virtues. A student who has seen many instances of application are more 
likely to form a virtuous habit than those who have very limited experience of the application 
of critical thinking skills. The development and practice of skills is a necessary component of 
the critical thinking virtues. With respect to achieving proficiency in detecting fallacies, 
Richard Whately in his Elements of Logic claims  
After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each individual Fallacy, much must depend on 
natural and acquired acuteness; nor can any rules be given, the mere learning of which will 
enable us to apply them with mechanical certainty and readiness: but still we shall find that to 
take correct general views of the subject, and to be familiarized with scientific discussions of 
it, will tend, above all things, to engender such a habit of mind, as will best fit us for practice.2 
Skills and habits are necessary to achieve the internal success of virtues of critical thinking; 
but they are not sufficient.3 It may be the case that many courses with the title of critical 
thinking do not teach much critical thinking at all. Although this reflects a misunderstanding 
of what critical thinking is, these misnomers are not necessarily a bad thing, as many critical 
thinking courses have preparing students for academic life as their aim, and Critical Thinking 
makes for a more interesting subject name than does Academic Skills. However, although it 
makes sense to teach other things at the same time or under the same banner as critical 
thinking, it does not follow that critical thinking should be conceived of as these other aims. 
Critical thinking is not exactly the same thing as argumentative essay writing or collaborative 
conversation. With this caveat in mind, I turn to what it means to teach critical thinking; 
distinguishing between when it does or does not occur. 
6.1 Teaching the critical thinking virtues 
An immediate benefit of a critical thinking course based on a virtue epistemic conception 
would be that its goals are well-identified. By not seeking to improve all kinds of thinking, or 
instil all virtues, both moral and intellectual, the curriculum does not become overcrowded, or 
misguided. The first complaint of McPeck is that one should not promise to improve thinking 
simpliciter, and this complaint, though misplaced as a criticism of critical thinking, is a 
justified general admonition. At the time of writing, McPeck was replying to nascent attempts 
at the definition of a practice which had not defined its goal well enough.  
An act of intellectual virtue is one which has internal success, and this is a function of 
intention towards the good and acting in a way which would reliably achieve the goals of the 
2 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic, 9th ed. (Boston and Cambridge: J. Munroe and Co., 1855)., 
168-169. 
3 See chapter 5 for the distinction between skills and habits, and the critical spirit, and Passmore 
Passmore, “On Teaching to Be Critical.” 
virtue in normal situations. It is clear, therefore, that a great deal of critical thinking instruction 
should be directed towards the development of skills. Without skills, there can be no reliable 
success. Many critical thinking textbooks focus on the inculcation of skills of argument and 
reasoning, see Appendix 5 for an overview. One textbook, Ronald Munson and Andrew 
Black’s The Elements of Reasoning, has been recently criticised by Benjamin Hamby. It 
contains the following chapters: 
The Elements of Reasoning, Ronald Munson and Andrew Black4 
1. Recognizing arguments 
2. Analyzing arguments 
3. Evaluating arguments 
4. Some valid argument forms 
5. More valid argument forms: Categorical reasoning and Venn diagrams 
6. Causal analysis 
7. Argument by analogy and models 
8. Errors in reasoning: Fallacies 
9. Definition 
10. Vagueness and ambiguity 
11. Reasonable beliefs 
12. Rules for writing 
Hamby’s main concern about textbooks of this type is that they do not ‘stress the dispositions 
necessary for a person to be a critical thinker, such as open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, 
courage, and a commitment to reason.’5 This is a fair observation, and it might be the case that 
a better textbook would do such things; however, it does not mean that the course in which 
the textbook is employed fails to do such things. I have a more sanguine opinion of such critical 
thinking textbooks. They may provide drill in skills that supplement the acquisition of the 
critical thinking virtues. As the virtues are those which are arguably best acquired through 
habituation, it may be pedagogically sound to have students refer to the textbook in order to 
quickly focus on skill-building—as long as the teacher is aware that this is all they are using 
the textbook for, and they are not under the impression that being able do things like causally 
analyse is sufficient for critical thinking. In any case, Hamby’s criticism, if applied to critical 
thinking courses, certainly stands. 
4 Ronald Munson and Andrew Black, The Elements of Reasoning, 6th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012). 
5 Benjamin Hamby, “Libri Ad Nauseam: The Critical Thinking Textbook Glut,” Paideusis 21, no. 1 
(2013): 39–48., 45. 
Hamby identifies Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby’s Reason in Balance: An Inquiry 
Approach to Critical Thinking as the best available critical thinking textbook, in part as it 
reflects the standing of critical thinking in the literature.6 Hamby states that 
It is written by scholars in the field, it avoids many traps of a traditional presentation of 
fallacies, and it stresses attitudes and dispositions and the process of dialectical inquiry. 
Finally, it avoids the mistake of simply equating critical thinking and argument analysis.7 
Bailin and Battersby’s textbook focusses on fostering the spirit of inquiry reaching a reasoned 
judgement, which they consider are the aims of critical thinking. Hamby lauds elements of the 
textbook which I argue are incidental to the aims of critical thinking 
Readers are thus reminded that their attitudes matter, and that to be a critical thinker it is never 
enough to be a negative criticizer, a ruthless fallacy-finder, focused exclusively on winning 
arguments or gainsaying other perspectives. Instead, readers are encouraged to take a positive 
and respectful approach to thinking about alternative perspectives, with a view not just to 
knock them down, but to see how they illuminate our judgment. This is instrumental in 
fostering critical thinking skills in our students, helping them to become better critical thinkers: 
people who are both willing and able to go through a process of careful thinking, being open- 
and fair-minded of alternatives in their efforts to come to reasoned judgments. … 
Finally, what distinguishes Bailin and Battersby’s book from any other approach I have seen 
is that a good portion of it is written in dialogue form. Students are exposed to a process of 
cooperatively examining controversial issues through the exchange of reasons for or against. 
The book exemplifies real-life conversations that might take place regarding euthanasia, 
capital punishment, the legalization of marijuana, and polygamy, just to cite a few examples.8 
I argued in chapter 5 that considerations of respect and cooperation are not the aims of critical 
thinking and will not restate these arguments here. However, a course that follows Bailin and 
Battersby’s textbook would make a much richer course than one which only teaches the skills 
from Munson and Black’s textbook. Furthermore, Hamby’s observation provides us with an 
excellent view of what a course that focusses on virtues rather than skills would look like. 
Other examples of theorists who wish to see a greater role for the development of 
intellectual virtues in education include Jason Baehr who has argued that ‘education should 
aim at fostering growth in the traits…’ of ‘intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, 
6 Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby, Reason in Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking 
(Canada: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2011). 
7 Hamby, “Libri Ad Nauseam: The Critical Thinking Textbook Glut.”, 46-47. 
8 Ibid., 46. Page numbers in Hamby’s quotation refer to Bailin and Battersby, Reason in Balance: An 
Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking. 
intellectual rigour, and intellectual honesty.’9 He identifies seven strategies and requirements 
for teaching intellectual virtues: 
1. a supportive institutional culture 
2. direct instruction in intellectual virtue concepts and terminology 
3. self-reflection and self-assessment 
4. making explicit connections between the course material and intellectual virtues and 
vices 
5. opportunities to practice the actions characteristic of intellectual virtues 
6. integrating virtue concepts and standards into formal and informal assessments 
7. modelling of intellectual virtues10 
Similarly, Heather Battaly outlines two approaches to teach for intellectual virtue: teaching 
reliabilist skills of induction and deduction, which she argues would be ‘best-suited for courses 
in logic and critical thinking’ and teaching the responsibilist virtues of motivation towards 
truth, which she argues better suit ‘a variety of introductory and upper-division philosophy 
courses.’ 11  Battaly defends lessons in typical critical thinking skills as being lessons in 
reliabilist virtues: 
To be skilled in deductive and inductive reasoning, one must acquire a myriad of specialized 
skills that enable one to identify, evaluate, and construct arguments. Fortunately, many of these 
specialized skills—e.g., translating English sentences into the symbols of sentential logic; 
doing derivations in sentential and predicate logic; evaluating the strength of an argument by 
analogy, etc.—are already being taught via a combination of lecturing, imitation, and 
supervised practice. In short, many of us are already employing classroom strategies that are 
conducive to learning the skills of deduction and induction. So, what does virtue epistemology 
contribute? By arguing that the skills of deduction and induction are reliabilist virtues, virtue 
epistemology helps to explain and justify the very pedagogical practices that we are already 
using: it grounds those practices in epistemological theory.12 
As the conception of virtue I have been advancing requires reliable action, I do not consider 
the reliabilist epistemic virtues as virtues properly so-called. 13  However, there is an 
attractiveness in identifying critical thinking skills-acquisition with the reliabilist epistemic 
virtues—it does not underestimate the worth of the skills found in textbooks like Munson and 
9 Baehr, “Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice.”, 248. 
10 Ibid., 256-259. 
11 Battaly, “Teaching Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom.”, 208 
12 Ibid., 209. 
13 It seems as though Battaly thinks similarly, as she refers to the reliabilist virtues as ‘skills in 
deduction and induction’. Ibid., 208. 
Black’s; these activities are not the only value, but without them one would often fail to achieve 
the internal success of the critical thinking virtues.  
 Battaly provides an overview of how one can approach the teaching of the 
responsibilist epistemic virtues, which she characterises as the ‘motivation for truth’. Battaly 
provides many excellent practical examples of how to teach the responsibilist virtues. In 
particular, the following: 
There are several additional strategies that we can use to encourage students to practice 
intellectually virtuous actions and motivations. Three of the pedagogical tools that we are 
already using—classroom discussions, argumentative papers, and oral presentations—can be 
easily adapted to serve this purpose. First, we can require students to practice performing 
virtuous actions in classroom discussions. Discussions of any philosophical topic provide 
students with opportunities to listen to ideas that conflict with their own; to defend their own 
ideas against objections; to admit that they were mistaken; and so on. Instructors can require 
each student to write a one-page paper, which describes an intellectually virtuous act that he 
or she performed during a classroom discussion, and his or her motivations for performing that 
act. Instructors must monitor the intellectual actions performed in discussions, and indicate 
when students are succeeding and when they are failing to hit the mean. After all, it will 
sometimes be appropriate for the open-minded person to ignore a conflicting view (e.g., when 
it is blatantly racist), for the courageous person to capitulate (e.g., when she acquires sufficient 
evidence against her view), and so on. Instructors can indicate which moments in the 
discussion call for admitting defeat, or ignoring an alternative, as well as which moments call 
for defending one’s view, or entertaining alternatives. Second, we can require students to 
practice performing virtuous actions in researching and constructing argumentative papers. In 
constructing a written argument on any philosophical topic, students will have opportunities to 
defend their views, to consider reasonable objections and alternatives, to be thorough, and to 
take care in gathering and evaluating evidence. Instructors can require each student to write a 
supplementary one-page paper that describes: (1) an intellectually virtuous act that he or she 
performed in preparing the argumentative paper and his or her motivations for performing that 
act; and (2) an intellectual act that he or she performed in preparing the argumentative paper 
that fell short of a virtuous act. Third, we can require students to practice performing virtuous 
acts in oral presentations to the class. We can encourage students to perform virtuous acts in 
constructing their oral arguments and in answering questions from fellow students. Again, a 
short supplementary paper can be required. 14  
Battaly rightly sees that ‘it is not enough to know which actions and motivations are said to be 
virtuous’ and that ‘[s]tudents must also learn to care about truth and consistently perform 
virtuous actions.’ 15 To do this, Battaly argues  
we can draw their attention to different intellectual motivations and intellectual actions (if not 
our own then those of others), and, in particular, to the motivations and actions that are 
characteristic of the responsibilist virtues.16 
14 Ibid., 210., 216. Further examples from pp 210-217. 
15 Ibid., 214. 
16 Ibid., 211. 
Any such course must provide students with many opportunities to practice virtuous acts. In 
practice, there will be a tension in this approach. Much of the time, a critical thinking class 
will be involved in teaching students how to interpret, analyse, and create arguments so that 
they can better defend their own opinions and see through the chicanery of others. Argument 
analysis skills are both subsidiary benefits and stepping-stones to help students better embody 
the virtues of prudent wariness, conscientiousness and self-awareness. Other activities such as 
identifying heuristics and detecting fallacies will also aid in assisting students in acquiring the 
skills required for the critical thinking virtues. However, the virtue approach must also aid in 
the inculcation of dispositions towards the goods of each virtue. Providing an environment in 
which these virtues can develop is essential. Such a course makes for a more coherent and 
attractive curriculum for a student rather than a sort of ill-focused course on learning the rules 
of logic or how to win debates without cheating. 
A critical thinking course with a clear view of which virtues are constitutive and which 
are incidental provides students with a clear view of value. Having intellectual autonomy as 
the aim provides a strong motivation—students can be shown that people are trying to fool 
them and that their own beliefs and cognitive weaknesses can lead them to make mistakes. 
The teacher plays a vital role in such classes, as acquisition of virtue requires modelling and 
habituation. McPeck warns that in order to fully practice critical thinking, even the teacher 
should be questioned:  
True critical or autonomous thinking is, by definition, doing one’s own thinking; therefore, 
students must cut loose from their dependency on authority. Yet teachers in a classroom are in 
a de facto position of authority, and this fact has a deleterious effect upon the free and open 
exchange of ideas. It can be like having an adult referee at a teenage pillow fight. Thus, the 
pedagogical problem is one of conveying the idea that reason and argument are the only 
acceptable currency in the pursuit of truth, and that even the teacher’s views must be subjected 
to this tribunal.17 
Furthermore, a good critical thinking class will, as Battaly describes in her class for the 
intellectual virtues, show students the value in not being fooled and in thinking for themselves. 
17 John E McPeck, Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic (New York: Routledge, 
1990)., 52. 
Its subsidiary aims, such as writing better essays can also be described in terms of acquisition 
of belief—better essays are better not because they are simply more persuasive, or free from 
logical errors, but because they reflect the autonomous beliefs of their author. Being one’s own 
person and not being fooled is of a higher value—and should be perceived as having higher 
value by students—than being able to win arguments and write better essays. As I have been 
arguing, critical thinking cannot be taught without skills, but a virtue approach shows how the 
skills contribute towards an aim. This frames the activity differently to a pure skills or skills 
and dispositions approach. Identifying conclusions and uncovering unstated assumptions are 
not done for their own sake, but instead are done because these are activities that one will need 
to be good at in order to not be fooled; a conscientious person has more than just vigilance or 
a motivation to be conscientious, she has the skills to identify situations of chance and look 
for evidence; a self-aware person does not simply introspect, but can identify heuristics and 
biases; and a prudently wary person is not simply cynical of others’ opinions, but is able to 
detect fallacies and ambiguous language. 
In addition to shifts in focus and framing, there are theoretical differences in a virtue 
approach to critical thinking. One such example is in how ad hominem arguments are 
perceived. Critical thinking textbooks are often worried about the ad hominem features of 
one’s thinking. If a scientist under the employ of a tobacco company offers an argument for 
the safety of tobacco, or a climate scientist offers an argument for the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change, or if a climate sceptic offers an argument for the non-existence 
of anthropogenic climate change, since they are offering me arguments, I should take these on 
their merits and their sources are (at least largely) irrelevant. I should have the power to 
adjudicate arguments on their own. Joel Rudinow and Vincent Barry, for example, describe 
ad hominem arguments as follows: 
When people argue ad hominem, they argue against the person rather than the position or the 
reasoning. They argue that the person, not that person’s reasoning or position, is defective or 
at fault. Ad hominem’s prevalence and remarkable rhetorical force both probably stem from 
general psychological tendencies to personalize conflict and escalate hostility. As natural as it 
may be for us to turn attention to the personal weaknesses, flaws, and failures of others, these 
things—whether real or imagined—are, with only rare exceptions, irrelevant to whatever the 
issue is under discussion.18 
From a virtue perspective, ad hominem concern is a kind of wariness, and ad hominem 
considerations are about adjusting one’s level of wariness. If an interlocutor is a dubious 
entrant into a conversation, such as that he stands to gain from something being true, or is a 
known liar, or struggles to act in a way that is consistent with his beliefs despite exhorting 
otherwise, then one’s wariness of his claims should increase. To not be fooled, one must know 
the types of people who will try to do so, and the situations in which a person should carry a 
higher burden of proof. The idea that one should treat everyone as if they are an equally-valid 
source of reasons, and trust one’s capacity to see through any obfuscating rhetoric to the 
reasons itself and their merits is the vice of epistemic immodesty. A fallacious ad hominem 
from this perspective is one in which one is too wary, but wariness has its place. Other fallacies 
have been analysed as arising through the activity of vices. Scott Aikin and John Casey argue 
that being too open-minded can lead to ‘iron manning’, which is being overly charitable in 
one’s interpretation of another’s argument; and being too closed-minded causes one to commit 
straw man fallacies.19 
6.2 A return to the critical thinking debate 
Previous sections have argued that some of the initial complaints about critical thinking, such 
as offered by McPeck conflate expertise with critical thinking. Of course an expert in one field 
does not spontaneously become an expert in another—the very concept of expertise requires 
non-simple knowledge of field-specific things. The more critical thinking is dependent on 
subject-specific knowledge, the less likely it is to transfer. In this section I will argue both that 
virtues in general are more permeable than knowledge and skills alone, and the activity of the 
critical thinking virtues I have identified are less dependent on subject-specific knowledge. 
18 Joel Rudinow and Vincent E Barry, Invitation to Critical Thinking, 6th ed. (Belmont: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2008)., 331. 
19 Scott F. Aikin and John P. Casey, “Straw Men, Iron Men, and Argumentative Virtue,” Topoi, 2015. 
They are virtues that may be employed in coming to a recognition that one needs to acquire 
further knowledge, they engage rather than fail in situations where one knows nothing. As I 
have been arguing, there are discipline-specific virtues; so despite sharing many virtues, the 
ideal lawyer may have a different set of virtues to the ideal astronomer. However, I contend 
that compared to a novice, an expert in one field will find it easier to become an expert in 
another. Becoming an expert requires the acquisition of many intellectual traits and many of 
these have wider application than any given field. This is the key reason that a virtue-theoretic 
conception of critical thinking provides a solution the transfer problem. Someone who has the 
virtues of conscientiousness, prudent wariness and self-awareness in one field is likely to have 
it in another. The aim of critical thinking is intellectual autonomy; the critical thinker when 
placed in an area where she has no prior knowledge will be a critical thinker insofar as she has 
the virtues that aim towards intellectual autonomy.  
The critical thinking debate is a debate over whether or not what is taught in a critical 
thinking class will transfer. In the scope of this thesis, I cannot prove that a virtues approach 
will aid in transfer—that is an empirical claim. However, I can show that a virtues approach 
removes many of the obstacles and objections raised by those who argue that critical thinking 
does not transfer. Teaching critical thinking is not teaching people to know everything, or be 
able to walk into a room and solve every problem; instead, it is a matter of fostering in students 
the ability to think for oneself—to avoid being controlled by one’s biases, one’s history, and 
the sophistry of others. The main objections to transfer do not apply to the critical thinking 
virtues I have identified. Alternative virtue-conceptions of critical thinking, such as those 
offered by Bailin and Battersby who argue that critical thinking aims at reasoned-judgement, 
may find it more difficult to address the transfer problem; reasoned-judgement involves a 
stronger requirement of knowledge than intellectual autonomy as it is more context-dependent.  
 McPeck, and those who argue against transfer, have argued against the idea that 
people who have been taught how to think correctly can do it everywhere. This is a false 
picture of the aims of critical thinking, which makes it appear as though the transfer problem 
is enormous and insurmountable. With the correct picture, the problems of transfer are no 
longer insurmountable. I am not arguing for perfect transfer of the critical thinking virtues. 
However, if one is self-aware in church, one can be self-aware in a political meeting. The 
activity of the critical thinking virtues is very much the same thing in different spheres—there 
may be different emotions, or different levels of knowledge, or different levels of antipathy 
from one area to the next, but this is not what is of concern in the transfer problem. To be fair, 
it is not so much that McPeck and others who argue against transfer are necessarily in the grip 
of a false picture of critical thinking, but rather they are criticising others for being in the grip 
of a false picture. They are right to do so; however, they have missed what is really of value 
here. 
McPeck argues against the ‘standard approach’ to transfer (which he diagrams in 
Figure 4). For McPeck, ‘the standard approach chooses to teach certain general principles 
which apply to all (or most) areas of human knowledge’ and that, if successful, this would 
explain the importance of giving students standalone courses in these principles, as it would 
result in an ‘impressive economy’—a little time spent on principles will reap benefits across 
all aspects of intellectual life. 
 
Figure 4: McPeck’s depiction of the ‘standard approach’ to transfer20 
20 John E McPeck, “Stalking Beasts, but Swatting Flies: The Teaching of Critical Thinking,” 
Canadian Journal of Education 9, no. 1 (1984): 28–44., 38. 
McPeck argues by way of analogy that this standard approach to teaching critical thinking 
skills is misguided: 
If, just out of the blue, someone offered to improve our speed, the first thing we would properly 
ask is “at what?” We’d probably all like to be speedier at running, or reading, or typing, or 
even changing mufflers, but we know that no single course could improve our speed at all 
things. Given that the range of things over which we’d like to improve our “reasoning ability” 
is perhaps even wider than the range of things over which we desire to improve our speed, then 
the prospects for improving our general reasoning ability are even dimmer. And the reason 
they are dim, I’m suggesting, is that the very notion of “general reasoning ability” is, upon 
reflection, incoherent. At the very least, intellectual clarity would be much improved by our 
dropping the phrase “reasoning ability” from our critical thinking lexicon. We are not in the 
business of improving reasoning ability simpliciter.21 
This is an unfair characterisation of the critical thinking movement who use ‘reasoning ability’ 
to refer to a set of skills, usually those of argument-analysis (which McPeck also considers a 
mistake). However, his concern is with the ‘burgeoning cottage industry in textbooks and 
materials promising to improve everyday reasoning.’22 McPeck claims that transfer across 
such a wide range of spheres implied by ‘everyday reasoning’ is unlikely, and courses that 
purport to be able to do so promise too much. Robin Barrow puts the case against transfer of 
skills clearer. For Barrow, generic skills are those which he argues are ‘perfected by practice 
at the activity itself’, such as ‘the ability to dribble a ball, the sleight of hand of the conjuror 
and the ability to plane a piece of wood well.’23 In contrast, skills involved in intellectual 
pursuits are far from generalisable: 
If we turn to the skills of, say, the historian or even the skills of reading and writing, we see 
that some at least of these so-called skills are quite different kinds of thing. It may be reasonable 
to see the ability to form letters or decode words as skills in the sense of physical abilities, 
perfected by practice, though even here there is a difference in that such ‘skills’ involve 
considerably greater understanding than does the skill of dribbling a ball. … The skills of the 
historian, for instance, include imagination, knowledge and intellect. The important practical 
point is that whereas one helps someone to perfect the skill of planing wood largely by helping 
them perform the operation and giving them practice, perhaps supplemented by a minimum of 
explanation (e.g. if you press too heavily, it will not run smoothly), one does not help somebody 
to become a sophisticated reader or a good historian by getting them to practice specific 
operations, so much as by giving them understanding of literature and history. … The skill of 
planing wood or dribbling a ball is something that, if one has it, one may put to use in a variety 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Ibid., 29. 
23 Barrow, “Skill Talk.”, 191. 
of situations for a variety of purposes. The skills of the historian—the ability to weigh 
evidence, for example—are not things that can be transferred.24 
As ability to weigh evidence in a historical setting is dependent on knowledge within and about 
the field of history, it is wrong to assume it will transfer to a scientific setting—though a case 
could be made that some skills in history may be more likely transfer to nearer settings, such 
as anthropology.25 However, McPeck and Barrow’s claim against general transfer is that the 
application of skills within disciplines require understanding, so are tied to knowledge. A 
virtue approach does not face this objection. A critical thinker is one with the critical thinking 
virtues, and their attainment is largely independent of knowledge. In fact, Barrow sees that 
dispositional characteristics will transfer: 
To be sure there may be aspects of being good at weighing evidence in history that will find 
application elsewhere, such as a disposition to weigh evidence, though I would rather say that 
these are characteristics of the individual than that they are abilities which they transfer.26 
It is not a requirement of self-awareness that one knows everything, but only to be aware when 
one is out of one’s depth. A historian with the virtue of self-awareness will be able to use the 
same self-awareness in other fields. Self-awareness differs from ‘weighing evidence’—an 
activity which is field-dependent. An individual characteristic is far more stable across 
contexts. Siegel, too, suggests that arguments against transfer do not address his critical spirit, 
which he argues is ‘fully generalizable’.27  
 David Bridges offers a distinction between two types of skills: ‘transferable or core 
skills’ and ‘transferring skills’.28 He argues that transferrable skills differ in their context 
24 Ibid., 191-192. 
25 I do not wish to defend the case for near or far transfer here. For an excellent overview of the 
problems with far transfer, see Susan M Barnett and Stephen J Ceci, “When and Where Do We Apply 
What We Learn? A Taxonomy for Far Transfer.,” Psychological Bulletin 128, no. 4 (2002): 612–37. 
26 Barrow, “Skill Talk.”, 192. 
27 Harvey Siegel, “The Generalizability of Critical Thinking,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 23, 
no. 1 (1991): 18–30., 19. 
28 David Bridges, “Transferable Skills: A Philosophical Perspective,” Studies in Higher Education 1, 
no. October 2012 (1993): 43–51., 50. 
specificity, in that word-processing skills can help in multiple settings, but negotiating skills 
are  
heavily context dependent, relying on all sorts of sensitivity to, responsiveness to and 
adaptation to relations between you and your partner, your class of students, your employer or 
your bank. And, indeed, it will be a recipe for disaster if you do not adapt your style and 
approach to these different social relations.29 
As such, the former sub-variety of transferable skills (such as word-processing) are less 
resistant to transfer than the latter sub-variety (such as negotiation skills). He recognises that 
identifying a list of those skills which are transferable ‘may be quite useful, though it threatens 
to be an enormous list of items.’30 Instead, he suggests we identify and focus on transferring 
skills, which are ‘… the meta-skills, the second order skills, which enable one to select, adapt, 
adjust and apply one’s other skills to different situations… and perhaps similarly across 
different cognitive domains.’31 For Bridges, ‘[a]ny account of such meta-competencies must 
surely include reference to at least three elements’: 
1. to the sensitive and intelligent discernment of similarities and differences 
between one social/cognitive setting and another; 
2. to whatever cognitive equipment it is which enables someone to modify, extend 
or adapt a previous repertoire or response to the different requirements of the new 
situation;  
3. to the attitudes or dispositions which support both of these—perhaps a 
combination of the receptiveness and sensitivity which is necessary to the first of 
these requirements with the confidence or enterprise which supports the second.32 
The virtues of critical thinking, as I have described them, share many similarities with the 
items in the above list. Self-awareness will provide a sensitive realisation that one is out of 
one’s depth, or that one must acquire a set of skills or knowledge in a field in order to reach 
an autonomous decision; conscientiousness will provide the motivation to pursue such 
acquisition. I do not wish to equate virtues with skills or meta-competencies; however, the 
similarities between Bridges’ transferring skills and the dispositions and skills of virtuous 
29 Ibid., 50. 
30 Ibid., 50. 
31 Ibid., 50. 
32 Ibid., 50-51. 
critical thinking suggest that one who has these or similar powers will be more capable of 
transferring other skills. This is a tempting line of argument; it suggests that the critical 
thinking virtues are sufficient for the transfer of non-critical thinking skills. However, I do not 
advance it here. My argument is that the critical thinking virtues themselves are worth pursuing 
and arguments against transfer of critical thinking skills do not apply to them. 
Having the skills of argument in one field does not guarantee that one will have them 
in another field. McPeck’s claim that general critical thinking skills face obstacles to transfer 
as they require subject-specific knowledge may well stand. However, self-awareness makes 
one conscious of one’s strengths and limitations in both skills and knowledge and 
conscientiousness involves a motivation towards filling these gaps. These attributes are likely 
to be stable across many fields. If a person is self-aware, when she enters a new field she will 
be more likely to know if something is missing in her knowledge base. The critical thinking 
virtues may not always help to win arguments, but they help in not being fooled. This is in 
part because someone with the critical thinking virtues will not form strong beliefs in a novel 
field of high technicality and will have a tendency to avoid over-confident judgement. 
However, I do not make the claim that possessing the critical thinking virtues will 
ensure that one will always know when one is out of one’s depth, or that by having the critical 
thinking virtues one will always know when to withdraw and not be fooled. I have argued that 
the critical thinking virtues require internal success, not external success. The external success 
of these virtues is not necessarily transferrable. Someone with the critical thinking virtues may 
be internally successful, but bad luck or lack of knowledge may prevent him from avoiding 
intellectual heteronomy. Intellectual autonomy sometimes requires luck, and sometimes 
requires knowing what one does not know. To know who the charlatans are, one will 
sometimes need specialised knowledge. At other times, one will need worldly knowledge. 
Consider the distinction between a Nigerian email scam and an elaborate variant of the Spanish 
Prisoner confidence game.33 Someone who falls for the former can only do so by not having 
the critical thinking virtues as she would fail to achieve the internal successes of prudent 
wariness and conscientiousness. However, this failure is of a different kind to the failure of 
someone who falls for an elaborate version of the Spanish Prisoner confidence trick. In this 
case, intellectual autonomy depends on knowing one is involved in a scam that has been 
specifically designed to fool those who are conscientious and prudently wary. Knowledge is 
clearly an ineliminable feature of external success, but it is also needed for internal success. 
Without it, one cannot accurately calibrate one’s level of wariness. However, knowledge 
requirements for the exercise of critical thinking virtues—and for their internal and external 
successes—are easily met most of the time. We rarely find ourselves the victim of a Spanish 
Prisoner style sting. In most circumstances, everyday practical knowledge and self-knowledge 
suffice for us to calibrate appropriate levels of wariness. A person who employs the critical 
thinking virtues in one domain will generally find it a straightforward affair to apply them in 
another domain. There is at least prima facie plausibility that those who achieve internal 
success in one field will be more likely to achieve internal success in other fields. 
The telos of the critical thinking virtues is intellectual autonomy, and this is not 
something that one can establish in specialised fields without specialised knowledge. People 
are critical thinkers in X, insofar as they have the virtues of critical thinking to do with the 
activity of X. Intellectual autonomy can be lost in religious matters, and inside scientific 
communities. Furthermore, some fields (at least at the basic level) may not lend themselves to 
having critical thinkers, as they are not candidates for autonomous thought. If there is no call 
to be conscientious, prudently wary, or self-aware in the fields such as basic mathematics, then 
these are not fields for critical thinking. Furthermore, failures of critical thinking within a field 
33 Spanish Prisoner confidence tricks involve the promise of great rewards in exchange for a modest 
payment. This modest payment is claimed to be for various things: to release someone out of prison in 
another country (who then promises to offer a greater reward for their release), to pay bribes to free-up 
accounts, to release valuable goods from customs, and so on. Nigerian email scams are basic variants 
of this confidence trick. These are plainly fake, but succeed due to the large numbers of people who 
are able to be contacted via email.  
occur not because of a lack of knowledge, but because of a lack of virtue. If a critical thinker 
enters the field of theoretical physics without any requisite skills, he will realise he lacks the 
skills and seek out those whose testimony is worth paying attention to. If he does not recognise 
his ignorance, or forms beliefs without being wary of experts in the field who are able to wield 
considerable powers of deception owing to their expertise, then he fails at being a critical 
thinker. Critical thinking is not a test of expertise, but a test of whether one can form a 
judgement that is one’s own. Failing at critical thinking does not come from having limits, but 
it comes from failing to recognising one’s limits. 
 A critical thinking course need not solve every intellectual problem, and an approach 
to critical thinking need not be as ambitious as the one Richard Paul proposes.34 Just as we do 
not need to seek improvement at thinking skills in general in order to foster the critical thinking 
virtues, we also do not need to seek to improve virtues in general. Jonathan Adler argues that 
McPeck’s inflation consists in demanding that CT programs be an educational Holy Grail, 
when all that should be demanded, and it is plenty, is that they promise to lead to the 
“significantly better.” Improvement is what is required for justification, not some level of 
absolute success.35 
Though Paul could argue likewise that all that is needed to justify a course that seeks to teach 
all of the virtues is that it make people ‘significantly better’, the goal is unfocussed and thus 
risks confusing students. Intellectual and moral virtues do not combine easily; and with too 
many aims come too many values, and these values can and do clash and fail to coordinate. 
Practically, the aims of a project like Paul’s would be approached over a lifetime of education 
rather than in a single undergraduate degree, let alone a single undergraduate subject. Critical 
thinking does not include everything that is good about the human mind and the intellectual 
life; it is a sub-discipline, and courses that seek to teach all of the virtues also may overpromise. 
We also should not expect critical thinking virtues to be acquired within a single subject. After 
34 See section 5.1. 
35 Jonathan E Adler, “Critical Thinking, A Deflated Defense: A Critical Study of John E. McPeck’s 
Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic,” Informal Logic 13, no. 2 (1991): 61–78., 62. 
providing rich examples of how the intellectual virtues may be taught, Battaly is careful to 
claim that these activities do not guarantee students will acquire the virtues:  
Of course, it is widely thought that practicing virtuous motivations and actions gradually leads 
one to acquire a taste for them. But there are no guarantees—I suspect that many readers know 
students who, despite such practice, do not acquire the intellectual virtues. Nature and the 
values that our students have learned before they enter our classrooms each undeniably play a 
role. Second, even if this worry were set aside, we would not expect students to acquire the 
responsibilist virtues in one semester. Students must be afforded a plethora of opportunities to 
care about the truth and perform virtuous actions.36 
Although many will never acquire intellectual virtues, Battaly is optimistic that ‘the 
acquisition of intellectual virtue can begin in a single classroom.’37  
6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that a conception of critical thinking as the achievement of certain 
intellectual virtues provides clarity and avoids the critical thinking debate. Alternative 
conceptions of critical thinking, such as those offered by Bailin and Battersby, and Paul focus 
on achieving aims that are not within the scope of critical thinking. Teachers may wish to add 
moral virtues such as intellectual empathy or intellectual honesty to their classes to ensure 
students behave well, or act as productive members of a community of inquiry, or 
intellectually-responsible members of society in general; however, it does not follow on this 
basis that these components should be added to the concept of critical thinking. The critical 
thinking debate arises from concerns about transfer of skills, knowledge, and virtues. I have 
argued that a virtue theoretic approach to critical thinking avoids the arguments advanced 
against transfer. Virtues are stable features of character, and the critical thinking virtues are 
largely knowledge-independent—one with the critical virtues will know when one knows 
nothing.  
36 Battaly, “Teaching Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom.”, 218. 
37 Ibid., 218 (italics in original). 
7. Conclusion 
In this thesis I have argued that extant conceptions of critical thinking can benefit from virtue 
theory in general, and virtue epistemology in particular. Early conceptions of critical thinking 
focussed too strongly on requisite skills. Criticism of these conceptions led to the addition of 
dispositions, and these dispositions have, over time, shifted from motivations to act to 
motivations to act for the good. This building-up of the picture of a critical thinker either leads 
to circularity, or extensive lists of attributes and capacities that are incoherent. We are able to 
largely avoid these concerns by adopting an agent-based approach. I have argued that it is only 
after we have a clear picture of the aims of critical thinking that we can determine its requisite 
components, and not vice versa. 
Virtue theorists have advanced various accounts of the role of success in virtuous 
action. For some, success is a necessary ingredient; for others, motivations are fundamental 
and success is considered to be something that will tend to follow from the right motivations, 
but is not a requirement of virtuous action. I have distinguished between two types of success: 
success that is external, which is the success that is achieved when the aim is achieved; and 
success that is internal, which is a combination of motivation and acting in a way that would 
reliably achieve the aims of virtuous action. I have argued that a virtuous act requires internal 
success. This means that, in acting virtuously, one succeeds in being for the good of the virtue, 
rather than necessarily obtaining the good of the virtue. It is my contention that agents are 
more admirable if they succeed in achieving internal success than if they are merely motivated 
towards the good. However, adding external success to internal success does not make one 
more admirable. 
 I have argued that the aim of critical thinking is intellectual autonomy. This is distinct 
from other intellectual practices that are often equated with critical thinking, such as the 
practices of those engaged in scientific pursuit and communities of inquiry. In a scientific 
pursuit, one must at times act in a non-critical way to best achieve joint aims; scientific pursuit 
involves a division of intellectual labour discovering the search for best explanation. A 
scientist who is too critical may prematurely abandon a hypothesis, and scientific discovery 
would be weakened if scientists only pursued theories that are most likely. Similarly, the aims 
of communities of inquiry lie in reaching a reasoned-consensus, and this sometimes requires 
activities that are opposed to critical thinking. Consensus requires that one provides others the 
encouragement and room to voice their opinions, which is different to, and at times opposed 
to, the aims of critical thinking. 
 By conceiving the aim of critical thinking as intellectual autonomy, I have identified 
its essential virtues as those that aim at avoiding intellectual heteronomy. Simply put, this 
means avoiding being fooled. One can be fooled in three ways—by chance, by others, and by 
one’s self. The three critical thinking virtues I have identified are those that avoid such 
heteronomous distortions of belief. They are: conscientiousness, a virtue of seeking out 
information and not leaving acquisition of belief in important matters to chance; prudent 
wariness, a virtue that involves an alertness to the deceptions of others; and self-awareness, a 
virtue of introspection that recognises one’s biases, prejudices and fallibilities as a source of 
potential influence over one’s beliefs. One is a critical thinker insofar as one achieves the 
internal successes of these virtues, and one is intellectual autonomous insofar as one achieves 
the external successes of the critical thinking virtues. This conception recognises that even 
possession of these virtues may not be enough to be intellectual autonomous—one can act in 
a way that would reliably reach the aims of the virtues under normal conditions, but still be 
under the doxastic control of heteronomous forces. The question “What do you think?” is the 
realm for critical thinking. Where personal intellectual autonomy exists, so does critical 
thinking. Working out what one thinks requires some argument analysis; working out what 
one thinks requires avoiding bad reasoning, and detecting the bad reasoning in others’ 
arguments; and in many cases, working out what one thinks requires a deep level of 
knowledge.  
In the account I have developed here, critical thinking is its own project. It is not good 
thinking as such; it is thinking in robust pursuit of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual autonomy 
is not the goal of all intellectual pursuits. One can be a critical thinker in science insofar as one 
pursues intellectual autonomy with internal success. However, this is not the same thing as 
being a good scientist. Being a good scientist is determined by the practice of science and its 
requisite skills and dispositions, as is being a good lawyer or psychologist or soil tester. In 
some fields there may not be much room for autonomy, thus not much room for critical 
thinking—such as mathematics, at least at the undergraduate level. Critical thinking is 
especially important in fields in which interpretation is valued, or necessary—such as 
aesthetic, ethical, and political subjects. When physicians approach the problem of how to best 
treat a broken arm, there is relatively little room for intellectual autonomy to become an issue. 
By comparison, critical thinking is highly relevant to the problem of how to best treat certain 
types of cancer. We need physicians to be critical in such situations because there are multiple 
different viewpoints from which to choose. Some viewpoints will be presented by people who 
have vested interests, some will be presented by those who base their findings on anecdote—
a physician who is a critical thinker can navigate these and reach a decision that is her own, 
reflecting her own best judgement of her expertise and its limits. 
The critical thinking debate arose due to a conflation of critical thinking with good 
thinking. Good thinking in science differs from good thinking in law and journalism; the 
virtues of one field not only differ, in part, from those of another, they partly conflict. However, 
virtues that contribute to critical thinking complement each other and are directed towards a 
particular goal: establishing personal intellectual autonomy. Intellectual autonomy is 
intrinsically valuable and its effects are also valuable. For example, the value of intellectual 
autonomy reflects the importance of individuality and pluralism of thought. We want people 
to be their own person, to think for themselves. We want people to think for themselves about 
disciplines, but the disciplines themselves have certain rules, and certainly have their own 
attendant requisite amounts of knowledge and unique practices. So the participants in the 
critical thinking debate rightly observe that people cannot be good thinkers in every field. 
Goodness of thinking in a field resists transfer, as it is dependent on field-specific knowledge, 
field-specific virtues, and field-specific skills. I cannot be a good thinker in the area of 
advanced physics, I cannot even be a critical thinker in the field of physics; however, if I form 
strong opinions about dark energy without exhibition of the critical thinking virtues, then I am 
neither a critical thinker nor intellectually autonomous. However, virtues that are shared 
between fields are more likely to transfer, as these are at least less bound by context. A person 
who has the virtue of conscientiousness will be likely to seek appropriate evidence and reason 
in every context in which truth or justified opinion is sought. A prudently wary person will 
require the skills and dispositions to be sensitive to the deception of others. This may require 
subject-specific knowledge, but the person with robust self-awareness will tend to appreciate 
their lack of knowledge and not form beliefs that overstep their understanding.  
The aim of intellectual autonomy contrasts with other putative aims of critical 
thinking, such as fairmindedness, reasoned-judgement, or good intellectual citizenship. 
Making students good intellectual citizens is a worthy aim, but this is more of a goal for an 
entire education. Reasoned-judgement as an aim clouds the focus of critical thinking, which I 
have argued is a more personal than public activity. The main pedagogical difference in 
approaching critical thinking as having the aim of intellectual autonomy lies in framing the 
curriculum. Successfully teaching critical thinking to students does not mean simply 
improving university performance on essays and speeches, or enhancing all of their attributes 
to make them pleasant and cooperative members of an intellectual community. It is about 
imparting the virtues of intellectual self-defence. Certainly there are dangers in a critical 
thinking class that does not alert students to the fact that the powers of self-defence can be 
used to intimidate and trick others. However, there is cause for optimism. On the way to virtue, 
students may misapply their newly-fledged skills and it is the job of a good teacher to ensure 
this does not happen. This is a danger inherent in the skills of critical thinking, not the virtues. 
It is common for critical thinking courses to offer definitions of ‘critical’ that immunise against 
its negative, disapproving fault-finding connotations. It is right to do so, as it is right to focus 
on positive activities of criticism in a classroom. However, it is wrong to add unwarranted 
positive components to its conception. We need not add additional moral virtues of fairness 
and caring to the concept of critical thinking to solve this problem, though these additional 
moral virtues have a place in a critical thinking classroom. Critical thinking is not the only 




Appendix 1: Ennis’ 1987 conception of critical thinking  
 
Working definition: Critical thinking is reasonable reflective 
thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.  
I. Critical thinking so defined involves both dispositions 
and abilities:  
A. Dispositions  
1. Seek a clear statement of the thesis or 
question  
2. Seek reasons  
3. Try to be well informed  
4. Use and mention credible sources  
5. Take into account the total situation  
6. Try to remain relevant to the main point  
7. Keep in mind the original and/or basic 
concern  
8. Look for alternatives  
9. Be open-minded  
a) Consider seriously other points of view 
than one’s own (dialogical thinking)  
b) Reason from premises with which one 
disagrees - without letting the disagreement 
interfere with one’s reasoning 
(suppositional thinking)  
c) Withhold judgement when the evidence and 
reasons are insufficient  
10. Take a position (and change a position) when 
the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do 
so  
11. Seek as much precision as the subject permits  
12. Deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a 
complex whole  
13. Use one’s critical thinking abilities  
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of 
knowledge, and degree of sophistication of 
others  
 
B. Abilities  
1. Focusing on a question  
a) Identifying or formulating a question  
b) Identifying or formulating criteria for 
judging possible answers  
c) Keeping the situation in mind  
2. Analyzing arguments  
a) Identifying conclusions  
b) Identifying stated reasons  
c) Identifying unstated reasons  
d) Seeing similarities and differences  
e) Identifying and handling irrelevance  
f) Seeing the structure of an argument  
g) Summarizing  
3. Asking and answering questions of 
clarification and/or challenge, for example:  
a) Why?  
b) What is your main point?  
c) What do you mean by ‘_____’?  
d) What would be an example?  
e) What would not be an example (though 
close to being one)?  
f) How does that apply to this case (describe a 
counterexample)?  
g) What difference does it make? 
h) What are the facts?  
i) Is this what you are saying ‘______’?  
j) Would you say some more about that?  
4. Judging the credibility of a source  
a) Expertise  
b) Lack of conflict of interest  
c) Agreement among sources  
d) Reputation  
e) Use of established procedures  
f) Known risk to reputation  
g) Ability to give reasons  
h) Careful habits 
5. Observing and judging observation reports; 
criteria:  
a) Minimal inferring involved  
b) Short time interval between observation and 
report  
c) Report by observer, rather than someone 
else (ie. not hearsay)  
d) Records are generally desirable; if report is 
based on a record, it is  
a) generally best that  
2) The record was close in time to the 
observation  
3) The record was made by the observer  
4) The record was made by the reporter  
5) The statement was believed by the 
reporter, either because of a prior belief 
in its correctness or because of a belief 
that the observer was habitually correct  
e) Corroboration  
f) Possibility of corroboration  
g) Conditions of good access  
h) Competent employment of technology, if 
technology is useful 
i) Satisfaction by observer (and reporter, if a 
different person) of  
a) credibility criteria (item B4)  
6. Deducing and judging deductions  
a) Class logic  
b) Conditional logic  
c) Interpretation of statements  
1) Double negation  
2) Necessary and sufficient conditions  
3) Other logical words and phrases: only, 
if and only if, or, some, unless, not, not 
both, etc. 
7. Inducing and judging inductions  
a) Generalizing  
1) Typicality of data  
2) Limitation of coverage  
3) Sampling  
b) Inferring explanatory conclusions and 
hypotheses  
1) Types of explanatory conclusions and 
hypotheses  
a) Causal claims 
b) Claims about the beliefs and 
attitudes of people 
c) Interpretations of authors’ intended 
meanings 
d) Historical claims that certain 
things happened 
e) Reported definitions 
f) Claims that something is an 
unstated reason or unstated 
conclusion 
2) Investigating  
a) Designing experiments, including 
planning to control variables  
b) Seeking evidence and 
counterevidence  
c) Seeking other possible 
explanations  
3) Criteria: Given reasonable assumptions  
a) The proposed conclusion would 
explain the evidence (essential)  
b) The proposed conclusion is 
consistent with known facts 
(essential)  
c) Competitive alternative 
conclusions are inconsistent with 
known facts (essential)  
d) The proposed conclusion seems 
plausible (desirable)  
8. Making value judgements  
a) Background facts  
b) Consequences  
c) Prima facie application of acceptable 
principles  
d) Considering alternatives  
e) Balancing, weighing, and deciding  
9. Defining terms, and judging definitions in 
three dimensions  
a) Form  
1) Synonym  
2) Classification  
3) Range  
4) Equivalent expression  
5) Operational  
6) Example-nonexample  
b) Definitional strategy  
1) Acts  
a) Report a meaning (reported 
definition)  
b) Stipulate a meaning (stipulative 
definition) 
c) Express a position on an issue 
(positional, including 
programmatic and persuasive 
definition)  
2) Identifying and handling equivocation  
a) Attention to the context  
b) Possible types of response  
1. The simplest response: 
‘The definition is just 
wrong.’  
2. Reduction to absurdity: 
‘According to that 
definition, there is an 
outlandish result.’ 
3. Considering alternative 
interpretations: ‘On this 
interpretation, there is this 
problem; on that 
interpretation, there is that 
problem.’ 
4. Establishing that there are 
two meanings of key term 
and a shift in meaning 
from one to the other  
5. Swallowing the 
idiosyncratic definition  
c) Content  
10. Identifying assumptions  
a) Unstated reasons  
b) Needed assumptions; argument 
reconstruction 
11. Deciding on an action  
a) Define the problem  
b) Select criteria to judge possible solutions  
331 Ennis, ‘A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking 
Abilitites and Dispositions.’, 12-15. 
c) Formulate alternative solutions  
d) Tentatively decide what to do  
e) Review, taking into account the total 
situation, and decide  
f) Monitor the implementation  
12. Interacting with others  
a) Employing and reacting to fallacy labels, 
including  
1) Circularity  
2) Appeal to authority  
3) Bandwagon  
4) Glittering term  
5) Name calling  
6) Slippery slope  
7) Post hoc  
8) Non sequitur  
9) Ad hominem  
10) Affirming the consequent  
11) Denying the antecedent  
12) Conversion  
13) Begging the question  
14)  Either - or  
15) Vagueness  
16) Equivocation  
17) Straw person  
18) Appeal to tradition  
19) Argument from analogy  
20) Hypothetical question  
21) Oversimplification  
22) Irrelevance  
b) Logical strategies  
c) Rhetorical strategies  
d) Argumentation; Presenting a position, oral 
or written  
1) Aiming at a particular audience and 
keeping it in mind  
2) Organising (common type: main point; 
clarification; reasons; alternatives; 
attempt to rebut prospective challenges; 
summary, including repeat of main 
point)331
Appendix 2: The Delphi Report’s ‘Consensus Statement Regarding Critical Thinking 
and the Ideal Critical Thinker’ 
We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in 
interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, 
conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that 
judgment is based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating force in 
education and a powerful resource in one’s personal and civic life. While not synonymous with 
good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-rectifying human phenomenon. The ideal critical 
thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-
minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing 
to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant 
information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking 
results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit. Thus, 
educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It combines developing CT 
skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield useful insights and which are 
the basis of a rational and democratic society. 
Appendix 3: The Delphi Report’s ‘Affective Dispositions of Critical Thinking’ 
(numbers added) 
Approaches to life and living in general: 
1. inquisitiveness with regard to a wide range of issues,  
2. concern to become and remain generally well-informed, 
3. alertness to opportunities to use CT, 
4. trust in the processes of reasoned inquiry, 
5. self-confidence in one’s own ability to reason, 
6. open-mindedness regarding divergent world views,  
7. flexibility in considering alternatives and opinions, 
8. understanding of the opinions of other people, 
9. fair-mindedness in appraising reasoning, 
10. honesty in facing one’s own biases, prejudices, stereotypes, egocentric or 
sociocentric tendencies, 
11. prudence in suspending, making or altering judgments, 
12. willingness to reconsider and revise views where honest reflection suggests that 
change is warranted.  
Approaches to specific issues, questions or problems:  
1. clarity in stating the question or concern, 
2. orderliness in working with complexity, 
3. diligence in seeking relevant information,   
4. reasonableness in selecting and applying criteria, 
5. care in focusing attention on the concern at hand, 
6. persistence though difficulties are encountered, 
7. precision to the degree permitted by the subject and the circumstance. 
 
  
Appendix 4: Richard Paul’s Intellectual and Moral Virtues of the Critical Person 
1. Intellectual Humility: Having a consciousness of the limits of one’s knowledge, including a 
sensitivity to circumstances in which one’s native egocentrism is likely to function self-
deceptively; sensitivity to bias, prejudice, and limitations of one’s viewpoint. Intellectual humility 
depends on recognizing that one should not claim more than one actually knows. It does not imply 
spinelessness or submissiveness. It implies the lack of intellectual pretentiousness, boastfulness, 
or conceit, combined with insight into the logical foundations, or lack of such foundations, of one’s 
beliefs. 
  
2. Intellectual Courage: Having a consciousness of the need to face and fairly address ideas, beliefs, 
or viewpoints toward which we have strong negative emotions and to which we have not given a 
serious hearing. This courage is connected with the recognition that ideas considered dangerous 
or absurd are sometimes rationally justified (in whole or in part) and that conclusions and beliefs 
inculcated in us are sometimes false or misleading. To determine for ourselves which is which, we 
must not passively and uncritically “accept” what we have “learned.” Intellectual courage comes 
into play here, because inevitably we will come to see some truth in some ideas considered 
dangerous and absurd, and distortion or falsity in some ideas strongly held in our social group. We 
need courage to be true to our own thinking in such circumstances. The penalties for non-
conformity can be severe. 
 
3. Intellectual Empathy: Having a consciousness of the need to imaginatively put oneself in the place 
of others in order to genuinely understand them, which requires the consciousness of our 
egocentric tendency to identify truth with our immediate perceptions or long-standing thought or 
belief. This trait correlates with the ability to reconstruct accurately the viewpoints and reasoning 
of others and to reason from premises, assumptions, and ideas other than our own. This trait also 
correlates with the willingness to remember occasions when we were wrong in the past despite an 
intense conviction that we were right, and with the ability to imagine our being similarly deceived 
in a case at hand. 
 
4. Intellectual Good Faith (Integrity): Recognition of the need to be true to one’s own thinking; to 
be consistent in the intellectual standards one applies; to old one’s self to the same rigorous 
standards of evidence and proof to which one holds one’s antagonists; to practice what one 
advocates for others—and to honestly admit discrepancies and inconsistencies in one’s own 
thought and action.  
 
5. Intellectual Perseverance: Willingness and consciousness of the need to pursue intellectual 
insights and truths in spite of difficulties, obstacles and frustrations; firm adherence to rational 
principles despite the irrational opposition of others; a sense of the need to struggle with confusion 
and unsettled questions over an extended period of time to achieve deeper understanding or insight. 
 
6. Faith in Reason: Confidence that, in the long run, one’s own higher interests and those of 
humankind at large will be best served by giving the freest play to reason, by encouraging people 
to come to their own conclusions by developing their own rational faculties; faith that, with proper 
encouragement and cultivation, people can learn to think for themselves, to form rational 
viewpoints, draw reasonable conclusions, think coherently and logically, persuade each other by 
reason and become reasonable persons despite the deep-seated obstacles in the native character of 
the human mind and in society as we know it. 
 
7. Fairmindedness: Willingness and consciousness of the need to treat all viewpoints alike, without 
reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested interests of one’s 
friends, community, or nation, implies adherence to intellectual standards without reference to 
one’s own advantage or the advantage of one’s group.332 
  
332 Paul, “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship.” 169-170. 
Appendix 5: Chapters of Critical Thinking Textbooks
1. Critical Reasoning: Understanding 
and Criticizing Arguments and 
Theories, Jerry Cederblom and David 
W. Paulsen333 
1. Deciding what to believe 
2. The anatomy of arguments: 
Identifying premises and 
conclusions 
3. Understanding arguments 
through reconstruction 
4. Evaluating arguments: Some 
basic questions 
5. When does the conclusion 
follow? A more formal 
approach to validity 
6. Fallacies: Bad arguments that 
tend to persuade 
7. “That depends on what you 
mean by…” 
8. Arguments that are not 
deductive: Induction and 
statistical reasoning 
9. Causal, analogical, and 
convergent arguments: Three 
more kinds of nondeductive 
reasoning 
10. Explanation and the criticism 
of theories 
11. Putting it all together: Six steps 
to understanding and 
evaluating arguments 
12. Making reasonable decisions 
as an amateur in a world of 
specialists 
 
2. Critical Thinking, Brooke Noel Moore, 
Richard Parker334 
1. What is critical thinking, 
anyway? 
2. Two kinds of reasoning 
3. Clear thinking, critical 
thinking, and clear writing 
4. Credibility 
333 Jerry Cederblom and David Paulsen, Critical Reasoning: Understanding and Criticizing 
Arguments and Theories, 7th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2012). 
334 Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker, Critical Thinking, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2009). 
335 Richard L Epstein and Carolyn Kernberger, Critical Thinking (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 
2006). 
336 Tracy Bowell and Gary Kemp, Critical Thinking a Concise Guide, 4th ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2015). 
5. Persuasion through rhetoric: 
Common devices and 
techniques 
6. More rhetorical devices: 
Psychological and related 
fallacies  
7. More fallacies 
8. Deductive arguments I: 
Categorical logic 
9. Deductive arguments II: Truth-
functional logic 
10. Three kinds of inductive 
arguments 
11. Causal explanation 
12. Moral, legal, and aesthetic 
reasoning 
 
3. Critical Thinking, Richard L. 
Epstein335 
1. Critical thinking 
2. What are we arguing about? 
3. What is a good argument? 
4. Repairing arguments 
5. Is that true? 
6. Compound claims 
7. Counterarguments 
8. General claims 
9. Concealed claims 
10. Too much emotion 
11. Fallacies 
12. Reasoning by analogy 
13. Numbers? 
14. Generalizing 
15. Cause and effect 
16. Evaluating reasoning 
17. Composing good arguments 
18. Making decisions 
 
4. Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide, 
Tracy Bowell and Gary Kemp336 
1. Introducing arguments 
2. Language and rhetoric 
3. Logic: Deductive validity 
4. Logic: Probability and 
inductive reasoning 
5. The practice of argument-
reconstruction 
6. Issues in argument-assessment 
7. Pseudo-reasoning 
8. Truth, knowledge and belief 
 
5. Critical Thinking: An Appeal to 
Reason, Peg Tittle337 
1. Critical thinking 
2. The nature of argument 
3. The structure of argument 
4. Relevance 
5. Language 
6. Truth and Acceptability 
7. Generalization, Analogy, and 
general principle 
 
6. Critical Thinking and Everyday 
Argument, Jay Verlinden338 
1. Argumentation 
2. Critical thinking 
3. Ethics in argumentation 
4. Introduction to argumentative 
fallacies 
5. Formal logic: The classical 
structure of arguments 
6. The Toulmin model of 
argumentation 
7. Forms of reasoning 
8. Propositions and stock issues 
9. Evidence 
10. Language and argumentation 
11. Refutation 
12. Persuasive public speaking 
13. Critical listening 
14. Dyadic argumentation 
15. Argumentation and small 
groups 
16. The scientific method and 
critical thinking 
17. Inductive argument: causal 
Reasoning 
 
7. Critical Thinking Skills: Developing 
Effective Analysis of Argument, Stella 
Cottrell339 
1. What is critical thinking? 
2. How well do you think? 
Develop your thinking skills 
337 Peg Tittle, Critical Thinking: An Appeal to Reason (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
338 Jay Verlinden, Critical Thinking and Everyday Argument (Boston: Wadsworth, 2005). 
339 Stella Cottrell, Critical Thinking Skills. Developing Effective Analysis and Argument, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
340 Paul and Elder, Critical Thinking Skills for College Life: Tools for Taking Charge of Your 
Learning and Your Life. 
3. What’s their point? Identifying 
arguments 
4. Is it an argument? Argument 
and non-argument 
5. How well do they say it? 
Clarity, consistency and 
structure? 
6. Reading between the lines: 
Recognising underlying 
assumptions and implicit 
arguments 
7. Does it add up? Identifying 
flaws in the argument 
8. Where’s the proof? Finding 
and evaluating sources of 
evidence 
9. Critical reading and note-
making: Critical selection, 
interpretation and noting of 
source material 
10. Critical, analytical writing: 
Critical thinking while writing 
11. Where’s the analysis? 
Evaluating critical writing 
12. Critical reflection 
 
8. Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking 
Charge of Your Learning & Your Life, 
Richard Paul and Linda Elder340 
1. Becoming a fairminded thinker 
2. The first four stages of 
development 
3. Self-understanding 
4. The parts of thinking 
5. The standards for thinking 
6. Asking questions that lead to 
good thinking 
7. Master the thinking, master the 
content 
8. Discover how the best thinkers 
learn 
9. Redefining grades as levels of 
thinking and learning 
10. Making decisions and solving 
problems 
11. Deal with your irrational mind 
12. How to detect media bias and 
propaganda 
13. Fallacies: the art of mental 
trickery & manipulation 
14. Developing as an ethical 
reasoner 
15. Learning & using information 
critically & ethically, part one 
16. Learning & using information 
critically & ethically, part two 
17. Strategic thinking, part one 
18. Strategic thinking, part two 
19. Becoming an advanced thinker 
 
9. Invitation to Critical Thinking, Joel 
Rudinow and Vincent E. Barry341 
1. Critical thinking 
2. Language 
3. Argument 
4. Argument analysis I: 
Representing argument 
structure 
5. Argument analysis II: 
Paraphrasing arguments 
6. Evaluating deductive 
arguments I: Categorical logic 
7. Evaluating deductive 
arguments II: Truth functional 
logic 
8. Evaluating inductive 
arguments I: Generalization 
and analogy 
9. Evaluating inductive 
arguments II: Hypothetical 
reasoning and burden of proof 
10. Evaluating premises: Self-
evidence, consistency and 
indirect proof 
11. Informal fallacies I: 
Assumptions, language, 
relevance, and authority 
12. Informal fallacies II: Inductive 
reasoning 
13. Making your case: 
Argumentative composition 
 
10. Introduction to Logic and Critical 
Thinking, Merrilee H. Salmon342 
1. Introduction to arguments 
2. Paying special attention to the 
language of arguments 
3. Deductive arguments, 
inductive arguments, and 
fallacies 
341 Rudinow and Barry, Invitation to Critical Thinking. 
342 Merrilee H. Salmon, Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking, 6th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 
2013). 
343 Bailin and Battersby, Reason in Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking. 
344 Munson and Black, The Elements of Reasoning. 
4. A closer look at inductive 
arguments 
5. Causal arguments 
6. Probabilities and inductive 
logic 
7. Confirmation of hypotheses 
8. Deductive reasoning—
sentential logic 
9. Categorical syllogisms 
10. Quantifiers and arguments in 
which validity depends on 
relationships 
 
11. Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry 
Approach to Critical Thinking, Sharon 
Bailin and Mark Battersby343 
1. The Nature and Value of 
Inquiry 
2. Introducing Guidelines for 
Inquiry 
3. Arguments and their Structure 
4. Inductive Arguments and 
Fallacies 
5. Key Argument Types 
6. Credible Sources and Appeals 
to Experts 
7. Identifying the Issue 
8. Understanding the Case: 
Reasons and Context 
9. Evaluating the Arguments 
10. Making a Judgment and 
Making a Case 
 
12. The Elements of Reasoning, Ronald 
Munson and Andrew Black344 
1. Recognizing arguments 
2. Analyzing arguments 
3. Evaluating arguments 
4. Some valid argument forms 
5. More valid argument forms: 
Categorical reasoning and 
Venn diagrams 
6. Causal analysis 
7. Argument by analogy and 
models 
8. Errors in reasoning: Fallacies 
9. Definition 
10. Vagueness and ambiguity 
11. Reasonable beliefs 
12. Rules for writing 
13. The Miniature Guide to Critical 
Thinking Concepts & Tools, Richard 
Paul and Linda Elder345 
1. Why Critical Thinking 
2. The Elements of Thought 
3. A Checklist for Reasoning 
4. Questions Using the Elements 
of Thought 
5. Criteria for Evaluating 
Reasoning 
6. Universal Intellectual 
Standards 
7. Analyze the Logic of Articles 
and Textbooks 
8. The Problem of Egocentric 
Thinking 
9. Intellectual Traits 
10. Three Kinds of Questions 
11. A Template for Problem-
Solving 
12. A Checklist for Assessment 
13. What Critical Thinkers 
Routinely Do 
14. Stages of Critical Thinking 
Development 
 
14. Think Critically, Peter Facione and 
Carol Ann Gittens346 
1. The power of critical thinking 
2. Skilled and eager to think 
3. Solve problems and succeed in 
college 
4. Clarify ideas and concepts 
5. Analyze arguments and 
diagram decisions 
6. Evaluate the credibility of 
claims and sources 
7. Evaluate arguments: The four 
basic tests 
8. Evaluate Deductive reasoning 
and spot deductive fallacies 
9. Evaluate inductive reasoning 
and spot inductive fallacies 
10. Think heuristically: Risks and 
benefits of snap judgements 
11. Think reflectively: Strategies 
for decision making 
12. Comparative reasoning: Think 
“this is like that” 
13. Ideological reasoning: Think 
“top down” 
14. Empirical Reasoning: Think 
“bottom up”  
15. Write sound and effective 
arguments 
  
345 Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and Tools, 
Thinking, 2008. 
346 Peter A Facione and Carol Ann Gittens, Think Critically (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Pearson Education, 2013). 
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